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The impact of biotechnology can be compared to that of the Industrial Revolution
two centuries ago. Nowhere is this more evident than in the food and drug indus-
tries. Genetic modification of crops has become so commonplace that a wide
variety of products in an average supermarket now contains ingredients produced
or affected by genetic engineering. The development of many pharmaceutical
products results from biotechnological manipulation of the genetic codes for
natural plant compounds.
The international trade in genetic resources is significant. The global market for
pharmaceuticals alone is more than US$300 billion a year. Like the Industrial
Revolution, the biotechnology revolution has created a demand by corporations
for access to the resources of southern countries — with the difference that genetic
resources (genetic material containing the fundamental units of heredity) rather
than natural resources (timber, minerals, fish) are the prize today. For their part,
countries providing genetic resources haven't forgotten the price paid by many
southern countries during and before the Industrial Revolution: colonization by
European countries. Control over access to plant genetic resources and sharing in
the benefits from their use are extraordinarily sensitive issues.
In the rush to develop global policies that deal with access to genetic resources,
aquatic animals and plants have largely been overlooked. International agreements
such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Agreement on
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) have been largely
driven by agricultural and pharmaceutical agendas, and have tended to treat
aquatic matters as an afterthought. The same trend appears to be occurring in the
development of national strategies for biodiversity management and of laws regu-
lating access to genetic resources.
Plant genetic resources have received far more press than aquatic ones for good
reason: scientific understanding and commercial use of aquatic genetic resources
lag decades behind their plant counterparts. But this situation is changing fast.
Although industrial-scale aquaculture was virtually unknown 30 years ago, it's
now predicted that more than 40 per cent of global food fish production will come
from farms by 2020. Similarly, bioprospecting for marine organisms with value for
pharmaceutical or industrial applications lags far behind terrestrial bioprospecting
- but the quest for the holy grail of a cancer cure is a powerful incentive for
increased activity. Meanwhile, the natural capital of aquatic genetic diversity is
rapidly being eroded by overfishing and development, with species disappearing
before they are even known to humans.
While it is true that certain aspects of biodiversity and genetic resources policy
can apply equally to plants or fish, significant differences need to be taken into
account as well. For example, whereas seed companies can collect their genetic
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resources from international gene banks, fish farmers generally rely on wild popu-
lations to replenish their broodstock. The very different nature of aquatic genetic
resources (for example, hidden, migratory, publicly accessible) raises ownership
issues that may be different from those known to the plant world. Communities in
the areas where aquatic genetic resources are likely to be collected may have no
traditional knowledge that is useful to fish farmers or pharmaceutical companies -
yet some countries' laws make the sharing of useful traditional knowledge a
prerequisite for a community's right to benefit from providing access to genetic
resources.
These and many other distinctions between plant and aquatic genetic resources
deserve consideration by policy makers. In addition, the vacuum in policies for the
management and conservation of aquatic biodiversity needs to be addressed before
countries begin to contemplate putting access regulations in place. This book
offers an analysis of policy gaps and proposes approaches at the international,
national and community levels to providing a foundation for the conservation and
sharing of aquatic biodiversity.
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THE GENE RUSH:
Finding new value in aquatic biodiversity
The genetic manipulation of underwater life represents a quantum leap forward in
humans' use of aquatic biodiversity. Every year, scientists discover new ways and
new reasons to transfer genes not only between different fish species, but also
between much more distantly related organisms. The creators of the Super
Salmon, a transgenic Atlantic salmon that contains the genes of an Arctic flounder
and grows several times faster than wild stocks, have applied for US Food and
Drug Administration approval to market their invention to American consumers
(Moore, 2000). Fish genes have been transferred to fruits to make them more frost
resistant (Specter, 2000), and insect genes have been inserted into fish in an effort
to increase disease resistance (Fletcher et al, 1999). In 2003, an American
company secured regulatory approval to market the GloFish - a vivid, artificially
fluorescent ornamental fish created by injecting the eggs of zebra fish with a sea
anemone gene (Gong et al, 2003).
The creation of transgenic varieties is the most dramatic of several types of use
of genetic resources — genetic material containing functional units of heredity (eg
eggs, sperm, DNA). Fish biologists also use more conventional selective breeding
- combining the eggs and sperm from different populations of the same species -
to improve farmed stocks. For example, genetically improved tilapias developed
from broodstock collected in Africa are now widely farmed in Southeast Asia.
Government fisheries agencies, corporations and even some indigenous commu-
nities have started 'banks' of cryogenically frozen fish sperm to facilitate
commercial breeding and stock rebuilding, and to provide insurance against
extinctions.
Meanwhile, researchers hired by pharmaceutical companies continue to collect
and analyse marine organisms whose chemical compounds could provide the clues
needed for the invention of anti-cancer drugs, painkillers or a host of other
medicinal products. Deep in the ocean recently discovered bacterial communities
in hydrothermal vents are being tested for the ability of their enzymes to convert
harmful chemicals to safer derivatives, enabling the clean up of oil spills and
hazardous wastes (Glowka, 1998a).
The stakes are high. Global sales of pharmaceuticals exceed US$300 billion a
year (Laird, 2002). The global share of food fish production from aquaculture is
projected to rise to 41 per cent in 2020, up from 31 per cent in 1997 (Delgado et
al, 2003). The interest among aquarium hobbyists in Europe, Japan and North
America in cultured ornamental fish with never-before-seen colours and markings
is huge.
The variety of raw material for genetic modification of aquatic life is vast,
including fish germplasm and somatic cell DNA, tissue samples of marine
organisms such as snails or sponges to be screened for useful chemical compounds,
even aquatic plants and bacteria. In some cases, pharmaceutical companies have
succeeded in reducing the amounts of raw materials needed through technologies
such as chemical recombination, while the most common ornamental species such
as neon tetras have been bred in captivity through so many generations that there
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is little if any need for wild broodstock. While it's not clear precisely how great the
demand for aquatic genetic resources will be in the future, the explosion in new
uses suggests that it will increase significantly.
What is clear is that the trade in aquatic genetic resources requires clear policy
direction. There are many players with different and sometimes competing prior-
ities. Commercial and academic researchers need to know the rules for obtaining
access to the raw material in the wild, and so do the local communities where the
resources may be found. Complicating the task of developing workable access
policies is the fact that the real economic value of genetic resources lies not in the
physical material but in the knowledge of how to use it. Users of genetic resources
— a fish farmer who invents a new strain, a pharmaceutical company that develops
a new drug — protect their knowledge with a patent. But who protects the
knowledge of an indigenous community that a collector may need to speed the
process of developing an 'invention'?
Should genetic resources and the traditional knowledge of their uses be valued
separately in negotiations for access? If so, what's a fair price for each? Countries
around the world are grappling with questions like these as they struggle to
develop laws to regulate access to genetic resources. One question they usually
overlook, but which is becoming more and more relevant as new uses of aquatic
genetic resources proliferate, is: what differences between aquatic and plant
genetic resources do access rules need to take into account?
GENE DRAIN: Halting the erosion of genetic diversity
To many of us, newly announced products of genetic engineering can seem mirac-
ulous, outlandish and sometimes frightening. All the developments described
above have happened in the last 20 years, usually in the absence of clear regulatory
frameworks. It's hard to properly regulate new practices without fully under-
standing their long-term consequences. Scientists studying biodiversity
management repeatedly call for the application of the precautionary principle in
the use of aquatic biodiversity (Bartley and Pullin, 1999), but it takes a lot to
convince governments of the need for long-term risk assessment in the face of
short-term economic pressures. Governments even shy away from making the
small investment that it would take to bank fish germplasm as insurance against
extinctions, fearful that such an initiative might imply that they don't adequately
manage risks to fish populations (Harvey et al, 1998).
Genetic diversity within species is the foundation for aquaculture, pharmaceu-
tical development and for all the other existing and potential uses of aquatic
genetic resources, in addition to being valuable in its own right. The more genetic
diversity there is within a species, the greater the likelihood of characteristics that
may some day be invaluable for improvement of farmed stocks. For example, each
of the six species of Pacific salmon contains several hundred stocks, a small number
of which are currently considered commercially valuable. Salmon are sensitive to
minute changes in ocean temperatures. A stock that is capable of adapting to
warmer temperatures produced by climate change might be invaluable for aqua-
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culture in the future - provided science knows of its existence and it doesn't join
the hundreds of stocks that have already become extinct, unable to survive high-
tech harvesting practices or the habitat impacts of logging, mining, damming,
agricultural runoff or urban development.
'Sustainable development' has been a catchphrase for governments around the
world since the United Nation's (UN) Brundtland report made it popular in the
late 1980s (WCED, 1987). However, without concerted government action and
corporate buy-in, the natural capital needed for biotechnology will continue to
erode at an alarming rate. Many more marine species could be close to extinction
by 2050 if more isn't done to stem the increasing impact of high-technology
harvesting, especially in the deep sea (Pauly, 2003). One-fifth of freshwater fish
species is considered to be extinct or endangered (Heywood, 1995). Science may
have a better understanding today of the effects of human activities on aquatic life,
but governments and other stakeholders still need to find the determination and
resources to reduce those effects.
Somewhat ironically, the wide publicity given to advances in genetic sciences
and to new inventions such as the GloFish stands in sharp contrast to the lack of
knowledge about aquatic biodiversity. Aquatic science in general lags behind
terrestrial sciences in identifying species, understanding ecosystem relationships
and assessing potential uses for genetic resources. Communities of life on the
ocean floor are the least-understood ecosystems on the planet. The deep sea alone
may contain 10 million species that have yet to be described (Norse, 1993), and
perhaps only 45,000 out of a million freshwater species have been identified
(McAllister et al, 1997). Every year, some aquatic species become extinct before
science has even become aware of their existence. Too often, the underwater world
has been out of sight, out of mind when it comes to funding basic science and
developing policies for biodiversity management and conservation. When a rain-
forest is clear cut, the world takes notice; but when a trawler scours away all the
seabed life in its path, there's no one to see.
CONSERVING AND SHARING AQUATIC BIODIVERSITY:
Filling policy gaps
New uses of aquatic biodiversity require new policy approaches. The introduction
or expansion of food fish aquaculture, for example, creates the need for policy
makers to consider a wide variety of issues such as environmental impacts of fish
farming, potential health risks to consumers of genetically modified products,
access by fish farmers to wild broodstock and transfers of live broodstock from
their ecosystems of origin, research into the different genetic characteristics of
different wild stocks and conservation of wild genetic diversity.
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), signed by 188 countries
(the handful that have not signed includes the US) links these diverse policy issues
through its three objectives: the conservation of biological diversity; the
sustainable use of its components; and the fair and equitable sharing of the
benefits derived from the use of genetic resources. The CBD provides guidelines
OVERVIEW 5
for national policies and laws. Most countries are still a long way from imple-
menting them because of the complexity of creating legislation that is clear, widely
supported and enforceable.
Developing policy approaches that accommodate both capture fisheries and
aquaculture presents a challenge for policy makers. Governments are paying
increasing attention to aquaculture, but policy development has largely been
reactive - focusing on public concerns that attract the most publicity, such as envi-
ronmental impacts and genetic modification. Traditionally, managers of wild fish-
eries have been preoccupied with the management of fish stocks of greatest
importance to commercial fisheries. Sometimes that has meant casting a blind eye
to threats to other stocks that may possess important genetic material. And it is
only within the past decade that the true extent of genetic variability within species
has even been appreciated. Conserving the wild genetic diversity needed to
support sustainable capture fisheries and aquaculture and to maintain healthy
aquatic ecosystems means focusing on all stocks, not just those with current
economic importance.
Access to genetic resources of plants has become an important policy issue in
many countries. As food fish aquaculture expands and the demand for wild brood-
stock increases, clear policies on access need to be in place for aquatic genetic
resources as well. For these policies to work, countries will need to support the
research needed for better scientific understanding of aquatic ecosystems and will
need to develop sound policies for the management of aquatic genetic diversity.
International agreements such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) have provided a useful starting
point for approaches to sustainable management of aquatic biodiversity, but
national laws with teeth are much in need.
WHOSE TO SHARE?
Ownership and control of aquatic resources
Southern countries with the richest concentrations of biodiversity are usually the
primary providers of genetic resources, and northern countries with highly
developed technologies are the primary users. This applies particularly to crop
enhancement (through genetic modification of plant characteristics) and to the
development of pharmaceutical and industrial products through screening of
plant and marine samples for biological effects. It's less true of aquaculture,
primarily because fish are most successfully bred in conditions that most closely
approximate their original habitats — either in the same country or at similar lati-
tudes - and temperate regions have their share of potentially useful aquatic bio-
diversity.
Before the 1990s, genetic resources were generally considered common
property, available to all takers. The negotiation of the CBD led to some hard
bargaining. Developing countries noted that the responsibility for conserving
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biological diversity would fall primarily on their shoulders, both because it is most
heavily concentrated in the south and because many northern countries have
already made use of or used up their own natural assets (Atlantic cod stocks being
a case in point). Southern countries insisted on recognition of national sovereignty
over natural resources as a condition of signing the Convention, thus ensuring
control over access. (The Law of the Sea, which was also negotiated in the early
1990s, extends a country's sovereignty beyond its coastline to a maximum of 22.2
km and creates a 321.8 km Exclusive Economic Zone with exclusive exploration,
exploitation and management rights. Beyond that is the high sea, with open access
rights.)
National sovereignty over natural resources provides only a limited measure of
control. To commercial users of genetic resources, physical possession of genetic
material is usually secondary to the big prize: the patent on the resulting invention
(for example, an improved fish strain or process for creating a drug). The World
Trade Organization's (WTO) pressure on developing countries to agree to a
universal intellectual property law system in return for trade benefits has generated
considerable concern among developing countries that it's an attempt to bypass
their hard-won national sovereignty over genetic resources (Seiler and Dutfleld,
2002). According to some critics, the WTO agreement on Trade-related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is nothing more than an extension of the
'biopiracy that led to developing countries' demands for control over access to
their genetic resources in the first place.
THINKING LOCALLY:
Rights of indigenous and local communities
The first peoples naturally gravitated to areas with the greatest natural abundance;
consequently, coastal and inland aquatic biodiversity is most richly concentrated
in the traditional territories of indigenous peoples. The 'ecosystem approach' that
has recently come into favour in natural resource management planning is a scien-
tific validation of what was once a spiritual belief system for many indigenous
peoples. The CBD recognizes the importance of restoring and maintaining tradi-
tional ecosystem management practices of indigenous and local communities as an
important tool for conserving biological diversity. Obviously, this is easier said
than done. Many traditional communities have long since lost control over their
lands and resources and, as a consequence, have seen a gradual erosion of their
cultures, ecological knowledge and traditional livelihoods. In addition, the tradi-
tional fisheries of some coastal fishing communities continue to be depleted by
commercial offshore fleets. Today, fishing communities are among the poorest in
the world, and poverty is a big barrier to conservation. For a poor fisherman in the
Philippines, the choice between using illegal fishing methods and feeding his
family is no choice at all.
Through international agreements such as the CBD and UN Draft Declaration
on Indigenous Rights, there is greater recognition than ever before of the rights of
indigenous and local communities to control over land, natural resources and the
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use of traditional knowledge. However, translating principles into practice at the
national level is a very hard sell indeed. Canada and Australia have been engaged
for years in treaty-making with indigenous peoples; and a few other nations, such
as the Philippines and Bangladesh, have enacted comprehensive community rights
legislation. Most countries, however, have adopted a wait-and-see attitude, while
international discussions on the details of implementing the CBD continue. Apart
from the inevitable tensions between different levels of government (local,
regional, national) over control over natural resources management, the needs of
the poor do not always conform with the goals of the powerful.
The Convention takes a tentative step towards the recognition of community
rights. Article 8(j) encourages parties to the convention to encourage the sharing
of benefits from the use of genetic resources with indigenous and local commu-
nities whose knowledge contributes to that use. The logic behind this provision is
that users of plant genetic resources (for example, seed companies and pharmaceu-
tical companies) depend on access to traditional knowledge about crop strains or
medicinal uses of plants. The same cannot be said of users of aquatic genetic
resources. Agriculture dates back several thousand years; the history of aqua-
culture, with the notable exception of China, can be measured in decades. While
local fishermen may have extensive familiarity with the habits of aquatic life, this
type of knowledge may be irrelevant to fish farmers or scientists developing new
strains of cultured fish. Similarly, pharmaceutical researchers prospecting for
marine organisms may be looking for seabed creatures for which local commu-
nities have no traditional uses.
For national governments, the logic of linking community rights over access to
genetic resources to traditional knowledge is readily apparent: individuals or
groups have the right to control the use of their ideas. However, nation states own
biological resources (apart from those on private lands) in their physical state, and
the CBD calls on parties to the convention to facilitate access to genetic resources.
Providing more far reaching rights to communities might simply create regulatory
confusion and insurmountable barriers to access, in addition to eroding the
strength of national sovereignty for which developing countries fought so hard
during the CBD negotiations. Industrial countries are even less inclined to expand
community rights over genetic resources. While much depends on variations in
political systems, democratic governments are not necessarily any more likely than
other forms of government to view expansion of community rights favourably. At
the most, communities may be given the opportunity for 'consultation' or 'input'
in the decision-making process.
Indigenous groups have divided views about the CBD. Some consider the
question of right to consent to access to genetic resources to be secondary to a
more fundamental issue: rights to ownership of and control over biological
resources in their traditional territories. Why, they ask, should indigenous
communities need to negotiate access to something that is theirs already? In 1993,
the Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples confirmed their
right to:
own, develop, control and use the land and territories, including the total
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environment of the lands, air, waters, coastal seas, sea ice, flora and fauna
and other resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise
occupied or used.
In 2001, the International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity declared that the
1993 UN Declaration represented the minimum acceptable standard, and that the
recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples is necessary to create the trust
needed to meet the CBD objective of access and benefit sharing (IIFB, 2001).
Some indigenous groups have called for an outright ban on bioprospecting
while human rights issues remain unresolved. And some cynics say that
indigenous communities that drive a hard bargain may be merely holding out for
an illusory 'pot of gold'. Diversity of motivation and of political agenda is as much
a characteristic of indigenous groups as of any sampling of human societies. But
motivation is really irrelevant. For access laws to be effective in the long run, some
reconciliation between the claims of indigenous rights movements and the reluc-
tance of governments to recognize them will be essential.
ACTING GLOBALLY:
Towards national laws on access to aquatic resources
Each of the 188 signatories of the CBD is expected to implement the Convention
through national laws and policies that set the rules for access to genetic resources
and lay the groundwork for negotiation of benefits in return. About 50 countries
are at various stages of development of these laws and policies. The small handful
of post-CBD laws that are already in place (all in southern countries) take a variety
of approaches to the management and sharing of biodiversity. For example, while
the Philippines and Brazil have enacted laws specific to access and benefit sharing,
Costa Rica and India have embedded access and benefit-sharing provisions in
comprehensive biodiversity management laws. Access rules typically cover
domestic as well as international collections, with more stringent rules for foreign
applicants.
For good reason, most countries have been taking a go-slow approach, waiting
for further guidance from CBD implementation bodies and from regional associ-
ations such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), while care-
fully observing the experience of the first countries out of the starting gate. Some
southern countries have been hesitant about setting rigorous access requirements
that may result in a loss of business if collectors of genetic resources (ornamental
fish, for example) can get what they want in countries with looser regulations.
What the go-slow approach means is that fisheries managers in many countries,
states and provinces may not yet have heard of the CBD, though they will
undoubtedly feel its effects in due course.
Regulatory obstacles to research are a serious concern for both commercial and
academic collectors and one of the most difficult challenges for policy makers. For
commercial collectors, the negotiated price of access to genetic resources must be
within reason, and the ability of collectors to pay depends very much on the use of
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the resource, the type of benefit to be negotiated, and the sheer time and effort it
takes to negotiate. A pharmaceutical company needs to consider that the odds of
developing a marketable drug from a collected sample might be one in 10,000 or
lower. Similarly, an aquaculture company collecting wild broodstock may have
little idea of the likelihood of achieving a desired commercial result. One reason
why the CBD takes such pains to mention non-monetary benefits such as tech-
nology transfer is that royalties may be an empty promise, while a significant up-
front payment may be intolerably burdensome for a commercial collector who is
making numerous collections, sometimes in several countries. In addition, devel-
oping countries have been anxious to acquire the technologies that will enable
them to further their own research and development expertise in the use of genetic
resources.
Academic researchers generally have far less capacity than corporations to make
generous deals with communities for access to genetic resources. Yet basic research
such as taxonomy is vital to a better understanding of the aquatic world. Drafters
of access laws have been struggling to develop effective ways to streamline the
approval process and to ease regulatory barriers to academic research, with limited
success. For several years after the Philippines passed the world's first access law in
1995, approval of access applications from both commercial and academic
researchers came to a virtual halt. Part of the challenge that legislative drafters face
is that it may be difficult to draw clear lines between commercial and academic
research. Pure academic research can lead to unexpected commercial applications,
academic institutions are becoming increasingly dependent on corporate financial
support, and many academics cross the line into commercial activities. This is as
true for aquatic-oriented businesses such as aquaculture or the development of
cancer drugs as it is for plant-based research.
A related challenge is how to define in law the rights of traditional communities
to provide or withhold consent to applications for access to genetic resources.
What is an indigenous or local community? Who speaks for it? How much infor-
mation and understanding does a community need to be capable of providing
prior informed consent to collections? What are the minimum standards, if any,
for reaching agreement with communities? Should the law distinguish between
biological resources and genetic resources? Does it matter whether or not the
community has traditional knowledge that the collector needs?
The latter issue in particular is problematical for the regulation of access to
aquatic genetic resources. Understandably, given that the use of aquatic genetic
resources is barely beginning, the development of national access laws appears to
have been largely based on the premise that 'genetic resources' means plant genetic
resources — and that collectors need traditional knowledge along with the resource.
A proposed Peruvian law assumes the provision of traditional knowledge to be a
prerequisite for the right to benefit sharing; the Philippines law requires consent
with or without traditional knowledge (but has been difficult to implement); and
the federal Brazilian law is ambiguous. Defining community rights to consent to
the use of genetic resources presents an enormous challenge for developing and
developed countries alike; dealing with aquatic genetic resources issues simply
adds another wrinkle to an already complicated task.
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It has largely fallen on the shoulders of developing countries to lead the way in
the formulation of access and benefit-sharing laws. Northern countries, as the
users, have less incentive to create a level playing field. The CBD calls on all parties
to ensure equitable access and benefit-sharing arrangements. Industrial countries
could help to do so by requiring applicants for patents involving genetic modifi-
cation to demonstrate that genetic resources have been acquired in compliance
with CBD principles and the laws of the provider country. In terms of aquatic
genetic resources, this would apply particularly to the collection of ornamental fish
and of marine organisms for pharmaceuticals research. In addition, certification
programmes might provide a useful complement to access and benefit-sharing
laws by ensuring that collectors of aquatic genetic resources have met appropriate
standards. Certification programmes have proven to be a highly effective means of
promoting responsible forest practices, and recently have been adapted to capture
fisheries under the auspices of the Marine Stewardship Council.
RESULTS THAT COUNT:
Meaningful benefits for fishing communities
It is in all our interests that agreements for access to aquatic genetic resources
promote the sustainable use of aquatic genetic resources and the conservation of
aquatic genetic diversity. It may not be enough for governments merely to set
minimum standards for the negotiation of fair agreements with fishing commu-
nities. While it will be up to communities to determine in each instance what
benefits are satisfactory, governments could help ensure productive negotiations
(and thereby facilitate access) by, for example, providing negotiation training and
developing policy approaches to support a wide range of monetary and non-
monetary benefits.
The promise of royalties might be seductive for communities with little under-
standing of the odds against the development of a marketable product (roughly
estimated to be one in 10,000 in pharmaceutical research). Up-front and periodic
payments are financial alternatives if collectors are willing to take the gamble that
they'll pay off. Local people may also gain some financial benefit if they are
employed in the collection of aquatic genetic resources. The CBD and some
national laws suggest that financial benefits should be used in ways that promote
sound biodiversity management. What might these be? Funding for basic social
needs such as health care and schooling, while it may not appear to be directly
related to biodiversity management, may be the most important step of all in
increasing the capacity of communities to develop conservation-based economies.
Healthy, educated communities can better participate in the decisions that affect
their lives on both a local and a global level.
The type of technology transfer that is useful at the national level — such as the
training of scientists in techniques for drug development or genetic modification -
is likely to be irrelevant to indigenous and local communities. However, access to
low technologies and training can be extremely useful, especially if they enable
the development of sustainable fishing livelihoods and are based on a clear
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understanding of community characteristics and needs. What kinds of training or
technologies could be involved? One example is the training that the South East
Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) provided to a Philippines
community to start up a successful and low impact mud crab farming operation.
SEAFDEC was also instrumental in working with local communities in another
part of the Philippines to establish no-fish areas (Agbayani et al, 2000). In another
example, Project Seahorse provided the training and technical support needed for
another Philippines fishing community to set up a seahorse ranching operation
that not only provides sustainable livelihoods, but also enhances wild seahorse
populations (Project Seahorse, 2000). In Brazil, Project Piaba has been instru-
mental in helping fishing communities on the Rio Negro practise a sustainable
ornamentals industry that contributes to the protection of the rainforest
ecosystem (Chao et al, 2001).
What these solutions have in common is that they involve a hand up rather than
a handout — making available technology and training that are appropriate to local
conditions and culture, and providing the means for local entrepreneurship to get
a toe-hold. A little economic power can go a long way in helping to empower
communities generally. It may take a lot of toe-holds to break the cycle of poverty
and nurture conservation-based, small-scale fishing economies in countless
communities. However, the alternative — a continuing wasting away of aquatic
biological diversity by groups with little or no self-interest in conservation - is
unacceptable in a world where virtually all nations have expressed agreement with
the principle of sustainable economies, sustainable ecosystems and sustainable
communities.
The phrase 'act locally never took on more urgent meaning. The real challenge in
the future will be getting the most powerful countries and the most influential multi-
national corporations on board. In 2002, US Department of State guidelines
suggested that American researchers abroad obtain the written consent of indigenous
communities prior to collecting genetic resources. The irony of that advice is huge.
The most powerful country in the world is one of a very small handful of countries
to decline to endorse the CBD, which set the ground-rules to which the state
department guidelines refer - and US recalcitrance has contributed mightily to the
difficulty developing countries have faced in implementing the CBD.
The success of sustainable livelihoods projects is likely to depend on a clear
understanding of the cultural background of a community, ensuring widespread
participation in and support for a proposed venture, and designing enterprises that
build on traditional community practices and knowledge. A study commissioned
by FAO (2001) found that the degree to which fisheries management practices or
policies strengthen or weaken small-scale fisheries is directly related to the level of
understanding of community fishing cultures. The study found that traditional
fishing communities generally share two common characteristics: a detailed and
function oriented knowledge of aquatic systems and species important to the
community economy, and participation of the entire population, including
women, children and the elderly, in fishing, processing, marketing and distri-
bution. Ideally, the design of sustainable livelihoods projects takes into account
such community characteristics.
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Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and aquatic sciences institutes might
play a useful role as intermediaries in benefit-sharing negotiations with commu-
nities, helping to lay the foundation for sustainable fisheries livelihoods. And,
although the CBD has provided the impetus for governments to think about
community benefits that might contribute to both ecological and economic
sustainability, it would be short-sighted to limit such thinking to circumstances in
which communities provide access to genetic resources. The cold truth is that,
despite all the hopes for quick implementation of the CBD, ten years later there
are very few examples of tangible benefits to communities resulting from access
agreements for plant or aquatic genetic resources. Is the CBD promise of benefit
sharing for traditional communities a fiction? It's perhaps still too early to say, but
the signs so far haven't been encouraging.
The conservation and sustainable use of aquatic biodiversity on a global level
are crucial objectives, and governments need to take all steps possible to promote
the economic, social and cultural well-being of traditional fishing communities,
whether or not someone is seeking access to their genetic resources. If that involves
maintaining and restoring traditional practices, as envisioned by Article 8(j) of the
CBD, so much the better, but sustainable livelihoods do not need to be traditional
to be worthy of support. For example, it is estimated that almost all the annual
growth in total food fish production between now and 2020 will come from aqua-
culture, and much of that will occur in developing countries (Delgado et al, 2003).
Given that reality, governments should be taking steps to ensure that growth in
aquaculture benefits rather than disrupts traditional communities. One example
worth studying might be the initiative of the World Fish Center (described in a
case study in this book, Chapter 4) to provide training for small-scale pond
farmers in African or Asian countries in productive and ecologically sound
farming of species such as tilapia.
PUTTING PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE
As demands for access to aquatic genetic resources increase, it will be crucial to fill
significant policy gaps in the management of aquatic genetic resources and aquatic
biodiversity generally. Policy makers need to focus on several key areas: increasing
scientific knowledge, integrating traditional knowledge in policy development,
improving information gathering and sharing, increasing public and government
awareness of aquatic issues, defining and coordinating agency responsibilities and
ensuring broad stakeholder participation in policy making. In addition, countries
developing access and benefit-sharing policies will need to learn from the experi-
ences of their predecessors, paying particular attention to community rights to
prior informed consent, the relevance of traditional knowledge, and the provision
of institutional support for fair and effective benefit-sharing agreements between
fishing communities and collectors. Finally, all organizations with the power to do
so need to develop creative approaches to help traditional fishing communities
become self-reliant through technological solutions that are in tune with local
resources, means and culture.
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Policy makers face an enormous challenge in determining how to facilitate the
sustainable use of aquatic genetic resources in a manner that promotes conser-
vation and fair play. Much depends on trial and error, and there is no sure right
way or wrong way to achieve the CBD objectives. What matters most is the deter-
mination to do so, recognizing that biology trumps politics and nature bats last.
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A Note on the Case Studies
There's nothing like a story to flesh out an abstract concept. Case studies can be
extremely useful in illustrating problems and possible solutions in a 'real world'
context.
Each of the first six chapters in this book concludes with a case study. Each case
study highlights a distinct issue, although it may also illustrate themes discussed
elsewhere in the book. As part of the research for case studies 1 and 5, we visited
the countries in question (Brazil and the Philippines). The material for the
remaining case studies was compiled through interviews and literature reviews.
The following summary highlights some key points raised by the case studies:
CASE STUDY 1, CHAPTER 1
THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: Conserving the
ornamental fish industry in Barcelos, Brazil
The collection of ornamental fish such as cardinal tetras and cichlids is the primary
economic activity for small communities along the middle Rio Negro in the
Amazon Basin. The trade in ornamental fish contributes at least 60 per cent of
the total revenues of Barcelos, which is geographically the largest municipality in
the world, containing within its boundaries more than 120,000 km2 of largely
intact rainforest. Project Piaba, based at the University of the Amazon, has been
working with local communities to enhance the economic and environmental
sustainability of community ornamental fisheries.
To protect the fishery, Barcelos has banned activities such as logging and mining
that pose a potential threat to the habitat of ornamental fish, which migrate far
into the rainforest to spawn when river levels rise during the rainy season.
Assuming that the municipality is able to continue to stave off pressures for indus-
trial development of the Rio Negro basin, another threat from a far less obvious
source could have an equally devastating impact on the local fishery.
Southern Florida is a central hub of activity in the sale, distribution and
breeding of ornamental fish. To obtain broodstock for culturing, breeders can
simply purchase wild specimens in quantity from the wild trade that originates in
areas like the Rio Negro and is shipped out of Brazil by exporters in Manaus. In the
past, species such as cardinal tetras have been considered too difficult to breed
because of very specific habitat requirements. That all changed in 2000, when
Aquatica Tropicals took a Best-in-Show award after successfully breeding cardinal
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terras. Generally, cultured fish can be sold for a cheaper price than fish collected
from the wild, primarily because of the impact of transportation costs. Project
Piaba is concerned that, if the culturing of cardinal tetras becomes widespread, the
wild fishery along the Rio Negro will collapse for lack of a market. If that were to
happen, local people might have to turn to alternative, less 'environmentally
friendly' livelihoods, and the incentive of communities like Barcelos to conserve
aquatic ecosystems and keep out development might be considerably reduced.
What policy action, if any, should be taken to support the sustainability of the
Rio Negro ornamentals fishery? Should access to wild cardinal tetras used for
breeding purposes be regulated? This case study examines some of the policy
implications arising from this unusual set of circumstances.
CASE STUDY 2, CHAPTER 2
No POLICY, NO ACCESS? A salmon farmer's frustrated
efforts to collect genetically pure broodstock
Creative Salmon, an aquaculture business farming chinook salmon in British
Columbia, decided to enhance its stocks by cross-breeding them with Yukon River
chinook. What makes Yukon chinook desirable is the high oil content that is char-
acteristic of fish inhabiting Arctic waters - and an important asset for sale of
salmon to Japanese markets.
Because chinook populations mingle in the Yukon River on the way to their
separate spawning grounds, Creative Salmon applied to the Canadian
Department of Fisheries and Oceans to collect broodstock from smaller tributaries
where individual populations would already be separated out from the mixture in
the river mouth and lower stages of the river. The company could thus determine
later the source of desirable characteristics they hoped to amplify through
breeding.
The department refused the request to collect from isolated populations in trib-
utaries because it was concerned not only about setting a precedent for the
collection of samples outside areas open for fisheries, but also about the possibility
of subsequent collectors approaching First Nations bands for permission to collect
gametes (eggs and sperm) in areas with restricted fishing. Instead, the department
required Creative Salmon to purchase broodstock from licensed commercial
fishers harvesting mixed populations, thereby eliminating the company's chances
for genetically pure stock.
In some respects, Canada faces greater challenges than other countries in devel-
oping access policies that address the question of indigenous communities' rights
to prior informed consent and benefit sharing. The Canadian Constitution and
the courts recognize the existence of indigenous rights in traditional territories,
but the nature of these rights remains to be defined in a complex process of treaty
negotiations (especially in British Columbia) that may take decades to complete.
In addition, policy makers with thinly stretched resources have had little oppor-
tunity or incentive to develop comprehensive rules for access to aquatic genetic
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resources at a time when demand still remains relatively low. The same applies to
the development of policies governing gene banking.
Indigenous peoples are already sensitive about collections of biological resources
and research in their traditional territories. With a few exceptions, collection of
aquatic genetic resources in developed countries hasn't yet become a controversial
issue in the way it has for plant collections in developing countries, but it can be
expected to attract greater attention as the demand increases. Governments need
to anticipate such a trend in the course of policy making.
CASE STUDY 3, CHAPTER 3
AN INDIGENOUS COMMUNITY SAYS NO:
Negotiating access to charr broodstock in
northern Canada
In another part of northern Canada, the Inuit people along the Arctic coast
recently completed an agreement that recognizes both land and resource rights.
The Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) retains a role in the
management of sea-going fish, but communities have the right to prior informed
consent to collection offish broodstock.
Icy Waters, the major charr-farming company in the Arctic, proposed a joint
venture with Inuit communities and an Ontario university research group to set
up a new company, Suvaak Inc, to improve the company's existing broodstock,
based on previous DFO collections. Under the proposal, each of seven partici-
pating Inuit communities would receive a 5 per cent equity stake in the new
company in exchange for sperm from six male Arctic charr from two separate
stocks found in waters near the communities. Icy Waters suggested that Inuit
communities would also benefit through education and practical experience in
fish farming, and access to genetically improved stocks as these were developed.
The business proposal provided that each community would own its original fish
contribution but that hybrid lines resulting from cross-breeding would be owned
by Suvaaq. The proposed project would result in Icy Waters gaining access to a
total of 14 genetically distinct charr stocks through local communities.
Several difficult issues emerged during negotiations on the proposal. Local
fishermen worried that the sale of genetically improved farmed fish would have a
negative effect on markets and prices for wild-caught fish. Icy Waters attempted to
allay this fear by suggesting that successful farming could benefit local fisheries by
reducing commercial harvesting pressure on wild stocks, ensuring a valuable sport
fishery, and increasing consumer awareness of charr. Ownership issues added a
further complication. These included not only concerns about Suvaaq ownership
of successive generations of charr hybrids, but also the possibility that the
university research group might try to obtain a process patent based on genetic
mapping of charr. Mapping would accompany the collection of genetic resources
and was necessary in order to ascertain whether the genetic differences between the
collected populations were significant. Finally, some Inuit expressed concern that
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the project showed a lack of respect for charr and that the spirit of the charr might
take revenge on the Inuit people if the project went ahead, a not unusual
sentiment among native people who may accept technologies as a necessary evil
yet still feel uncomfortable with the spiritual implications of altering nature.
Ultimately, the communities withheld their consent and Icy Waters eventually
made other arrangements to obtain a more limited supply of charr broodstock
elsewhere.
Icy Waters described the failed negotiations as expensive and time-consuming,
complicated by the difficulty of dealing with several different levels of authority,
the need to negotiate with several communities over a vast land area, a high level of
confusion about the implications of fish farming and a long history of local
suspicion of outsiders from southern Canada. The case study illustrates the
magnitude of the challenge that collectors may currently face in preparing for and
conducting negotiations with indigenous communities - and hence the need for
careful planning. At present, every negotiation for access to aquatic genetic
resources is an experiment that can help inform the development of future access
rules and the development of support for successful negotiations through training
in negotiations and cross-cultural communication, etc.
CASE STUDY 4, CHAPTER 4
GENETIC IMPROVEMENT OF FARMED TILAPIA:
Lessons from the GIFT project
The International Center for Living Aquatic Resource Management (ICLARJVI,
now known as the World Fish Center) works with farmers, scientists and policy
makers to help the rural poor increase their income, preserve their environment
and improve their lives through the sustainable use of aquatic resources.
Tropical finfish currently account for about 90 per cent of global aquaculture
production for food. Most species currently farmed are genetically very similar to
wild, undomesticated stocks. For aquaculture to be able to meet the expected
global increase in demand for fish protein, there is a need for improved strains that
are faster-growing, resistant to disease and suited to a variety of pond-farming
conditions. The situation is analogous to the early days of agriculture.
Although the majority of Africans rely on fish as their primary source of animal
protein, pond farming has generally failed to flourish in Africa. Yet tilapia, a
species native to the continent, has proven to be one of the biggest success stories
in pond farming in many Asian countries (particularly the Philippines, China and
Thailand), where the fish's popularity has become so widespread that it's become
known as the 'aquatic chicken'. Tilapias are a major source of protein for the poor
in Thailand because they cost half as much as other freshwater species such as
catfish and snakehead.
Some of the recent success of farmed tilapia production in Asia is a result of a
breeding programme by ICLARM. In the early 1990s, ICLARM developed a new
strain of tilapia by cross-breeding several strains of Nile tilapia (Oreochromis
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niloticus). Neither genetically modified nor transgenic, the new strain has been
developed using traditional selective breeding methods under the Genetic
Improvement of Farmed Tilapia (GIFT) programme. Tilapias were first intro-
duced from Africa to Southeast Asia in the 1970s, and the GIFT strain was
developed from collections made in four African countries in the late 1980s and
four existing collections in the Philippines.
As the collections were made before the CBD came into effect, obtaining
consent from communities where the tilapias were collected wasn't yet an issue.
Two decades later, following a further series of ICLARM projects, tilapia farming
in rural Africa may finally be about to get a fresh start. In 2000, ICLARM began a
project to transfer GIFT's selective breeding technology from the Philippines to
sub-Saharan Africa and Egypt. The objectives of the new project were to train
African scientists on the use of the selective breeding technology that is the basis
for GIFT, initiate national breeding programmes, and develop strategies for the
dissemination of the GIFT technology and the genetically improved fish resulting
from it. This is a good example of the types of benefits that may be useful, at the
national level, to countries providing aquatic genetic resources for use in breeding
programmes. With the assistance of the International Network on Genetics in
Aquaculture (INGA), national research institutions in 13 developing countries in
Asia, Pacifica and Africa have now used the selection methods developed through
the GIFT project to initiate national breeding programmes for genetic
improvement of their indigenous cultured species (Gupta et al, 2000).
The GIFT project has made a valuable contribution to the availability of low-
cost food sources in several developing countries. The project also highlights
several issues that are central to making policies for the management of aquatic
biodiversity and sharing of genetic resources:
• Selective breeding of farmed fish stocks can play an important role not only in
ensuring cheap and abundant food supplies but also in promoting 'environ-
mentally friendly' aquaculture. (There is a world of difference between indus-
trial farming of salmon and rural pond farming in southern countries.)
• Breeders may target wild broodstock for collection in several locations and,
indeed, several countries. If projects like GIFT are to be feasible in the future,
countries providing genetic resources may find it useful to cooperate to avoid
the need for multiple negotiations with multiple communities.
• ICLARM started out with no direct commercial objectives yet years later trans-
ferred to a private consortium the right to market and sell an improved strain of
tilapia. What started out as a philanthropic exercise eventually took on a
commercial aspect. Although there is no doubt that the GIFT project provided
significant social benefits, governments in provider countries need to be careful
about distinguishing between collections for academic and commercial
purposes, recognizing that there may be considerable cross-over.
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CASE STUDY 5, CHAPTER 5
COMMUNITY RIGHTS vs RESEARCH CHILL: The Philippine
experience with access and benefit-sharing legislation
In 1995, the Philippines became the first country to enact an access and benefit-
sharing law, following forceful advocacy by community groups, civil society orga-
nizations, and support from a president who wanted to make his mark at a time
when biopiracy had become a hot topic in his country. The challenges the
Philippines has faced during the initial years of the implementation of Executive
Order 247 hold useful lessons for policy makers generally and in particular for
those dealing with access to genetic resources in fishing communities.
Executive Order 247 was carefully prepared, with participation by a broad
range of stakeholders, and at first glance appears to be a logical and straightforward
approach to facilitating access to genetic resources. As so often with the implemen-
tation of legislation that represents a major change to the status quo, the devil has
been in the details, and the details here are many. At the very least, the difficulties
experienced in implementing EO247 suggests that, to be effective, access and
benefit-sharing laws need to:
• Provide for an efficient process without unreasonable delays.
• Ensure the availability of adequate government resources to implement and
enforce enabling regulations and to process applications expeditiously.
• Ensure that distinctions between academic and commercial research are clear
and that academic research applications can proceed without unnecessary
obstacles.
• Provide adequate support for the negotiation of prior informed consent at the
community level.
• Clearly define the scope of the legislation with regard to the genetic resources to
which it applies.
CASE STUDY 6, CHAPTER 6
SHAPING NEGOTIATION TOOLS: A marine bioprospecting
agreement in Fiji
Laws requiring the consent of indigenous and local communities to collections of
genetic resources mean nothing unless they lead to workable agreements. The
effectiveness of future laws and regulations will depend very much on the lessons
learned from real-life examples of agreements. In Fiji, the chemistry department of
the University of the South Pacific (USP) teamed up with the World Wide Fund
for Nature to develop a research project that would advance scientific knowledge
while promoting community development and community-based conservation,
emphasizing best practices for benefit sharing with communities.
The Fiji constitution recognizes indigenous rights over all resources located in
fishing grounds, including the seabed. USP had been doing research for years on
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the isolation from plants used for medicinal purposes and wanted to extend its
work into the marine area. To facilitate this objective, USP approached
Smith—Kline Beecham, a pharmaceutical company involved in the collection of
marine samples. Although Fiji had no policy on bioprospecting at the time,
government departments came to the support of the project by agreeing to adopt
a regulatory role that would define the approval process and ensure that the rights
of communities were protected.
The resulting agreements with the indigenous community of Verata set detailed
procedures for prior informed consent by the community to any research activity
and provided for both monetary and non-monetary benefits, including assistance
with the development of village-based enterprises and the establishment of a
marine conservation area to allow overfished stocks to recover.
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Chapter 1
The Gene Rush: Finding New Value
in Aquatic Biodiversity
Salmon gene banking in bear country, British Columbia (Photo by Monica Maclsaac)
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Out of sight, out of mind. Nowhere does the saying seem more appropriate than
in the way we treat underwater life. Our scientific understanding of aquatic
biodiversity lags far behind our knowledge of terrestrial life. Naturally, we're
quicker to understand the potential for commercial exploitation than we are to
decipher and deal with threats to aquatic biodiversity. Food fish aquaculture,
which barely existed three decades ago, has since emerged as the fastest growing
food industry. Along the ocean floor, the modern equivalent of the gold
prospector is the pharmaceutical company researcher, sifting through samples of
sponges, ascidians and other bottom-dwelling organisms in the hope of finding
cures for cancer and other diseases. As in the plant world, advances in genetics
signal that we've barely scratched the surface in our quest for new (and often
controversial) uses for aquatic life, whether plugging a flounder gene into a straw-
berry to increase its resistance to frost or finding a way to use deep sea micro-
organisms to gobble up oil spills.
We are quickly learning how to expand our uses for the still largely untapped
capital of the waters of the planet. But do we really know how to conserve that
capital as an investment for the future? If we managed our financial assets the way
we manage biological ones, we'd be going down the road to bankruptcy. Generally,
global policies for the management of aquatic biodiversity are muddled, reactive
and without teeth. Why? Largely because policy makers often lack access to the
biological understanding needed for informed decisions and because governments
typically cater to the noisiest and most influential 'stakeholders'. There's nothing
new about this reality, of course, but no one really likes to admit that it's so.
Understanding the current and potential values of any resource, as well as the
threats that jeopardize those values, is the first step towards sound policy devel-
opment. This chapter describes a diversity of new uses that humans are finding for
aquatic biodiversity as well as the not-so-new human threats that continue to
undermine the integrity of biological and genetic diversity. The chapter concludes
with a case study on the ornamental fish industry in the Rio Negro in Brazil. The
study illustrates just how difficult it can be to develop adequate strategies for the
conservation and appropriate use of aquatic biodiversity in the face of ever
advancing technologies. The Rio Negro story also illustrates the important role
that rural communities can play in ensuring the sustainable management of
aquatic biodiversity - a theme that we'll continue to develop throughout this
book.
Why is genetic diversity so important?
Biological diversity is the sum total of genes, species and ecosystems — what has
been described as the great evolving web of life made up of interdependent, fragile
strands. Break a thread, and the strength of the whole suffers. Genetic diversity
(genetic variability within species) holds the web together and can repair small
breaks. Today, we hear a lot about the sustainable use of natural resources — and
that means maintaining the biological and genetic diversity that provides the
natural capital for human economies.
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The diversity of aquatic life
The approximately 1.5 million living species that have been identified to date
represent a tenth or less of the total number estimated to exist (Wilson, 1999).
Largely because aquatic creatures inhabit a hidden world, far less is known about
marine and freshwater species than about terrestrial ones.
Named terrestrial species outnumber those in ocean environments by seven to
one, but the deep sea alone may contain 10 million species that have yet to be
described (Norse, 1993). Communities of life on the ocean floor are the least
understood ecosystems on the planet. Many of the deeper parts of the ocean are
largely beyond the frontier of existing knowledge. Scuba divers can't work below
about 92 m - about 1/250th of the depth of the deepest parts of the oceans. New
forms of ocean life are constantly being discovered. It was only 25 years ago that life
was found to exist in hydrothermal vents, approximately 2500 m below the surface,
in international waters off Ecuador's Galapagos Islands. That led to identification of
many new species of marine organisms, including bacteria adapted to life in near
boiling water mixed with toxic chemicals issuing from the vents. Unique forms of
tubeworms, crabs and clams that feed on the bacteria may be only the first of a
multitude of other species to be discovered in vent ecosystems (Glowka, 1998a).
Freshwater systems are no less rich in the diversity of species that inhabit them.
Perhaps 45,000 out of a million freshwater species have been described (McAllister
et al, 1997). The abundance of aquatic life in coral reefs is far surpassed in many
tropical rivers (Revenga et al, 2000). Freshwater ecosystems account for only about
I/100,000th of the water on the planet, yet contain an estimated 12 per cent of all
animal species and 40 per cent of all recognized fish species (Abramovitz, 1995).
As with terrestrial biodiversity, the diversity of life varies with geographical
location: in both marine and freshwater ecosystems, the number and diversity of
tropical species is far greater than in northern waters.
Although there are many more species on land than in water (May, 1988), more
than half of all vertebrates are fishes. With the number of known marine and fresh-
water fish species currently around 25,000 and climbing (Nelson, 1994), there is
clearly a high biological diversity at both the species and ecosystem levels. And
scientific research is only now beginning to show the extent of genetic variation
within aquatic species.
Conserving species and populations: the key to genetic
diversity
The bigger the number of species lost, the greater the risk of fragmenting
ecosystems irreparably. If one species disappears, another may increase in number
to take its place, but if several are eliminated, something like a biological domino
effect may occur. The elimination of a snail or trout or salmon species can trigger a
cascading effect throughout the food chain that eventually leads other species to
diminish or disappear as well. The diversity of biological systems helps ensure that
a gap in an ecosystem is gradually filled and that eventually it is restored, if not to
its original condition, then to a new and equally stable state.
26 BLUE GENES
Each individual in a species contains a vast number of genes - more than
700,000 in some animals (Wilson, 1988) — and this genetic diversity within and
among animals enables populations to adapt to local environmental conditions.
Each biological species is a closed gene pool — there is no significant exchange of
genes between species in the natural world. But within species, genes are
constantly exchanged and evolving. Different species of cone snail, for example,
have developed different types of venom to suit their needs - depending perhaps
on the types of predator and prey they encounter in a variety of ocean ecosystems.
These adaptations are passed on, and ultimately further altered, through innu-
merable generations. A population of neon tetras in a Brazilian river may develop
a different coloration than its downstream neighbours, perhaps ensuring better
chances of survival in local conditions. Unfortunately for the fish, the rarer the
population and its colouring, the more likely it is to be highly prized by discrimi-
nating collectors of ornamental fish. Variations in colorations and markings are
produced by variations in genetic structures. A local ornamental fish population's
desirable characteristic is a genetic resource.
When a species loses too many individuals, it becomes genetically more
uniform and less adaptable to changing ecological conditions such as, in the case
of an aquatic species, ocean warming or increased turbidity. That essential genetic
diversity within a species - the quality that enables it to fill an ecological niche -
evolves over hundreds of millions of years. Yet it takes only a blip in history to
damage it beyond repair.
Scientific study of the occurrence and functions of genetic resources, though
highly sophisticated now and using tools such as DNA fingerprinting, is very new.
The science of genetics originated with the Austrian botanist Gregor Mendel's
discovery of the laws of inheritance in the 1860s, but the structure and function of
the DNA molecule wasn't elucidated until 1953. As genetics becomes more
sophisticated, so too will the ability of scientists to identify, utilize and conserve
both plant and aquatic genetic resources. In the meantime, with only a small
fraction of aquatic species having been studied, their number and diversity are
constantly being eroded through overexploitation and human development.
Through carelessness or negligence, aquatic genetic diversity is gradually disap-
pearing through an endless progression of small cuts that cumulatively tear a
widening rent in the fabric of life.
The conservation of aquatic genetic diversity has yet to receive the attention it
deserves. Thirty years ago, for example, fisheries managers in Canada had little
evidence that the six Pacific salmon species were made up of many genetically
isolated stocks. Today it is common knowledge that as many as 1000 such stocks
migrate from the ocean to spawn in west coast streams. Many have become extinct
during the last century as the result of logging activities, urban development and
other human interventions. Today, fisheries conservation policies have become
much more aggressive, thanks to the willingness of policy makers to make conser-
vation decisions that may be very unpopular with commercial fishers.
Unfortunately, continuing scientific uncertainty about the status of stocks and the
reasons for population swings has fed public scepticism about policy shifts, espe-
cially after so many years when commercial importance of a stock overrode all
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other considerations. But the value of any given stock may become much more
apparent in the future if it's the one with the genetic ability to adapt to climate
change or to some other natural catastrophe. Unfortunately, the future, unknown
values of genetic resources to humanity don't carry much weight in the political
process. That, in a nutshell, is the fundamental dilemma facing sustainable devel-
opment strategies.
Threats to the diversity of aquatic species
Plant biodiversity includes not only wild plants but also hundreds of thousands of
varieties of food crops developed over centuries. Aquatic biodiversity, by contrast,
is almost exclusively limited to wild stocks, and that biodiversity is threatened.
FAO (2000) estimates that approximately 75 per cent of the world's marine fish
species are fully exploited, overexploited, depleted or recovering from overfishing,
and that catches will decrease if fishing is not reduced. Draggers trawling for
bottom fish, using weighted nets that scour the ocean floor, can eliminate virtually
all seabed life along the route. Coral reefs, which contain about 25 per cent of all
marine fish species (McAllister, 1999), have gradually been destroyed and eroded
by the fishers' use of dynamite and cyanide - a practice that is illegal but difficult
to control. Damage to reefs by ocean warming, which disrupts entire ecosystems,
poses a potentially even more serious threat.
Depletion of life is no less a concern in rivers and lakes. Fish are probably the
most threatened of all vertebrate groups (Bruton, 1995, cited in Froese and Torres,
1999), and freshwater species are ten times more likely to be threatened than
marine and brackish water ones (Froese and Torres, 1999). One-fifth of all fresh-
water fish are considered to be extinct or endangered (Heywood, 1995). In North
America alone, 123 freshwater animal species have been recorded as becoming
extinct since 1900, and it has been estimated that extinction rates for freshwater
fauna are five times higher than those for land creatures (Ricciardi and Rasmussen,
1999).
Although overfishing contributes to declines, particularly in marine species,
damage to habitat is equally serious. Damming of the Columbia River system in
the northwest US wiped out salmon populations to the extent that a recent search
by the Nez Perce tribe produced only one Snake River sockeye. In Brazil, the
country with the greatest known number of fish species, the routes of migratory
populations in many rivers are blocked by dams. Other industrial activities can be
just as devastating. In North America, careless logging has frequently damaged
salmon spawning streams through a combination of effects, including increased
water temperature through removal of streamside vegetation, blocking spawning
channels with debris, and concealment of spawning gravel in silt runoff from road
construction and logged areas. In some Brazilian rivers, ornamental fish species are
threatened by the pollution and increased turbidity caused by gold mining. Even
the removal of fruit trees bordering rivers eliminates the primary food source for
some large migratory fish species.
Industrial agriculture throughout the world contributes to habitat damage
through fertilizer and pesticide runoff. So too, for that matter, does runoff from
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Box 1.1 Lost Stocks: The Declining Genetic Variability of PaciBc Salmon
For thousands of years, indigenous peoples of the west coast of North America have
depended on salmon. Six species of salmon (Chinook, coho, soekeye, chum, pink and
steelhead) spawn in streams and lakes. Each species comprises hundreds of stocks, and
each stock is adapted to a particular spawning environment to which it unerringly returns
after an ocean journey that may cover thousands of kilometres and last several years (with
the exception of the freshwater steelhead). While all belonging to the same species, different
stocks do not interbreed because they are geographically isolated in separate spawning
streams. Hence each is genetically unique. A stock's adaptation over thousands of years to
a particular water temperature, rapidity of flow, combination of chemical components, etc, is
reflected in many ways. The high oil content of Yukon chinook, for example, enables them to
survive in frigid Arctic waters. Other Chinook stocks, spawning more than 1500 km away in
the comparatively warm waters of southern British Columbia, Washington or Oregon, have a
far lower oil content because there's no evolutionary need for it.
Hundreds of tHese salmon stocks have become extinct as a result of human activities.
Salmon afe & 'keystone species' in a stream ecosystem, meaning that the ecosystem
depends <m fie presence of spawning salmon. Salmon are an essential source of food for
bears, eagles and other animals throughout the food chain. Their carcasses, carried into the
forest by predators, even provide essential nutrients for the roots of trees (Harvey and
Macduffie, 2002). When a stock is wiped out or severely reduced, the ecosystem it supports
is also damaged. Extinct stocks can potentially be 'replaced' with hatchery fish from other
stocks (or stocks containing banked genes from the native stock), but because hatchery
stocks have less genetic variability than wild ones, such 'enhancement* must be done care-
fully if the replacement stocks are not to be weaker and less adaptable than the originals.
Loss of a genetically unique stock can have far ranging repercussions. The commercial
ocean fishery depends on a relatively small number of numerically large salmon stocks.
These megastocks provide the numbers for the commercial fishery but do not represent the
total genetic variability of each species. If a smaller, non-commercial stock becomes
threatened, the variability it represents suddenly becomes inestimably valuable. For
example, salmon stocks have evolved by adapting to precise ecological conditions and are
susceptible to even minor variations. If climate change results in significant warming of the
North Pacific, some stocks may be unable to adapt to temperature increases. If ocean
warming happens to change the survival or geographic distribution of commercially
important stocks, then the capacity to survive in the changed environment may reside in one
of the many small stocks - in other words, in the reservoir of genetic variability.
Variations among wild salmon stocks will become increasingly important to the relatively
new aquaculture industry as well as to the commercial fishery as fish farmers continue to
look for desirable Characteristics to introduce into cultured species. In tie future, genetic
varijabtttty will become as vital to food (and employment) security as it already is for the main-
tenance of healthy ecosystems.
Over countless generations, indigenous communities have acquired detailed knowledge
of each stock's characteristics and habits. This knowledge, transmitted orally from gener-
ation to generation, became the foundation for traditional fisheries management practices
and can make a valuable contribution to modern fisheries management. In addition, collec-
tions for fish farming and hatcheries may rely on the traditional knowledge of indigenous
peoples for an understanding of the characteristics of different stocks and when, where and
how to collect them. In this instance, as in many others, the economic value of aquatic
genefie resources may be directly dependent on the traditional knowledge needed to obtain
them!.In tte eas^ of many salmon stocks, the knowledge may linger on but the stocks have
already disappeared
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urban lawns and gardens treated with pesticides and from toxic deposits left on
every street by motor vehicles. The impacts of human activities on aquatic bio-
diversity are widespread. Too often, efforts to create policies to conserve it get
short shrift in government. The long-term, intangible benefits of conservation are
always a far tougher sell than the shorter-term economic benefits of business as
usual.
THE BLUE REVOLUTION: Unlocking the secrets of
aquatic genetic resources
The application of biotechnology to aquaculture has sparked a 'blue revolution'.
The use of fish hatcheries to supply farms and enhance wild stocks is now
commonplace, and we are now well into the second stage of the revolution,
namely the use of genetic engineering - including splicing genes from one fish
strain or species into another - to produce desired characteristics. If an aquaculture
company in New England gets the green light from the US Food and Drug
Administration, a 'Super Salmon' injected with a gene from an Arctic pout will
become the first transgenic fish available to consumers. And the valuable
commercial uses of aquatic genetic resources go beyond aquaculture and are not
limited to genetic manipulation. By far the most active players in the field, at least
in terms of financial investment, are pharmaceutical companies targeting the
development of anti-cancer drugs and other medicines inspired by chemical
compounds produced by marine organisms.
In 1999, the combined annual global market for products derived from genetic
resources in several key sectors was estimated at between US$500 billion and $800
billion (ten Kate and Laird, 1999). Aquatic genetic resources accounted for a tiny
fraction of that amount and, although the blue revolution is well underway and
the pace of discovery has been dramatic, geneticists have barely scratched the
surface in the search for new and more sophisticated uses for aquatic genetic
resources. While discoveries of uses for plant genetic resources have had the benefit
of thousands of years of knowledge of crop breeding and of far more advanced
taxonomical sciences, genetic principles have been rigorously applied to most
farmed fish species only in the last three decades. As a result, most farm-raised
aquatic animals and plants remain very close to their wild forms. Genetic
improvement programmes are beginning to be applied to more and more aquatic
species, but when compared to the levels of domestication in livestock and crops,
the aquatic sector is far behind (Bartley, 1997).
Millions of aquatic species yet to be identified, especially those from deep sea
ecosystems, may contain valuable properties that could be used for human benefit
in decades to come. The range of potential uses is broad. For example, scientists
have now discovered that microbial communities discovered in the near boiling
waters of deep sea vents only 25 years ago may provide the answer to dealing with
oil spills - namely by eating them (Glowka, 1998a). What's next is anyone's guess.
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The wider the genetic diversity of wild fish species, the more opportunities for
developing farmed stocks adapted for desired characteristics such as rapid growth,
resistance to disease, flavour or hardiness. An example of this kind of use of aquatic
genetic resources is the cross-breeding of several different populations of wild
African tilapia to produce a new strain designed to mature quickly and adapt easily
to pond-farming conditions in Southeast Asia (Case Study 4).
Conserving the genetic diversity of wild fish species is as important for its
potential social and economic benefits as it is for maintaining biodiversity for its
own sake. As Wilson (1999) points out, biodiversity is our most valuable and least
appreciated resource. The growing number and severity of threats to biodiversity
are not helped by the failure of governments to appreciate the potential future
economic and social values of biological and genetic diversity. Wild genetic
diversity has inestimable value for conventional harvest fisheries, so basing fish-
eries management policies only on current commercial values of stocks, and not
considering their genetic resources, is a short-sighted approach. For example,
several thousand distinct Pacific salmon stocks spawn in the rivers along the west
coast of Canada. If ocean warming occurs, stocks that have little commercial
significance at present may be far more able to adapt to changing water tempera-
tures than those currently emphasized in management policies.
Getting the most value out of aquatic genetic resources thus means first evalu-
ating and addressing the considerable ethical, environmental and legal issues asso-
ciated with genetic modification, the management of wild genetic diversity, and
the collection and use of genetic resources. Bringing policies for the management
of aquatic biodiversity and of the aquaculture industry up to speed is an enormous
challenge that will only get bigger as biotechnology continues to advance. The
development of these policies needs to go hand in hand with policies governing
access to aquatic genetic resources.
The economic and social impacts of today's biotechnology revolution may well
be as great as those of the Industrial Revolution three centuries ago. Now, as then,
northern countries depend on raw materials from the south. The demand for both
plant and aquatic genetic resources focuses largely on the regions of the world with
the greatest (and least damaged) biological and genetic diversity. Identified fresh-
water fish species in Brazil alone, for instance, number in the thousands compared
to the hundreds found in North America. The disparity between the south and
north in the number of potentially useful species of marine fish and seabed
organisms is just as great.
Finally, there is the unique role played by indigenous and local communities.
European countries secured the raw materials for the Industrial Revolution
through colonization. Determined to assert control over valuable genetic
resources, southern countries acquired international legal recognition of national
sovereignty over those resources as the price of approving the CBD in 1992. What
remains to be seen is how both southern and northern countries will deal with the
need for effective policies for access to aquatic genetic resources in indigenous and
local communities, whose involvement will be crucial both for conservation of
biological diversity and its commercial use.
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Box 1.2 What Is the Difference Between Biological and Genetic
Resources?
The distinction between biological and genetic resources can be confusing, but it's a crucial
one. To understand it, we must consider the meaning of the terms 'genetic material', 'genetic
resources' and 'biological resources', The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) defines:
• Genetic material as 'any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing
functional units of heredity';
* Genetic resources as 'genetic material of actual or potential value';
* Biological resources as 'genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, populations, or
any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for
humanity1.
Until relatively recently, it made sense to think of genetic resources as plant seeds or animal
(including fish) gametes (eggs and sperm) because those were the primary materials
available to breeders developing new strains. But now that it's routine to extract DNA from
one cell and put it in another, it's clear that every cell contains the functional units of heredity
and that genetic resources and biological resources are the same physical entity. Bartley
and Pullin (1999) suggest that it is advisable to assume that everything aquatic and alive
- and all of its DNA- has actual or potential value because of the significant knowledge gaps
in understanding how aquatic ecosystems function to support fisheries, how to choose
aquatic species for domestication, how to make rapid progress in domesticating them, and
how to harness aquatic biochemicals and biological processes for the benefit of humankind.
It follows, they conclude, that aquatic genetic resources are the sum total of all aquatic
plants, animals and micro-organisms on the planet, and that aquatic genetic resources and
biodiversity (or biological resources) are synonymous.
While such a broad definition may make sense to a biologist, patent lawyers take a
different point of view - one that essentially differentiates between the information in (or
about) the resource and its physical identity. Differentiating between biological and genetic
resources has become a central theme in the current global debate over intellectual property
rights agreements about the patenting of life and its derivatives. The International Union for
the Conservation of Nature (IUCN, 2001), noting the lack of clarity of the CBD definitions,
suggests that 'biological resources' might be best defined as referring to resources of which
each specimen is purchased or acquired separately, while 'genetic resources' refer to
genetic information - such as, for example, a gene sequence - that can be protected by
intellectual property rights or other legal mechanisms.
Such a distinction can lead to head-scratching. Should a salmon used as broodstock for a
fish farm ('genetic resource') be treated differently than one that ends up on a restaurant
plate ('biological resource')? Should different rules apply to the catching of a flounder not for
food but for the purpose of isolating an antifreeze gene, inserting it into a strawberry, and
patenting the process? Should genetic resources be defined by their uses, including the
genetic information they contain, or by their physical identity? At least for the time being, the
answer remains unclear. The evolution of the definition of 'genetic resources' is reminiscent
of evolutions in the meaning of sustainable development. The Brundtland report (WCED),
which first brought it into common usage, defined it as 'development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs'.
Fifteen years later, a myriad of variations in the definition of the term reflect the differing prior-
ities of the definers, whether they be governments, corporate interests, environmental
groups or community advocacy groups.
For the purposes of this book, we define aquatic genetic resources the way the CBD does
- genetic material (including the aquatic life that contains it) that is or has the potential to be
used by humanity for the reproduction of life or development of a product. In these practical
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Bex 1.2 continued
terms, genetic resources mean any cells containing genes - reproductive or otherwise. As
we will see later, such a definition has profound implications for the creation of policies that
protect the right§ of tcteal and indigenous communities.
Ramifications for indigenous atid local communities
Efforts to differentiate between biological and genetic resources hold significant ramifica-
tions for the rights of indigenous and local communities to control access to life on their terri-
tories and to share in benefits from its use. Many indigenous peoples object strongly to
defining nature as a 'resource' in the first place because doing so implies nature exists to be
exploited rather than respected. During the decade since the CBD came into force, several
countries have enacted laws governing access to biological and/or genetic resources*
Those that refer to biological resources most commonly require community consent for
access; those that refer to genetic resources generally require consent only by communities
that provide traditional knowledge that facilitates the use of those resources. This is a
distinction whose importance should not be underestimated.
The distinction is most crucial for fishing communities that actually provide aquatic
genetic resources to outsiders. The collection of plant genetic resources typically involves
tapping into the knowledge of traditional agricultural communities or indigenous commu-
nities that use plants for medicinal or other purposes. While traditional fishing communities
have developed an extensive body of knowledge about fish species of importance to them
and about the management of aquatic ecosystems, their knowledge is far less likely to
provide essential information for fish breeders or pharmaceutical companies - the primary
actors involved in the collection of aquatic genetic resources. Hence the parallel to plant
genetic resources is simply not there.
Access laws, which are generally driven by plant issues, are in the very early stages of
implementation, and how they will be applied remains unclear. In the meantime, consid-
erable uncertainty awaits both collectors of aquatic genetic resources and communities
providing them. As this book will argue, if confusion persists about the difference between
biological and genetic resources, and if laws linking the rights of communities to their
provision of traditional knowledge are too rigidly applied, fishing communities may be left out
of the equation entirely.
EXPANDING COMMERCIAL USES FOR
AQUATIC GENETIC RESOURCES
Food fish aquaculture
Over the past century, the worldwide demand for animal protein was met
primarily by cattle ranching and ocean fisheries. With the ecosystems supporting
both food sources pushed to the limits of production, growth of wild fisheries has
stalled. The slack has been taken up by farmed fish production, which tripled to
over 30 million tonnes during the 1990s and is expected to surpass cattle
production by 2010. Currently, aquaculture accounts for more than one-third of
global fisheries production (FAO, 2000) and is expected to hold a greater share of
the market than all other fisheries by the year 2020 (Rifkin, 1998).
The world population is projected to reach 9.3 billion by 2050, primarily as a
result of growth in developing countries (SEDA, 2000), many of which rely on
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fish as their main source of animal protein. Approximately 85 per cent of fish
farming takes place in developing countries. While the environmental effects of
aquaculture (especially salmon and shrimp farming) remain controversial, signif-
icant increases in aquaculture production may be essential to global food security.
In 1998, Chinese aquaculture accounted for over two-thirds of world production,
or about 27 million tonnes (FAO, 2000). The other developing countries with the
most significant output include India (2.03 million tonnes), Bangladesh,
Indonesia and Thailand.
Among industrial countries, Japan produces about 812,837 tonnes (including
scallops, oysters and yellowtail); the US produces 457,221 tonnes largely made up
of catfish; and salmon comprises the majority of Norway's 406,418 tonnes
(Brown, 2000).
The importance of genetic diversity in aquaculture
In nature, animals select their reproductive partners from a large pool. When
animals are farmed, however, reproduction is usually controlled by the farmer.
Farming aquatic organisms is like farming land animals: in the artificial system of
reproduction that farming imposes, you need constant injections of genetic
diversity to keep offspring from becoming inbred. Genetic diversity is also vital for
improving breed performance, a process called broodstock improvement.
Reproduction of domestic farmed animals is controlled either by farmers super-
vising matings or purchasing genetic resources - sperm or embryos - and using
these genetic resources on their own breeders. A cattle farmer, for example, is likely
to buy cryopreserved (frozen) semen with the desired genetic characteristics, and
use it to inseminate the females selected for breeding; he may also purchase frozen
embryos for implantation in his cows. There is a global network supplying such
genetic resources.
Farming of aquatic animals also requires a steady supply of genetic variability.
The requirement for genetic diversity is probably even greater for farmed aquatic
animals than for livestock, because the very high fecundity of aquatic animals
makes it far too easy for farmers to obtain all their seed from one or two indi-
viduals (a dangerous practice genetically because it dramatically reduces genetic
variability, something that is clearly impossible with a cow or pig).
Genetic improvement
One way of increasing aquaculture production is through the use of genetic
improvement techniques, including selective breeding, chromosome manipu-
lation, hydridization, production of monosex animals and, more recently, gene
transfer. While selective breeding may be the best long-term strategy, a variety of
short-term strategies are used for an immediate increase in production. In
Venezuela, hybrids of cachama and morocoto account for perhaps 80 per cent of
the aquaculture of these species. Manipulation of the sex of tilapia broodstock
through hormone-induced sex reversal and subsequent breeding is used to
produce predominantly male tilapia with high growth rates.
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Deliberate selective breeding is not the only way that different strains evolve.
New strains of cultured fish also occur not only because a farmer is trying to
improve what he has, but also from bottlenecks that arise when he starts out.
Many culture operations begin with only a few pairs of breeders (because fish are
very fecund), and after several generations of breeding the stock inevitably
becomes genetically distinct from the founder stock. The degree of distinctness,
and whether it has any importance for culture, varies tremendously with the
species and farming system.
Although only a small percentage of aquaculture production currently comes
from genetically improved species (Gjedrem, 1997), support for the promotion of
genetic improvement programmes is well entrenched in development circles. The
Strategic Plan of the World Fish Center (formerly ICLARM), a member of the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and a major
player in the development and dissemination of aquaculture methods in Asia and
Africa, illustrates the trend. Focusing on carps and tilapias, the World Fish Center
plans to 'develop techniques for improving breeds of fish, the dissemination of
those techniques, and the training of staff in their use' (ICLARM 2002). The
World Fish Center has long maintained a programme in genetic resource conser-
vation and use, primarily with the intention of ensuring that wild genetic resources
are available for breeding so as to improve livelihoods, and that they remain as far
as possible uncontaminated by genetic resources from introduced species (often a
delicate balance; Pullin, 1993).
This approach to aquaculture development is virtually universal, and some of its
pitfalls are well recognized. FAO, for example, acknowledges the drawbacks in its
Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries Series (No. 5, Aquaculture
Development), citing Article 9.3.4 of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries: 'States should promote the use of appropriate procedures for the
selection of broodstock and the production of eggs, larvae and fry'. FAO notes that
'few fish farmers have the training and experience to do such work efficiently and
without significant loss of genetic fitness' and that it is 'advisable to establish
specialized facilities for the development of improved stocks and the production of
seed' (FAO, 1997).
Collection of broodstock and the role of local communities
Whatever approach is taken to the improvement of cultured stocks, farmers need
ready access to genetic resources. Potential sources include:
• Wild stocks in their natural habitat.
• Broodstock collections ('living gene banks') on farms or in research institutes.
• Rural pond farms in developing countries.
• Cryopreserved gene banks (frozen sperm or embryos).
Agriculture and aquaculture are worlds apart when it comes to the collection of
genetic resources for improving farmed strains. Crop producers and seed companies
rarely need to collect their own seed from the wild. Under the auspices of groups
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loxlj Breeding Fish •
One of the most important issues in the defeat® over sharing benefits of plant genetic
resources is the investment by small farmer? in crop improvement. The argument goes as
follows: farmers put time, energy and money into developing local breeds or varieties; if the
results of their efforts attract the attention dtf ,a sa®d company, they are due a share in the
benefits from its further development and distribution.
The question is, do "small" aquaculturists in local communities fit WS pattern? The answer
is critical to the development of access and benefit-sharing policies, because it will tell us
how important traditional knowledge Is in Uie use of aquatic genetic resources.
To answer this question we need first to consider hovv fish are bred, and how the process
differs from plant breeding (fish are used as an example; simitar logic applies to cultured
shellfish, although the reproductive methods are different). Crops, of course, are produced
from seeds, which are easily collected from a portion of the year's harvest. Hybridizations
between different strains of crop are also usually easy. Fish, on the other hand, reproduce in
water and in response to a number of environmental cues that are still poorly understood for
many species. In fact, many cultured fish species will not reproduce or even reach sexual
maturity in farm conditions.
The culture of such species has thus been a stop and start process involving:
" fteliance on wild-caught fry {'seed');
* Rapid expansion to the point where natural fry sources are inadequate;
* Investment in research to develop techniques for artificial spawning and fry production;
* Extension work to either transfer these techniques to farmers or build supply tines for fry
produced In central hatcheries.
In most cases the spawning techniques have involved hormone injection or, more simply,
manipulation of environmental conditions to trigger gonadal development (Harvey and Hoar,
1979; Harvey and Caroisfeid, 1993). Either way, the methods are a lot more complicated
than planting the best maize seeds from the previous year.
Much of the technology development has been and continues to be done by universities
and government fisheries agencies, with funding from national and international aid
agencies. The technology is then transferred to farmers. For example, the snakehead, a
common freshwater fish in Malaysia, became increasing popular in the early 1990s when it
became known for its 'healing' properties - which may have some basis in a high content of
arachidonic acid, a precursor for chemicals that promote wound healing. Higher demands
led to a market for snakehead fry, and simple hatchery methods were developed at the
Universiti Sains Malaysia and transferred to farmers (Yaakob and Ali, 1992). Given the right
training, farmers can also become small-scale fish breeders, for example in Cambodia,
where small-scale 'household' hatcheries are being set up with assistance from the Mekong
River Commission (Touch and Griffiths, 2QG1).
Global spread of genetic resources dimugh fisli culture
The emphasis on hatchery production and stocking of fish fry in natural and manmade
bodies of water has produced a genetic co-mingting at least as pervasive as that in agri-
culture, and as hard to sort out. It alsomeans that rofes shift (from farmer to fry producer, for
example) and that it is hard to identify a genetic chain of custody, Despite the relatively
recent;start to aquaculture, the global translation pf popular cultured species of aquatic
artlrpafs has been; impressive, and analogous to the geographic spread of crops. The
Japanese oyster and Maniteclam, for example^ werp both deliberate introductions to North
America and are now rnabstays of the North American bivalve industry. Pacific salmon
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Box 1.3 continued
indigenous to North America are grown in Chile and New Zealand, while Atlantic salmon
from Europe are farmed in both North and South America, Tilapia, an African fish, is ubiq-
uitous, and through aquaculture transfers and subsequent escapes has become a serious
environmental pest in many countries. Even the migratory South American species such as
pacu and tambaqui, whose controlled reproduction is a recent achievement, have been
deliberately transferred to Asia, where they are cultured in China and Taiwan.
All these transfers happened before the CBD came into being. The pejerrey, for example, an
estuarine Argentine species, was introduced to Japanese lakes in 1966 and has become well
established in the Japanese market (it is used in sashimi and tempura dishes). The fish is now
produced in Japan and is believed to be a genetically distinct stock. Chinese carp (there are
three main cultured species) have the longest history of geographic transfer: within a decade
of developing methods for controlled reproduction in the early 1960s, the fish were being
grown throughout Europe, the US and in the United Arab Republic (Bardach et al, 1972).
The end result of all this moving around of fish is a situation where genetic patrimony is
hazy. For this reason, and because the breeding efforts of small fish farmers are either not
recorded or, more likely, relatively minor in comparison to the investments by state research
agencies and private companies, it is probably unwise to automatically transfer the logic of
benefit-sharing policies directly from the plant world. For crops, benefit sharing rides on the
back of traditional knowledge, a factor that is probably small in aquaculture (although quite
important for collection of broodstock or experimental animals for bioprospecting surveys).
such as the CGIAR, gene banks in many countries collect, store and distribute seeds
from a myriad of plant strains produced by generations of farmers, as well as from
wild varieties. Just one bank, at the International Rice Research Institute in the
Philippines, stores more than 90,000 samples of cultivated rice and wild species
(IRRI, 2004).
Aquaculture, by contrast, is starting from scratch. Outside of species such as the
common carp, cultured in China for several thousand years, there's little history of
farming to draw upon and no network of knowledge built up by previous genera-
tions of farmers. Moreover, understanding the characteristics of wild fish strains
and how they can be used to improve farmed stocks is very much a work in
progress. The work of building collections (both broodstock collections and
cryopreserved gene banks) has barely started. Currently they are few and far
between with nothing like the organization and coordination that exists in the
plant world (the development of fish gene banks is discussed in detail in the
following chapter).
For selective breeding purposes and to build up collections, research institutes
and aquaculture operations collect broodstock from the wild. Case studies later in
the book describe three such initiatives. One was the fruitless effort of a Canadian
salmon farmer to obtain government permission to collect genetically pure wild
broodstock to cross-breed with existing farmed stock (Case Study 2). Another
Canadian company was equally unsuccessful in negotiating access to Arctic charr
broodstock in Inuit communities on the Arctic Ocean (Case Study 3). Case Study
4 describes the World Fish Center's collection of Nile tilapia from four African
countries, resulting in the development of a strain of tilapia that is now widely
farmed in Southeast Asia.
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Box 1.4 Collecting Aquatic Generic Resources: A Primer for Policy Makers
There are two common kinds of aquatic genetic resource collection. The first is gene
banking, which includes collections of cryopreserved sperm or 'living gene banks' of adults
maintained in captivity. The second involves prospecting for marine invertebrates. Both
activities are substantially different from plant gene banking. What do they actually look like
in the field?
Gene banking
Both kinds of gene banking - for sperm and for adult breeders - involve fishing. Because the
point of gene banking is to collect wild genetic material, collectors must be capable of going
onto rivers, lakes or the ocean with the means of finding and catching live, wild fish. Anyone
who has ever gone fishing knows what is involved, with the added complication that the
animals captured have to be alive. Moreover, sperm donors generally have to be captured
ripe, at their reproductive peak, or else it is impossible to obtain samples/This requirement
causes more complications, because fish are only ripe at certain times of year, they tend to
frequent certain locations when they are ready to spawn, and they may travel in spawning
groups that cannot be disturbed by the removal of a few fish.
A typical fish gene banking collection trip, whether for endangered catfish in South
America or for salmon in North America, involves first of all a planning phase when collectors
secure the necessary permits, usually from the national fisheries or environmental agency.
They then consult spawning records for timing, location and abundance of fish, with input
from local experts, who may be fisheries agency biologists, local commercial sport fishing
guides, local fishermen or aboriginal people. Wherever the information comes from, the
success of the expedition depends on it, and the cost of a failed expedition can be high.
Once the most likely whereabouts of the fish have been determined, gear must be
assembled for catching the fish, for sampling and handling gametes, or for transporting live
fish if the purpose is a broodstock collection. Hence the gear includes typical fishing tools
such as boats, motors, nets and waterproof clothing for rivers, as well as cryogenic tanks if
sperm is to be frozen.
Catching fish in a river is usually a matter of placing nets in their path, or encircling them,
either from shore or by using a boat to pull a net around them. Where waters are deep or
turbid, as is often the case, good guides are essential. If broodstock are sought, they need
to be netted and handled carefully, and transported to the holding facility (the living gene
bank) with minimal mortality from handling stress. Transportation is usually by truck, and has
to be limited to less than a day to ensure good survival.
If sperm is to be frozen, male fish must be manually sorted for ripeness, and the sperm of
the selected donors obtained by squeezing the abdomen of the fish. Both procedures
involve skill and local knowledge. The freezing process is simple, and involves mixing the
sperm with a cryoprotectant mixture that helps the cells survive freezing, loading the
protected sperm into plastic straws, and placing the straws in a cryogenic container.
Removal of sperm does not harm the donor fish, which are often returned to complete their
natural spawning in the wild. Collectors usually aim to sample at least 50 males from each
stock, so local knowledge is important in guaranteeing sample size.
Live broodstock that have been collected to form a living gene bank are usually kept in
tanks, ponds or pens, with controls in pface to ensure that they and their progeny don't
escape, either to neighbouring enclosures or to the outside world (they may be from a
different watershed and need to be kept from mixing genetically with the local fish). Frozen
sperm is transferred from the field containers (which are relatively smalt and portable, about
the size of a keg of beer) to secure, long-term storage. Storage facilities can range from
small tanks of liquid nitrogen on site in a research lab or farm, to rented space in large liquid
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nitrogen tanks in a cattle insemination centre. The software for keeping track of cryopre-
served fish samples is nowhere near as developed as plant gene banking software, but most
collections are relatively small (fewer than 2500 samples) and can be managed using
Prospecting for invertebrates
Collecting aquatic invertebrates with reputed biological activity is analogous to collecting
wild plants, but the methods obviously differ. Both activities share a heavy dependence on
local knowledge, although in cases where a species or ecosystem has been academically
studied there may be no need to consult local people.
Where aquatic collection differs most from terrestrial ones is in the range of environments
that have to bfe searched. Animals that are exposed at low tide can be harvested on foot, but
many live at depth or in the water column and can only be extracted by towing nets or by
diving. Diving is stow and laborious and requires scuba gear, support Vessels and people
trained to recognize the animals in question. Nets require a boat big enough to tow them and
allow ortboard sorting of the catch, as well as facilities for preserving, processing or pack-
aging for shipping. Weather i& often a factor.
As with catching fish for gene banking, the invisibility of aquatic creatures beyond the low
tide line means that reliable local guides are indispensable,
At the time of the collections described in the case studies, neither Canada nor
the African countries had policies on access to genetic resources in indigenous and
local communities. They still don't. The authority of the Inuit communities to
provide or withhold consent was the result of a recently approved land claims
agreement. Subsequent chapters will discuss the importance of access policies and
any progress towards their implementation.
Finally, and perhaps most important, in none of these three examples did the
collectors depend on local knowledge of the fish stocks they wanted to breed. This
is not to say that traditional knowledge offish stocks is never relevant to collectors.
However, it is less of a factor than in the plant world, where the value of genetic
resources to collectors depends almost universally on local knowledge - whether
it's the expertise of traditional breeders or community knowledge of medicinal
uses of plants. As discussed later, this difference is critical because local knowledge
of genetic resources has been the primary rationale for the development of national
laws defining community rights to benefits from their use.
Lessons from the green revolution
It is too early to say whether the blue revolution created by advances in aquatic
genetic science will — or should — have an impact equivalent to that of the green revo-
lution, which transformed agriculture by using genetic improvement to produce
new varieties of crops. While the green revolution greatly increased agricultural
productivity, particularly as a result of enhanced growth rates, it also raised concerns
about crop diversity and community economies. These included decreases in crop
spreadsheets
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varieties available to farmers, the inability of farmers to save seeds from sterile crops
for subsequent use, and changes in income distribution among farmers.
There is growing, but by no means universal, recognition that genetic
improvement in aquaculture must go hand in hand with genetic conservation.
This means ensuring the survival of local breeds that may appear inferior to
imported strains, based on short-term measures of growth rate, but in the long
term may be more robust (eg resistant to local diseases or climate extremes) and
hence provide better returns to local farmers. It also includes ensuring the survival
of wild genetic resources. If the blue revolution is to increase overall food produc-
tivity and maintain healthy local economies, it will be essential to apply the lessons
learned from agriculture.
Addressing environmental risks and controversies
The CBD calls on member countries to adopt the precautionary principle in
biodiversity management. The difficulty of doing this is nowhere more evident
than in identifying and addressing the risks of industrial aquaculture. Public
concerns are growing. While the pond farming of species such as the tilapia in
developing countries may actually produce some environmental benefits by recy-
cling waste and producing fertilizer, the risks of genetic and other environmental
effects are considerable, just as they are for other species such as salmon, shrimp,
and yellowtail. The biodiversity effects of mariculture have recently been reviewed,
and symposia and consultations now regularly confront the environmental risks of
a variety of aquaculture technologies.
The impacts vary according to the type of operation and species farmed. In
southern countries, shrimp farming has come under attack for its impact on local
economies and cultures. Shiva (1999) argues that 'luxury consumption' of shrimp
by northern communities comes at great cost to the communities that produce
them, with ecological impacts such as salinization and removal of mangrove forests
leading to a destruction of livelihoods of the poor in coastal regions of the devel-
oping world.
The list of potential environmental impacts of net pen farming of salmon is also
extensive and has led to repeated calls for its abolition by environmental groups.
There is still no scientific consensus on the extent and likelihood of a broad variety
of environmental impacts, especially for migratory species such as salmon. In
2002, the salmon farming industry in British Columbia argued successfully for the
lifting of a seven-year moratorium on the licensing of new salmon sea pen farms,
even though some scientists believe that the likelihood of negative environmental
impacts is in fact greater than when the government established the moratorium.
Genetic issues related to farmed salmon are becoming better understood each year,
and new threats, such as the role of farmed fish in spreading diseases and parasites,
are producing conflict and increased research spending (Gardner and Peterson,
2003).
It is now clear that the impact of food fish aquaculture cannot be measured
simply in terms of increased productivity. Moreover, it's pointless to defend aqua-
culture by saying it holds the answer to the world's food problems when the main
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Box 13, Genetic Modification: Better Fist or Foul Play?
The application of contemporary biological knowledge to issues like food and nutrition and human
health has to occur, ft has to occur for the same reasons that things have occurred tor the past ten
millennia. People want to live better, and they will use the tools they have to do it. Biology is the best
tool we have (Robert Shapiro, chairman and CEO, Monsanto Company (quoted in Specter,
2000».
Genetic resources are the raw material for genetic modification. While conventional
breeding practices serve mainly to amplify desirable characteristics that already exist in a
species or variety, genetic manipulation enables breeders to incorporate single traits selec-
tively and quickly, without the normal limitation that breeding can only be between members
of the same species. Traditional methods of plant and animal breeding, hybridization, and
chromosome set manipulation all constitute genetic modification, but international agree-
ments and national fegislation define genetically modified organisms much more narrowly as
transgenic organisms - those that have had genes from another species or genus inserted
into their cells (FAO, 2000). However, the World Fish Center uses a broader definition that
includes the products of eaptiye and selective breeding, hybridization between species,
development of monosex populations, and several other techniques (Penman, 1999).
The products of genetic modification are everywhere. More than 60 per cent of super-
market foods are estimated to contain genetically altered products, and the number is
steadily rising to the point 1hat what used to be the exception is rapidly becoming tie rule.
Hundreds of foods contain products from varieties of all the major crops, genetically engi-
neered for characteristics such as enhanced growth rate, pest and disease resistance, or
adaptability to cooler climates. Domestic livestock reflect the results of genetic research in
ways; ranging from the simple use of cryopreserved semen to propagate a herd of beef cattle
to th6 experimental creation of clones of especially productive animals.
In principle and to some extent already in practice, the kinds of genetic advances that
permeate the farming of terrestrial plants and animals are all possible for aquatic organisms.
Fish gene banks have existed since the early 1980s, and several species of genetically engi-
neered farmed fish have been developed (although, as this book is written, they have yet to
receive marketing approval).
Manipulating the gene: A primer
The basic unit of living matter is the cell. The diversity of life ranges from single-celled
organisms such as amoebae and bacteria to humans, with approximately 3 trillion cells.
Inside each cell, chromosomes (two sets of 23, in the case of humans) store genetic infor-
mation on long strands of deoxyribonucleic acid (DMA). The information for how any cell is
structured and functions is encoded on segments of DNA called genes.
Each gene contains codes with instructions for the production of a specific protein -
a chain of amino acids, each with a different function. Proteins can be transport molecules,
antibodies, messengers, enzymes, hormones ̂ such as growth hormone) or structural
proteins. Genes contain 'promoters' and information blocks that read, accept or reject
messages for gene activation for the creation of proteins. A gene in a rose petal will respond
to a message to produce red pigment, but a palm leaf gene will block the same message.
The genetie code of an organism describes the essential characteristics that will be
inherited by each individual - the distinctive^ coloration of a neon tetra, the cold tolerance of
a winter flounder, the toxicity of a cone fenaii. The entirety of the genetic information stored in
an organism is called its genome.
Biotechnology can be broadly defined as any technique that uses living organisms or
their parts to make and modify products, improve plants and animals, or develop micro-
organisms for specific purposes {Hobbelink, 1991), the earliest forms of biotechnology -
THE GENE RUSH: FINDING NEW VALUE IN AQUATIC BIODIVERSITY 41
Box 1.5 continued
selective breeding of plants and animals and using roicroorQanisms to make products such
as beer, wine, bread and cheese - have been in existence lor several thousand years, but
techniques for manipulating the essential foundation of living structures have appeared only
!n the past three decades. These techniques include tissue culture, celt fusion, embryo
transfer and recombinant DNA technology that enable scientists to create whole organisms
from single cells, fuse different cell types to create hybrids with the qualities of both parent
cells, implant animals with embryos of other animals, tnd isolate genes from one organism
and insert them into another.
Genetic engineering involves the disarranging and recombining of gene fragments, often
of unrelated species. By cutting a fragment of a genetic sequence and pasting it into cells of
an unrelated species, scientists can insert a gene of one organism into an unrelated one. As
a result, a plant may be fooled into accepting messages that turn its leaves a different colour,
or promoters may be introduced into fish genes so they will respond in a desired manner
when transferred into the cell of a strawberry - eg producing a hormone for cold tolerance.
Genetic engineering in effect provides a shortcut around conventional selective breeding by
directly altering the essential Characteristics of a species - although with the disadvantage
that by excising only short segments of DNA, scientists may well be overlooking other
essential sections of the genome.
While it has become well established in agriculture, genetic engineering is largely at the
experimental stage in aquaculture. Most commonly, aquacuiturists improve stocks or
species by using the sperm of one strain or variety to fertilize the eggs of another. For
example, a salmon farmer who wants to produce fish with high oil content may cross-breed
a colder water salmon stock with another stock that is adapted to the warmer environment
where the offspring are intended to be grown. Genetic engineering offers a speedier road to
the Same destination.
The coming of super fish — transgenic research in aquaculture
Production of farmed fish can be considerably enhanced through the culturing of stocks with
traits amenable to production in captivity. Such traits include growth rate, disease
resistance, and temperature tolerance. A desirable trait achieved thfough conventional
qross-breeding (inseminating the eggs of one stock with the sperm of another) is slow to
emerge and often unpredictable. Using molecular biology to identify and isolate such genes
and then transfer them to broodstock can considerably accelerate the process. In addition,
new traits not present in a genome can be transferred to it from an unrelated species,
enabling the production of new phenotypes (Hew and Fletcher, 1997),
Aquaculture currently relies almost exclusively on conventional breeding techniques,
namely those that mate parents from the same species. However, species such as salmon,
tilapia, and channel catfish are being actively investigated as candidates for the development
of transgenic varieties that utilize genes from different species. A prominent example is the
development of the so-called Super Salmon, which may achieve several times the rate of
growth of unimproved stocks. Researchers initially produced the strain through the transfer of
growth promoting genetic material from an ocean pout into Atlantic and Pacific salmon
species. In other experiments, anti-freeze protein genes from coidwater fish such as the
winter flounder have been incorporated into the genome of the Atlantic satmpn, which lacks
the anti-freeze gene and cannot survive the subzero terî peratures that may occur in sea cage
farming in the northwest Atlantic (Hew and Fletcher, 1997), In both examples, a genetic
resource from one aquatic species was used to change the genetic make-up of another.
Although no transgenic fish are yet being sold, they may be on the market in the next few
years if health and environmental Issues are addressed (FAD, 2000). A7F Protein, th
company developing the Super Salmon on the east Coast of Canada, reportedly has orders
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for 16 million genetically modified salmon eggs. Aqua Bounty Farms, a subsidiary, has
applied to the US Food and Drug Administration for permission to market the transgenic fish.
If the application Is appfovf d, the Sttpet Salmon will be the first tran&genic animal approved
In 'the US for human consumption (Moore, 2000). Assuming this occurs, the penetration of
markets could proceed quickly, as it has for agricultural products: in 1993, no genetically
engineered crops were sold commercially; a mere five years later, an estimated 28 million
hectares globally were planted with transgenic crops (Crucible Group, 2000).
The fish in the strawberry: Gene transfers between phyla
Genetic manipulation has progressed to the point where gene transfers occur not only within
species or between related species (for example, one species of fish to another), but also
between much more distantly ("elated organisms. For example, subsequent steps in
enhancing cold tolerance in salmon could include the use of insect proteins to develop a
potent anti-freeze gene for fish (Fletcher et al, 1999). Testing is underway in the US to
introduce insect genes into striped bass to enhance disease resistance (FAO, 2000).
Researchers have implanted fish anti-freeze genes into strawberries (Specter, 2000) and
tobacco (Reid et al, 1993) to promote frost hardiness, and have inserted salmon catcftonin
producing genes ihto rabbits to control calcium depletion in bones (FAO, 2000). In addition
to enhancing aquaculture production^ anti-freeze proteins may also improve the quality of
frozen foods, and could prove useful in medical applications. For example, they can extend
the shelf life of blood platelets prior to transfusion and, used in conjunction with cryosurgery,
can destroy malignant tiHuours (Fletcher et al, 1999).
It is estimated that biological knowledge doubles every five years. In the field of genetics,
however, the quantity Of information doubles every 24 months. Biotechnological discoveries
are constantly fuelling new techniques for using aquatic genetic resources. Rifkin (1998)
suggests that the commercial possibilities are limited only by the human imagination and the
changing demands of the marketplace - a claim many scientists would take issue with but
that nonetheless reflects the potential social impact of biotechnology. The key point for this
book is that every new commercial application, and the research that demonstrates it to be
viable, requires the collection of genetic material, sometimes from many locations in several
countries, As the pace of discovery continues to increase, regulatory clarity regarding
access wj 11 become essential.
Ethical and environmental concerns about genetic engineering
Kneed (1999) says that 'the fact that we do not really know what the long-term conse-
quences of genetic engineering will be, and are not prepared to move slowly and to find out,
means that a grand experiment is taking place, and the outcome is anyone's guess', Many
proponents of genetic transfers maintain that there is little or no risk and that the social
benefits, especially global food security, are paramount. The general public, as well as much
of the scientific community, remain tope convinced. While genetic manipulation for medical
purposes has largely found public acceptance, altering the molecular foundations of the
food supply hasnt Even people who accept the notion of genetic manipulation within
species may draw the line at inter species transfers. For some, it's simply an ethical mater 
humans shouldn't tamper with nature by 'playing God' with living creatures.
One of the biggest unresolved issues is the potential environmental impact of raising
genetically modified animals. If a farmed Super Salmon grows to three times the size of a
wild chinook, will escapees from farms compete or breed with wild stocks? Whether
escaped, genetically engineered fish have a selective advantage over wild stocks is hotly
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debated, but it's nevertheless a concern to the public Even if such concerns are largely
hypothetical and many scientists would disagree with ithern, the fact remains that they
represent the mood of the public and must be taken seriously. And because poficy in this
area tends to reflect the public mood, they must be considered when developing guidelines
for the collection and use of aquatic genetic resources;
In 2002, several African governments joined to keep food aid containing genetically
modified organisms from entering their countries, fearing contamination of crop diversity
and possible risks for human health (GRAIN, 2QG2b). What wilt happen »f and when trans-
genie fish hit the market? Will some countries ban the use of transgenic fish in aquaculture
for fear of contamination of wild stocks, prohibit the collection of wild broodstock for such a
use, or even bar the importation of transgenic food fish for consumption? So far, policy
makers have largely steered clear of fish transgenics because so many thorny issues
surround the practice, but the time will come sooner rather than later when it needs to be
dealt with. If that time is when a genetically engineered cold-tolerant titapia begins to invade
North American lakes, then it will be far too late.
beneficiaries are countries with no food shortages. More than anything else, the
heated controversies over the impacts of industrial aquaculture point to the need
for better scientific information and solutions, improved biodiversity
management policies, and an end to 'decide, announce, defend' approaches by
governments intent on promoting new industries. Ultimately, although aqua-
culture is likely to create the largest demand for aquatic genetic resources among
commercial users, the rate of its growth will depend on whether public benefits (in
addition to private profit) exceed public costs.
Public controversies about the environmental and social impacts of aquaculture
are particularly relevant to this book because they may affect community decisions
on applications for access to broodstock for fish farming. On the Canadian west
coast, some indigenous peoples work on or want to set up their own salmon farms;
others not only oppose new operations but call for the removal of existing ones, for
both environmental and political reasons. It is very likely that the willingness of
indigenous and local communities to consent to access to aquatic genetic
resources, in countries that have established their right to do so, will depend on the
aquaculture industry's ability to mitigate or prevent environmental impacts.
Ornamental fish breeding
The trade in ornamental fishes is big business. The global trade value for exports of
all fish and fish products was estimated at over US$51 billion in 1997 (Watson,
2000). By contrast, the value of the trade in ornamentals is hard to gauge but has
been estimated at US$15 billion (Bartley 2000). It has increased annually by an
average of 14 per cent since 1985 (FAO, 1999) and is reported to involve about
4000 species, with an approximate 50—50 split between freshwater and marine.
Europe, North America and Japan are the primary markets, with the US
accounting for an estimated 60 per cent of the demand (Baquero, 1999).
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Distinctions between the freshwater and marine trades
Although the highest value freshwater ornamental species are almost exclusively
collected from the wild and may be sold in very small quantities (50 to 100 a year
for some species), about 90 per cent of freshwater ornamentals are cultured
(Bartley, 2000). Hong Kong, Singapore, the US (Florida) and Czechoslovakia are
primary centres of farming activity. Employment in the culturing of ornamental
fish is also significant in several other countries. In Sri Lanka, for instance, about
25,000 people depend on the industry (Rajapakse, 1998).
By contrast, only about 25 of 8000 marine ornamental species can be easily
cultured. Captive breeding currently accounts for only about 3 per cent of the
total supply and is growing very slowly because of biological and technical
constraints (Marine Aquarium Council, 2001). The seahorse, for example, is
notoriously difficult to raise in captivity because of its dependence on live food.
Nevertheless, there is a strong push to breed and domesticate this and other high
value species (Bartley, 2000), creating a need for collections of wild broodstock.
During recent years, as new technologies and an improved understanding of
reef ecology provide the means to create functioning mini reefs in home
aquariums, there has been increasing demand for collections from coral reefs in the
South Pacific. Although over 90 per cent of the ornamental fish kept in the US are
freshwater species, the demand for marine ornamentals is steadily growing.
Approximately 85 per cent of marine aquarium fish exported to the US and
Europe are captured from reefs in the Philippines and Indonesia, which contain
the greatest diversity of desired species such as wrasse, butterfly fish, anemone fish,
damsel fish, angel fish and surgeon fish. Clams, sea anemones, sea stars, sea
cucumbers, sea urchins and a few other invertebrates are also a growing part of the
trade from the south (Baquero, 1999).
Collection of wild ornamentals for the aquarium trade
In many developing countries, collecting freshwater and marine ornamental fish
provides an important source of income in areas with few employment alternatives.
For many indigenous and local communities, the collection of ornamentals is the
primary economy activity. Aquarists pay high prices for specimens of rare or exotic
freshwater ornamentals such as juvenile sting rays or miniature catfish. Equally
important in the capture trade are low-cost species sold in large quantities. The
annual export of ornamentals from Amazonas state in Brazil, for example, averages
about 20 million specimens (Chao et al, 2001), and the town of Barcelos on the Rio
Negro derives the majority of its income from the sale of cardinal tetras and cichlids.
The collection of ornamental fish typically depends on villagers familiar with
their habits. In Malaysia, for example, killi fish are gathered by women and
children who rely on traditional knowledge to find them in leaf litter at the bottom
of streams. Many ornamental fish are nocturnal and can only be captured by local
people thoroughly familiar with their habits. Typically, local fishers are paid a small
amount by middlemen who provide a list of species and numbers needed and sell
the catch to exporters.
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Collections for breeding
Breeding of the most popular freshwater species (guppies, mollies and neon tetras)
has such a long history, and has produced so many varieties, that there is virtually
no demand for wild specimens for genetic enhancement of cultured stocks.1
However, in other sectors the demand for wild fish is increasing as improved tech-
nologies enable the culturing of a wider range of freshwater and some marine orna-
mental species. To a breeder of an ornamental fish, genes that produce distinctive
colorations and markings offer the same type of value that cold resistance or
growth genes do for food fish breeders.
How does a breeder obtain the broodstock needed to produce these character-
istics in a cultured population? Depending on the circumstances, there are three
options:
1 As in food fish aquaculture, make an expedition to the fish's natural habitat and
collect specimens from the wild. This may involve making a deal with local
fishers to do the work. It may also involve taking advantage of their knowledge of
where to find fish and how to catch them. In these circumstances, collections for
breeding ornamentals are comparable to collections for food fish aquaculture.
2 If the species has already been bred over many generations (as in the case of
neon tetras), selectively breed from existing collections to produce desirable
colorations or markings in their offspring.
3 If there is already a significant live trade in the fish from its country of origin,
buy specimens from an importer and use them as broodstock. This option is
significant for communities involved in collecting fish for sale because, where
such a live trade exists, it may be impossible to determine whether fish collected
in a river in South America or an African lake will end up in a hobbyist's
aquarium or be bred commercially.
Impacts of aquaculture of ornamentals on community fisheries and
ecological values
The culturing of ornamental fish stirs up none of the controversy that surrounds
the farming of salmon and shrimp. Indeed, some environmentalists might assume
it could have a beneficial effect by reducing fishing pressure on vulnerable or
endangered species. While that may be true in some cases, competition by aqua-
culture with the wild trade can be devastating for local fisheries and, ultimately, for
fish habitat. Many indigenous and local communities are completely or substan-
tially dependent on the ornamental fish trade.
The neon tetra fishery in South American indigenous and local communities
was wiped out many years ago by the trade in farmed fish, now based primarily in
Hong Kong. Case Study 1, at the end of this chapter, illustrates that a similar fate
could await the cardinal tetra fishery on the middle Rio Negro in Brazil. The
bottom line is that people have to make a living, and if they can't make it from
fishing, they'll do whatever they need to put food on the table, including logging
and mining. The end of the cardinal tetra fishery could be the death knell for local
46 BLUE GENES
efforts to protect the fish's rainforest habitat. The case study describes the efforts of
Project Piaba to promote sustainable livelihoods for local fishers, protect fish
habitat, and anticipate the impacts of competition from aquaculture in other
countries. It also illustrates the complications inherent in designing access policies
that take into account different uses of aquatic genetic resources, different types of
collections, and the cultures of fishing communities.
Pharmaceutical and industrial uses of marine organisms
The value of aquatic genetic resources is by no means confined to reproductive cells.
In strictly monetary terms, the chemical compounds produced by many marine
organisms are far more likely to be a source of'blue gold', in this case for the pharma-
ceutical companies engaged in their collection. As in the case of food fish aquaculture,
the future commercial value of these aquatic genetic resources will certainly depend
on the success of research and development programmes. However, it will also depend
on the regulatory requirements for access to and use of aquatic genetic resources.
In all the examples that follow, and in discussing bioactive compounds from the
sea in general, one must be careful to distinguish between the levels at which these
biological resources can be tapped. At the simplest level, they can be collected, some-
times in prodigious quantities, and extracted for the drug. At another level, biotech-
nologists may be able to work out ways to synthesize a compound or an even more
effective analogue, which reduces the need for further collection. Finally, actually
isolating the gene or genes that produce the drug opens the door to inserting that
gene in another organism, either a micro-organism that can be grown in large quan-
tities and used as factories for the drug, or even directly into a human patient. All of
these approaches, while using different technologies, depend on genetic resources.
Marine organisms are especially interesting because they are a rich source of
bioactive compounds, many from novel chemical classes not found on land.
Currently, about half the world's best-selling drugs contain chemical structures
derived from compounds found in nature (Glowka et al, 1998). Unlike plants,
marine organisms possess primitive versions of human genetic systems and
therefore hold particular promise for new drugs. All the major pharmaceutical
firms - Merck, Lilly, Pfizer, Hoffman-LaRoche and Bristol-Myers Squibb - have
marine biology divisions. Interest in marine bioprospecting may lead to a further
rush of activity among large and small companies when the first ocean-derived
pharmaceuticals come onto the market in the next few years (Plotkin, 2000).
Exploration for marine genetic resources is typically an international undertaking
in which companies and government institutions in industrialized countries
prospect in the marine waters of other nations, often tropical ones, that contain
biodiversity rich marine ecosystems such as coral reefs.
Several compounds isolated from marine sources are currently in various phases of
clinical trials. These include four anti-cancer agents (from an Indian Ocean mollusc,
a Caribbean tunicate, a sea whip, and the US west coast bryozoan Bugula neritina), as
well as an immuno-suppressant from a Bahamian sponge (ten Kate and Laird, 1999).
While no compound from a marine source has yet advanced to commercial use, a
variety of drugs now on the market do owe their existence to aquatic life. For example,
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the most commonly prescribed antibiotics in US hospitals were derived from aquatic
molds. The hormone calcitonin, extracted from salmon, has been found effective in
preventing osteoporosis. And protamine sulfate, derived from salmon sperm,
provides an antidote to the anticoagulant heparin (Plotkin, 2000).
Anti-cancer drugs: The Holy Grail of the pharmaceutical industry
The 100+ known varieties of cancer share a common characteristic: the uncon-
trolled growth of cells that take on abnormal shapes and cease their normal func-
tions. The most effective anti-cancer drugs work either by selectively poisoning
cancer cells or by preventing them from reproducing. Some of the most promising
progress in recent years has been based on research into the defence mechanisms of
marine animals and plants, especially those from southern oceans. Many parts of
the ocean floor are populated by organisms that look vulnerable because they
move slowly or not at all, and have no protective shells or any apparent ability to
resist a predator. What they often do have, however, are toxins so potent and
complex that there's no need for any other defence.
Eleutherobin, a chemical derived from a soft coral originally collected off the
northwest coast of Australia, works by preventing cancerous cells from reproducing,
and could be more effective than taxol (a derivative of the bark of the yew tree) in
treating breast and ovarian cancer. Although eleutherobin sounds like a wonder
drug, there's one major catch that may stymie development of a product — even if all
the soft coral capable of producing eleutherobin were collected, there still would
not be enough to meet the demand for clinical testing, let alone the world market.
Once the coral's anti-cancer properties were detected in laboratory tests, it took
three years to synthesize eleutherobin, the compound responsible, and synthesis is
expensive. The rewards, however, are great.
Initial testing of a sea squirt found in the Philippines has shown it to be effective
in killing colon cancer cells in the test tube, but considerable quantities may be
needed for further testing. Cyanobacteria (formerly known as blue-green algae),
some of the most ancient of all living organisms, produce compounds that may
fight other diseases as well. Research has shown that the cryptophycins produced
by cyanobacteria not only have anti-cancer potential but may also be effective
against viral diseases such as herpes and HIV. Like eleutherobin, cryptophycins
can be synthesized, but only at a prohibitive cost.
The sponge is one of the most prolific sources of existing and potential pharma-
ceutical products. For more than 30 years, one of the most effective treatments for
leukemia has been a drug based on chemicals produced by a sponge found in the
Florida Keys. The same sponge has also been found to be effective in killing certain
viruses. This led to the development of the first drug that can be taken internally as
an effective treatment for herpes and shingles. Global sales of ara-A and ara-C now
exceed US$100 million annually. Other species of sponge, in addition to
producing a variety of potential anti-cancer compounds, have led to the devel-
opment of anti-inflammatory and anti-malarial drugs (Plotkin, 2000).
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Box 1.6 Gme Snails: Potent Painkillers in Pretty Shells
The decorative shell of the cone snail, long pri?ed by collectors, provides no clue to its repu-
tation as one of the most toxic creatures ort the planet. The cone snail has an ingenious
means of catching faster moving prey on the coral reefs it inhabits - it simply launches a
miniature harpoon (a disposable tooth) that ca;n;kiil a large fish almost instantly. Cone snail
venom contains a variety of toxic compounds, each of which has a different effect on the
nervous system. One of these compounds interrupts pain signals from the body to the brain
by blocking the transmission of proteins through nerve cells. One drug produced from cone
snail venom, ziconotlde, is considered to be hundreds of times more potent than morphine
and has the add^d benefit of not being addictive. It has been estimated that ziconotide, if
and when marketed, may produce sales of up to a billion dollars a year. As there are about
500 species of cone snail, each of which may produce 200 different poisons, there may be
enormous potential for development of other equally beneficial and profitable products,
assuming that the necessary research can be done (Plotkin, 2000).
Obtaining the snails' venom ducts for screening used to be a simple matter: a researcher
would simply go to the beach and buy cone snails from fishermen, who would discard the
flesh anyway before selling the shells to tourists.2 Then, in the early 1990s, came a national
campaign to combat biopiracy of genetic resources by foreign interests. The end result was
the Philippines' bioprospeeting law, Executive Order 247, which established regulations for
tie collection of all biological resources and created requirements for prior informed consent
by communities. For years afterwards, uncertainty in the scientific community about how to
obtain approval for access delayed research into the properties of marine organisms,
including cone snails. This phenomenon, since dubbed 'research chill', will be referred to
several times in later chapters.
Box 1.7 Underwater Chemical Warfare and the Rise of Genetic Databases
Most people know that some jellyfish cart sting, and that eating improperly prepared fugu
(puffer fish) can kill you. They are probably aware that stepping on a stingray or crown of
thorns starfish can land you a fatal injection of venom. These examples reflect the
widespread ability of aquatic animals to produce chemicals that have dramatic biological
effects on other organisms. Plants do the same thing - many important bioactive
compounds produced by plants are defence mechanisms - but the aquatic world is where
chemical warfare really thrives.
At all levels of the aquatic food chain, chemical defences are highly developed and
represent some of the most fascinating strategies and molecules known to science. For
example, tetrodotoxin - the ft/gt/fish poison capable of inducing paralysis In tiny doses and
probably the most studied natural poison - is actually produced not by the fish itself but by a
marine bacterium it eats (and to which it remains immune).
The marine environment is especially conducive to the emergence of toxic natural
compounds that give animals or plants a competitive edge. The search for bioactiv6
compounds in rainforest plants and animals may be much better entrenched in the public
imagination, but the fact ts that the aquatic world is undoubtedly just as productive - just
harder to explore. Nevertheless, there are already a staggering amount of data collected not
only on the occurrence of toxic or medicinal compounds in aquatic plants and animals, but
also, to an extent that might surprise many people familiar only with terrestrial
bioprospeeting, on the chemical make-up of the compounds and even their genetic codes.
By way of illustration, consider the three principal banks of genetic information: GenBank
(USA), the European Molecular BiolOgy Laboratory Nucleotide Sequences Database (Europe)
and the DfsfA Database of Japan. Most scientific journals now insist that DNA and amino acid
sequences that appear in articles be submitted to a sequence database before publication.
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Box 1.7 continued
Each group collects a portion of the total sequence data reported by scientists worldwide, and
all new and updated database entries are exchanged between the groups on a daily basis.
One can reach the GenBank database through FishBase, and advocates of benefit
sharing will be sobered to learn that this database alone contains entries on over 2000 fish
species (that is, It ignores molluscs, algae, bacteria, echinoderms, reptiles and aquatic
plants that produce bioactive molecules). The entries provide nucleottde sequences -
genetic blueprints - for chemicals isolated from each species, and in most cases those
chemicals have pharmacological effects. For the stonefish Synanceia verrucosa, the most
venomous fish in the world, the genetic sequence for verrucotoxin is provided. The venorn,
like tetrodotoxin and most other biological agents, has a multitude of pharmacological
effects, some of which have academic interest, and others of which may have practical
application including the development of pharmaceutical drugs.
For bioactive agents like verrucotoxin that also happen to be proteins, the path towards
production of the compound by genetic engineering is relatively straightforward. It involves
incorporation of a manmade copy of the gene into a suitable 'producer' (a bacterium, for
example) that can be grown in large quantities. The bacterium produces the chemical in the
same way as insulin is now manufactured.
What this means is that the pace of scientific discovery, specifically our understanding of
the genetic basis of basic cellular functions, is advancing extremely rapidly and is gener-
ating vast libraries of genetic data. These data may have practical application totally out of
proportion to the investment in time and effort needed to collect the 'donor' - a single animal
is often enough - on which they are based. Local communities may intuitively see the
connection between an aquarist or fish farmer collecting males and females for breeding,
but if a gene sequence for a bioactive compound can be obtained from a single specimen,
patented, and used to produce the compound in a bioreactor, how realistic is it to insist on
royalties from a company a dozen steps removed from the original collection?
Bacteria with bite: Mining microbial life
Enzymes from bacteria inhabiting waters near the boiling point in seabed
hydrothermal vents are being tested for their ability to consume toxic wastes and
oil spills. Freshwater hot springs are another potential source of bacteria whose
adaptability to extreme ecological conditions may be useful in industry.
The Taq polymerase enzyme for the polymerase chain reaction, now in routine
use by researchers, originated from heat-resistant bacteria found at a geyser in
Wyoming's Yellowstone National Park. In 1997, the Diversa Corporation made an
agreement with the US National Park Service to begin bioprospecting at
Yellowstone. The Edmonds Institute, a small environmental group in Washington
state, successfully challenged the agreement in court and won an order for an envi-
ronmental review, yet to be conducted. Diversa has been gradually building an
extensive microbial genomic library through the collection of samples from many
countries, and intends to use the libraries to develop products for the pharmaceu-
tical, agricultural, chemical processing and industrial markets (Diversa
Corporation, 2000). In 2002, the company applied to Environment Canada for
approval to study organisms at paper or pulp processing facilities on private lands
and expressed an interest, in expanding its activities to public lands. Diversa made
its proposal public at the World Indigenous Peoples conference in British
Columbia, where some indigenous delegates denounced it as 'biocolonialism'
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(Dalton, 2002). Even bacteria have become controversial in the debate over access
to genetic resources.
Time and cost of drug development
Isolation of chemical compounds of value to the pharmaceutical or cosmetics indus-
tries can prove extraordinarily lucrative. Global sales of pharmaceuticals have been
estimated at US$300 billion a year, of which the component derived from genetic
resources accounts for between $75 billion and $150 billion (ten Kate and Laird,
1999). A compound derived from a sea sponge to treat herpes was estimated a few
years ago to be worth US$50 million to $100 million annually. Current estimates of
the potential value of anti-cancer agents found in marine organisms range to well over
US$1 billion a year. The full potential of marine organisms to produce valuable
compounds is unknown, because so few have been tested and because the ocean floor
is largely unexplored. If regulators and policy makers think protecting local rights to
plant genetic resources is a challenge, they have only to consider the complexities of
marine life, its trans-boundary habits and its untapped potential to realize that aquatic
genetic resources represent an awesome challenge waiting in the wings.
While profits from drug sales can be extraordinarily high, so are the costs of
research and development. Testing for compounds that may prove useful is a little
like aiming for a dartboard in a dark room. Success is rare. Perhaps one in 10,000
chemicals produces a promising lead, and fewer than one-quarter of the chemicals
reaching clinical trials are likely to be approved as a new drug (McChesney, 1992).
Moreover, a commercially marketable drug takes several years of development,
including the process of screening candidate compounds, isolating active
compounds, testing for possible toxicity, and undertaking clinical trials.
Although bioprospecting has generally been increasing, some companies
involved in it suggest that if natural product research becomes too expensive, it
will be abandoned for other more profitable approaches like synthetic and combi-
natorial chemistry, genomics and bioinformatics. The amounts of raw material
needed to yield usable quantities of anti-cancer compounds can be enormous. For
example, a tonne of Caribbean sea squirts produces only a gram of the anti-cancer
compound ecteinascidin (Plotkin, 2000). However, the use of combinatorial
chemistry can reduce the need for collection by enabling researchers to rapidly
generate a huge number of chemical compounds for screening and to ease the
identification and production by chemical synthesis of the active compound.
Continuing advances in biotechnology could mean that future demand for access
to aquatic genetic resources drops off (ten Kate and Laird, 1999), a scenario of
which regulators need to be aware.
Collection of samples
Collectors of marine organisms may need only a scientific permit (as in Canada) or
the equivalent to harvest samples for screening. While local divers may be paid to
help with collections, more often than not there is little or no community
involvement in the collection process, and no requirement for community
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consent. Areas where collections take place are generally outside traditional
community boundaries, although the recognized rights of some indigenous
communities (as in Fiji) may extend to offshore waters and the seabed. Indigenous
groups involved in negotiations for land and resource rights (as in western
Canada) may claim similar rights. Dependence on local knowledge of marine
organisms is less likely to be a factor than in collection of fish genetic resources,
simply because communities may have no traditional uses for, or may even be
unaware of the existence of, marine organisms far beyond the shore. However, as
illustrated in Box 1.8, traditional medicinal uses of some aquatic animals and
plants are not uncommon.
Requirements for collection permits are likely to become more stringent with
the development of national access and biodiversity conservation laws. However,
as many species of marine organisms are not endemic to particular countries,
collectors can avoid regulatory requirements by moving their operations to more
'friendly' countries. This is one reason why countries such as those in the ASEAN
have adopted a regional approach to the implementation of access laws.
Given the cost and time involved in collection, and the abundance of marine
organisms in many countries, payments for access to genetic resources have typi-
cally been low to date. It was estimated in 1991 that the total revenue likely to be
received by developing countries seeking royalties for unimproved genetic material
of any kind, terrestrial or aquatic, could be less than US$100 million annually
(Barton, 1991, cited by Reid et al, 1993). In the pharmaceutical industry, royalties
paid for samples with unknown clinical activity have amounted only to 1 to
5 per cent of net sales. Nevertheless, while the relative amount involved may be
low, the scale of revenues generated in the pharmaceutical industry means that
even a small share of net profits can produce extremely large revenues for a devel-
oping country once a product has been developed and marketed (Reid et al,
1993).
In the 1990s, Shaman Pharmaceuticals, operating in the botanicals field,
announced a 'reciprocity' programme that would return benefits to indigenous
communities from which samples had been collected. The company expressed a
commitment to provide various types of benefits regardless of whether a
marketable product was developed or whether indigenous knowledge was essential
for product development (Bierer et al, 1996). Other companies have found
Shaman's innovation too risky to adopt. Typically, very few returns from drug
development trickle down to indigenous and local communities where collections
are made.
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Box 1:8 Meiicia^ Uses of Aquatk PJants ̂ nd Aninaals
Although we have Said that local knowledge does not have the same important© for
aquatic genetic resource's^ it does' tor terrestrial, medicinal properties of aquatic plants
and animals certainly *cist M^iW aquatic plants are harvested for medicinal purposes,
just as others have always been u^ed as food. Examples of the latter are cattails, which
have edible shoots and roots, and arrowheads, whose large edible tubers were eaten by
: Native Americans, Medicinal aquatic plants include watercress (Rorippa nmsturtiium-
aiqttaticurrty, also widely used as a salad green, and water lily roots that are commonly
eaten in many parts of the world as well as used for medicine. Marshmatlow roots, flowers
and leaves have medicinal uses including as a cough suppressant, immune system
booster and wound healer, white pennywort (Hydrocotyte spp) has been used to alleviate
symptoms of arthritis,
Seaweed was a popular food and an important trading item among Northwest Coast
peoples in western Canada, Dried red laver (Porphyra abbottae), containing all essential
vitamins and minerals, was commonly made into cakes, sometimes flavoured with the juice
of chewed rock chitons (a shellfi$h); Cultivation of nori, a cl^se relative of red; laver, is a
US$10 billion industry in Japan, and industrial production of the plant is beginning in North
America as well. Coastal tribes commonly traded dried seaweed to interior tribes such as
the Carrier and Gitksan, who used it as a medicine for goitre, an affliction caused by iodine
deficiency. Other medicinal applications of seaweed included the use of the gelatinous
matetial in rockweed receptacles to treat burns and sores, to strengthen limbs, and to
remove foreign objects: or soothe stinging in the eye, The Nuu-chah-nultti people used bull
kelp to make a skin salve (Turner 2000, 2002).
On the aquatic animal side, medicinal leeches are undergoing a revival in popularity, after
being Collected to near-extinction in Europe during the last century. As a result of severe loss
of httiitat, the medicinal leech is how listed on Appendix I I I of the B$rn Convention,
Appendix il of CITES and Annex V of the Habitats Directive. It is also listed as Vulnerable by
the IUCN and as Rare in the GB Red List. Leeches have proved uniquely useful in cleaning
and oxygenating the sites of plastic and reconstructive surgery, and the best known
species, Hirudo mecticinatisis now bred in captivity in Europe and the US. The southern
African species AliQlimnatis buntonensis is another candidate for surgical use, but has yet to
be bred in captivity (Appleton, 2001). Wild populations of medicinal leeches would seem to
be a valuable genetic resource.
Practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine rely on a variety of aquatic plants and
animals, some of which are used for multiple healing purposes. Cuttlefish bone, for example,
is used to staunch bleeding, stop nocturnalemissions, treat diarrhoea, and; cure skin ulcers,
PJpeftgh ar§ used to cure impotence and treat swellings, Clamshell, kelp^and sirgassum
seaweed are combined to clear phlegm and stop coughing. Both marine and river turtles are
used in the treatment of fever. Seahorses remain in high demand for the treatment of arthritis,
impotence and urinary tract infections, and they have many other uses. Ground oyster shell
is used for its calming effect, ahd abalone shell is used in the treatment of headache,
dizziness and tremors (Bensky and Gamble, 1993),
Whether one subscribes to theories of medicinal value or not, the fact is that many aquatic
organisms are already used for medicinal purposes, either by local communities (as in the
example of the arrowhead plant) or, as in the case of seahorses, on an industrial scale that
raises serious conservation concerns, The difficulty of addressing these concerns is often
increased by the fact that many local communities rely on the collection of creatures such as
the seahorse for a substantial part of their income, even if they have no local use for the
animal.
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INDIGENOUS VIEWS ON VALUING NATURE
Many indigenous communities that have traditionally subsisted on aquatic
resources have developed and maintain a relationship with them that is foreign to
Western concepts. Fish have made such a vital contribution to the well-being of
indigenous peoples living on lakes, rivers, and ocean coastlines that they have
come to form an integral part of community cultures and belief systems over
hundreds or thousands of years. Some cultures rejected the Western notion of
human dominance over other living beings. In the northwest coast of North
America, for example, indigenous peoples such as the Nuu-chah-nulth revered the
salmon. They would carefully return salmon bones to the river, both in gratitude
for the gift from the spirit of the salmon and as a symbol of rebirth and renewal.
The image of the salmon was central to the development of a sophisticated body of
art, songs and dances that celebrated the salmon spirit.
Not surprisingly, some indigenous communities consider it inappropriate to
describe fish as biological or genetic 'resources', as such a definition connotes
ownership and is alien to their beliefs. The argument by geneticists that there's
nothing sacred about 'pure' species contradicts fundamental principles guiding
indigenous cultures. Indigenous peoples may oppose genetic modification of
aquatic genetic life simply on the premise that it demonstrates a lack of respect for
creatures with a spiritual life of their own — or lack of respect for the Creator of
those creatures. The opposition voiced by some Canadian indigenous peoples to
the establishment of salmon farms may be based in part on such beliefs. Many
indigenous people accept the idea of salmon hatcheries only grudgingly, as an evil
necessary for the rebuilding of stocks, and strongly oppose the idea of collecting
genetic resources for later use.
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CASE STUDY 1. THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES:
Conserving the ornamental fish industry in Barcelos, Brazil
Environmental groups that protest against industrial food fish farming because of
its environmental impacts may throw their support behind the culture of orna-
mental fish, assuming that it can help save wild fish populations. As this case study
illustrates, the opposite may be true — but not for the reasons one might expect.
One of the difficulties with setting policy for managing aquatic genetic
resources is the wide variety of local cultural and ecological circumstances that
need to be taken into account. In the 1990s, following the passage of the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna (CITES), some airlines prohibited the transportation of live ornamental
fish.3 Some environmental groups have also pushed for the culturing of orna-
mental fish to relieve pressure on wild stocks. At the 22nd Professional Fish Show
held by the Florida Tropical Fish Farms Association (FTFFA), Aquatica Tropicals
took the Best in Show award for the cardinal tetra.
These seemingly unrelated events shared one thing in common — the potential
to damage a thriving Amazon Basin subsistence fishery, the survival of which may
be crucial to the protection of riverine ecosystems from industrial development.
The airlines eventually rescinded their ban on the transportation of live orna-
mentals. FTFFA members, meanwhile, have high hopes that successful culture of
the cardinal tetra will lead to a commercial industry that, operating without high
handling and transportation costs, could compete so well that the wild cardinal
tetra fishery might follow the example of the neon tetra fishery and become merely
a historical footnote.
Links between the ornamental trade, the local economy, and
ecosystem conservation
The diversity offish in Amazonia is such that more than 3000 species have already
been identified. The middle Rio Negro — the primary fishing grounds for live
ornamental fish in the Amazon Basin - exports approximately 20 million live fish
annually, generating about US$3 million for the local economy (Chao et al,
2001). The cardinal tetra accounts for over 80 per cent of ornamental fish exports
from Brazil (Chao, 1998). The trade in ornamentals (primarily cardinal tetra and
discus) contributes at least 60 per cent of total revenues in Barcelos, a community
400 km upriver from Manaus with a population of 16,000. An estimated 1000
local fishermen make their living from the fishery, with entire families, including
women and children, typically being involved in collection, sorting, handling and
transportation (Prang, 2001).
The collection of cardinal tetras has a short history compared to most tradi-
tional fisheries. It was only in the mid-1950s that the aquarist Herbert Axelrod
discovered the existence of the cardinal tetra after hearing stories from local fisher-
men about a species similar to the neon tetra but larger and more brightly coloured
(Axelrod, 2001). The cardinal tetra became an instant hit in the world of aquarium
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hobbyists and within a few years the trade had grown to millions of specimens,
providing a new and steady source of income for villagers along the river near
Barcelos, which had languished since the end of the rubber trade earlier in the
century.
Cardinal tetras are highly prolific, but the health of their populations largely
depends on pristine river and forest conditions. The fish are vulnerable to
turbidity and pollution in the Rio Negro, the waters of which are highly acidic and
ionic — one of the main reasons why cardinal tetras are so difficult to breed in
aquaria. During the rainy season, when the river rises more than 9m, the tetras
migrate from shallow streams into vast areas of the flooded forest to breed. In most
countries, protection of fish habitat is secondary to the needs of industries with
greater economic value. The reverse is true in the Rio Negro basin. Barcelos, which
covers an area of 122,490 km2 of largely intact jungle (and is geographically the
largest municipality in the world), has passed bylaws prohibiting both industrial
logging and gold mining in order to protect the ornamental fishery.
As development pressures throughout the Amazon Basin continue to increase,
Barcelos has the potential to act as a buffer zone — provided that the municipal and
higher levels of government are able to cooperate and that the ornamental fish
industry continues to provide satisfactory livelihoods for local people. It is ironic
that one of the most serious threats to the continuation of the fishery has come
from efforts to protect Amazon ecosystems by curbing the trade in live animals.
Blanket conservation policies can have unintended and counterproductive conse-
quences if they're made without an adequate understanding of variations in local
uses of species and in economic and cultural circumstances.
The threat of aquaculture to the wild fishery
If the Barcelos fishery is hurt by competition from a new aquaculture industry in
another country, that too will be an unintended consequence of not under-
standing or acknowledging local conditions. The Florida aquaculture industry
would simply be following the law of supply and demand. If hobbyists want
cultured tetras because they're cheaper and less fragile and there's a willing seller,
why should governments intervene? Already, over 90 per cent of freshwater orna-
mental sales are farmed fish. Popular home aquarium species such as guppies,
mollies and neon tetras have been bred for decades. Advances in breeding tech-
nologies are simply making it possible to culture species once thought impossible
to farm — the cardinal tetra being one of the most recent examples. Barcelos is by
no means unique in its concern about the impact of the continuing expansion of
ornamental aquaculture on the capture industry. In Sri Lanka, for instance, the
ornamental fishery represents 8 per cent of the volume of exported fish but
accounts for 70 per cent of its value, and supports so many people that few fishers
are willing to support aquaculture (Bartley, 2000; Watson, 2000, cited in Tlusty,
2002).
Policies on aquaculture generally focus on environmental impacts where
farming operations occur. However, the situation is more complicated than this.
Tlusty (2002) suggests that, while aquacultural production of species has many
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benefits for the aquarium trade, captive cultivation should be avoided when the
wild harvest maintains habitat and when a cultural and economic benefit would
disappear if collections come to an end. Assuming the government of Brazil took
seriously the threat of foreign aquaculture to the Barcelos fishery and, ultimately,
the rainforest ecosystem, how should it act? Control over access to cardinal tetras
for breeding is one option, but may be virtually impossible in the circumstances
under which the trade in live ornamentals operates.
In fact, it's unlikely that the CBD's efforts to ensure that provider communities
and countries have a say in and receive benefits from new uses of genetic resources
are likely to work very well for communities like Barcelos. Emerging access and
benefit-sharing laws, including that of Brazil, focus almost exclusively on
bioprospecting. Collection for ornamental breeding works very differently.
Breeders have no need to make forays deep into the jungle to find promising spec-
imens. For the most part, they can simply gather broodstock by purchasing wild-
caught fish that are already shipped abroad for sale to aquaria. In the case of the
cardinal tetra, there's no need to tap into traditional local knowledge at all - that
was done 50 years ago when Dr Axelrod first 'discovered' the tetra.
Some critics of the effectiveness of the CBD have suggested that importing
countries need to take further steps to discourage biopiracy in developing coun-
tries and their communities. For instance, patent offices might require applicants
to identify the location from which material (or traditional knowledge) used to
develop a new strain was collected. While such a requirement could conceivably be
useful for the protection of communities providing sea squirts or sponges, it's
hardly likely to be relevant for ornamental breeders who have bought their fish
from importers and have no knowledge of the precise origin of their aquarium
stock.
Chain of custody certification has been suggested as another way to encourage
both conservation and fair play in dealings with aquatic genetic resources. In a
recent poll, US hobbyists indicated that they would be prepared to pay as much as
50 per cent more for quality fish from a 'green' fishery than for substandard fish
from a poorly managed fishery (Dowd, 2001). Certification of wild fish collected
along the Rio Negro could help promote the Barcelos fishery, and the work of
Project Piaba (discussed below) should help facilitate certification approvals. The
Marine Aquarium Council already has a certification programme in place and is
planning to extend it to cover the use of aquatic genetic resources.
The relevance of Brazilian access law to the Barcelos fishery
Assuming that collectors do wish to travel to Barcelos to search for and collect
populations of cardinal tetras that might lead to a new cultured strain, what
protection does the new access and benefit-sharing law (Provisional Act No.
2186-16, August 2001) provide to communities?
Prior to the creation of this controversial law, foreign collectors of ornamental
fish needed approval from the Institute Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos
Recursos Naturais Renovaveis (IBAMA), the national environmental
management agency. Such collections, often made by individuals, have not always
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proceeded without incident. For example, in 1999, IBAMA officials apprehended
a German aquarist who was collecting cichlids in the Rio Negro region to study
their feeding habits.4 Generally, even if agencies are tipped off by local people, the
remoteness of most parts of the Amazon makes enforcement of regulations very
difficult. The effect of Provisional Act 2186-16, which covers scientific research,
technological development, and bioprospecting, is to limit the issuance of
collection permits to national public or private institutions. Individuals can no
longer obtain them. Consequently, an aquarist would first have to make an
agreement with an accredited Brazilian institution, which in turn would be
required to obtain the consent of the indigenous or local community where collec-
tions will occur. A local community is defined in the law as 'a human group ...
differentiated by its cultural conditions, which is, traditionally, organized along
successive generations and with its own customs, and conserves its social and
economic institutions'.5 It's not clear whether such a definition would apply to a
municipality such as Barcelos or to one of the many scattered family villages
within its boundaries.
Either way, the consent of a community (other than on indigenous lands) is
required only if the collection involves the use of traditional knowledge related
to genetic heritage. The original collector of cardinal tetras, Herbert Axelrod,
made his find through chance information provided by local people. Once he
had established a demand for the species, the fishery began, less than 40 years
ago. Assuming a villager provides information to an aquarist today about a
previously unknown (to aquarists) subpopulation of cardinal tetras, would that
constitute traditional knowledge for the purposes of the act? Is it enough that a
villager simply knows about the coloration or markings of a population for
which a community has no traditional use? If an aquarist only wishes to collect
specimens from populations already fished for the ornamental trade, is it enough
that villagers only know how and where to collect them, in order to be eligible
for the right to consent? Generally, other national laws are no more clear than
Brazil's about the nature and scope of provisions on traditional knowledge, and
the fact that they have been drafted primarily for plant bioprospecting offers
considerable room for confusion about their application to aquatic genetic
resources.
Assuming the knowledge of local fishermen confers the right to informed
consent, then what? The Brazilian act provides that any traditional knowledge
related to genetic heritage may be deemed to be held by the community even if
only one member of the community holds this knowledge (Article 9). The
community then has the right to receive benefits from the economic use of their
traditional knowledge by third parties (eg a fish farm outside Brazil). Presumably,
those benefits would be negotiated by the aquarist and a Brazilian national insti-
tution, as the act does not appear to contemplate direct negotiations of benefits
with a community, which only has the right to decide on the use of its traditional
knowledge (Article 8). A share of royalties is the most likely benefit to be nego-
tiated. The big Catch 22 is that any Rio Negro community that consents to the use
of ornamental broodstock for aquaculture outside its own area is likely to be
quickly blacklisted, creating serious divisions among local groups.
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In short, what the Barcelos fishery most needs is assistance with maintaining a
sustainable and reasonably profitable capture fishery, and the only benefit that
matters is keeping the aquaculture industry at bay. Are aquatic genetic resources blue
gold? Perhaps in the minds of the national government and national institutions, but
certainly not to Barcelos - or to similar communities in other countries that rely on
capture fisheries for wild ornamentals. This is precisely the reason why makers of
access and benefit-sharing laws need to have a clear understanding of the implica-
tions of legislative provisions for aquatic as well as plant genetic resources and of vari-
ations in local circumstances that have a direct bearing on conservation objectives.
Maintaining a sustainable fishery: The work of Project Piaba
The real profits in the Amazon ornamental industry are made by the exporters in
Manaus and importers in Florida and elsewhere. The earnings of a Barcelos fish-
erman roughly approximate the minimum wage in Brazil. However, as Prang
(2001) points out, the ornamental fishery provides greater returns than other
extractive activities in the Amazon and provides one of the few opportunities to
earn enough for basic necessities and consumer goods. The ornamentals trade
makes it possible for peasant fishers to remain in the interior rather than
emigrating to urban centres like Manaus. Without the trade, local people would
likely be driven to find alternative work in logging and gold mining, and the
municipality would have less incentive to try to keep environmentally destructive
industries out.
While higher returns to local fishers would be desirable, their most important
need is assurance that a sustainable fishery can continue indefinitely. To this end,
Project Piaba, based at the University of the Amazon and primarily funded
through the Herbert Axelrod Foundation, has undertaken a variety of activities
aimed at maintaining the live ornamental fishery at commercially feasible and
ecologically sustainable levels. Its objectives are to:
• Collect baseline data on the ecosystem, socio-economy and diversity of fishes in
order to analyse the impact of the ornamental fish trade on social and natural
environments.
• Diagnose diseases and reduce mortality of captive fish, introduce fish care tech-
niques to improve the survival and quality of fishes and turtles, and eventually
establish protocols for export quarantine.
• Provide environmental education and socio-cultural history to local children,
fishermen, distributors and public, and promote career development in
aquarium science and conservation.
• Create community-based fishery management strategies for managed harvest
levels, stock enhancement of fishes and turtles and the development of aqua-
culture of native species where appropriate.
• Assist in the revision of policies by regulatory agencies in order to protect
vulnerable species and enhance the economic viability of the region.
• Encourage local entrepreneurship, ecotourism, the production of local crafts
and the commercialization of other sustainable natural resources.
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Project Piaba objectives are based on the premise that sustainable fisheries require
a scientific basis for management together with support for community
management strategies. So little is known about the Rio Negro ecosystem that
extensive baseline data are required before developing integrated management
strategies. During its first ten years (1989—1999), in addition to conducting
baseline surveys offish diversity and socio-cultural implications of the ornamental
fishery, Project Piaba established a public aquarium and environmental education
programmes in Barcelos and worked with local people to define issues that need to
be addressed if community-based management strategies are to be effective (Chao
et al, 2001). The Project has also provided training in handling and transportation
techniques to reduce mortalities and increase the quality of the fish catch.
The Barcelos fishery illustrates the complexity of developing complementary
policies for the management of and access to aquatic genetic resources, and the
importance of taking into account local economies and ecologies. In the Barcelos
case, these include the following:
• Policies for the collection of aquatic genetic resources need to take into account
both direct and indirect environmental and social impacts of different uses in
different locations.
• Policies for access to aquatic genetic resources need to go hand in hand with
aquatic resources management policies that recognize a complementary rela-
tionship between science-based and community-based management. They also
need to ensure coordination between municipal and higher levels of
government in implementing policies that promote sustainable uses.
• Access laws and regulations need to clearly identify communities having rights
to prior informed consent. Laws that restrict that right to communities
providing traditional knowledge need to clearly define the nature of traditional
knowledge to which the laws apply.
• Benefits to communities may be most usefully directed to maintaining
sustainable livelihoods that in turn contribute to conservation of aquatic
ecosystems.
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Chapter 2
Managing Aquatic Genetic
Resources: Tools and Policy Gaps
Returning a dourado to the Taquari River after DNA sampling, Coxim, Brazil (Photo by
David Greer)
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When it comes to effective policies for the management and conservation of
biological and genetic diversity, fisheries are the poor cousins to agriculture. Why
the comparison? There are three reasons:
Firstly, agriculture has relied on genetic resources for decades, using gene banks
and other formal and informal collections. This process is only now beginning to
happen in aquaculture.
Secondly, countries have long cooperated to make sure that samples of plant
genetic resources (from both farmed and wild strains) are collected and stored in
trust for the future benefit of humanity. Countries could and should be doing the
same for aquatic genetic resources, but no national or international governmental
initiative has yet occurred to make it happen.
Finally, once the genetic modification of crops started to become commonplace
and the conservation of plant genetic resources came to be seen as important,
governments had to start making laws and policies to deal with all the problem-
atical issues that surfaced.
The thorniest issue of all was the question of ownership and control of genetic
resources. When countries began to discuss how to deal with such issues, as they
did during the negotiation of the CBD in 1992, it seemed to make sense to talk
about genetic resources generally, not just crop genetic resources. The problem, as
we'll discuss in this and following chapters, is that crops are so different from fish
that policies that may make sense in an agricultural context may be irrelevant or
even counterproductive when applied to the fish world.
Assuming that's the case, how does one go about developing policies that are
specific to aquatic genetic resources? Firstly, one needs to ensure that there's
already a good foundation of policies for the management of aquatic biological (as
opposed to genetic) resources. Secondly, policy makers will need to be well
informed about current and potential issues that policies on aquatic genetic
resources will need to address. As this chapter will explain, considerable progress
needs to be made in both these areas.
CONSERVING AQUATIC GENETIC DIVERSITY -
Still a new idea for fisheries management
The genetic diversity of the aquatic world is slipping away while governments for
the most part remain either oblivious to the extent of its decline or reluctant to act
forcefully to conserve it. It comes down to basic political realities. Until very
recently, we lived in an era when the bounty of river and sea was considered
virtually inexhaustible - which might have been true enough until industrial fish-
harvesting technologies and a wide variety of habitat destroying activity on land
had taken their toll. Even today, whenever a fish population temporarily rebounds,
usually for reasons beyond human understanding, some fisheries managers use the
event as a reason to dismiss concerns about threatened aquatic ecosystems as
misguided doom and gloom. We've seen it with climate change, we've seen it with
the Atlantic cod fishery: regardless of what the preponderance of scientific
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evidence might say, governments are reluctant to take meaningful and coordinated
action as long as there are louder voices pressing them to stay the course.
In the late 1980s, the UN's Brundtland commission issued a wake-up call by
drawing attention to the interdependence of economic, environmental and
community long-term well-being. 'Sustainable development' has been a common
phrase ever since. The problem remains that, without strong government commit-
ments and a clear understanding of what it takes to achieve sustainable devel-
opment, what was once a call to arms risks being reduced to an empty catchphrase.
With aquatic ecosystems, it's all too tempting to adopt an 'out of sight, out of
mind' approach and hope for the best. Who knows? Maybe things aren't as bad as
they seem. But that's a faint hope at a time when it appears the world will increas-
ingly depend on fish for its food needs. Is aquaculture the answer? Then we need
to make sure that we conserve genetically diverse wild stocks so that we still have
the opportunity to breed the best farmed ones.
It's essentially the same story in the search for powerful medicines or novel
industrial applications that are based on the knowledge we get from studying deep
sea organisms and other forms of aquatic life. Increasingly, we see the potential
value of aquatic genetic resources for all kinds of social purposes, but they're disap-
pearing before we've had a chance to understand how they might be used - and in
some cases before we've even discovered that a species exists in the first place.
Changing attitudes towards conservation: A steep learning
curve
The genetics of fish have been studied for decades, and even before the advent of
fast and sensitive tools such as DNA fingerprinting it was clear that single species
could be subdivided into separate, genetically distinct populations. But the impor-
tance of this fact was generally lost on fisheries managers - the people who make
the decisions on where, how and how much fishermen can fish. And since there
was no fish farming until comparatively recently, the practical value of aquatic
genetic resources, as opposed to their evolutionary significance, simply wasn't
recognized.
Fisheries managers are gradually beginning to pay attention to genetic diversity.
What is difficult for people familiar with genetic resources issues in agriculture to
appreciate is the struggle this newfound awareness represents, and the 'newness' of
the concept of aquatic genetic resources to policy makers. As illustrated by Box
2.1, it can take a very long time for this awareness to translate into policy change,
especially at a time of declining government resources and increasing competition
for a share of dwindling fisheries resources.
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Box 2.1 Protecting ttte Generic Diveisity of Pacific Salmon
Before the mid-1980s, commercial salmon fisheries in British Columbia and the large recre-
ational fisheries for trout were managed with little if any attention to genetic diversity. Little
was known about the actual genetic separation of different stocks of the same species of
salmon or trout, and most of the basis for even assuming there were separate stocks was
anecdotal. Fishermen claimed they could recognize different stocks, and there was genetic
evidence that pointed to separation, but the fish were generally harvested as though each
species was homogeneous.
When Canada's DFO opened a sockeye salmon fishery on the Fraser River, the fact that
there were numerically small sockeye stocks that went up small tributaries, and huge stocks
that went up others, was not generally taken into account. Sockeye were sockeye, and if an
opening had a disproportionate impact on certain stocks nobody was worrying about it, offi-
cially or unofficially. For trout, which are traditionally 'enhanced' through hatcheries to serve
the sports fishery, transplantation of a single hatchery stock into innumerable small lakes was
the norm. Trout were trout. And that was the situation not just for salmonids in Canada, but for
fish everywhere - at a time when plant gene banking was already extensive.
In 1992, when a non-profit organization tried to interest fisheries authorities in saving
salmon genetic resources, the response was generally negative. While the occasional
government biologist saw the need to preserve genetic diversity and worried about the
effects on small stocks of the mixed stock fishery, their managers were protective, and the
image that upset them most was the gene bank. Gene banks were 'technical fixes', which
deflected attention away from the 'real' problem of habitat loss and, in the words of a one time
provincial Director of Fisheries, they were a way to turn a quick profit on fish genetic
resources.1 The implicit objection, and possibly the most powerful, was that collecting
genetic resources for conservation was another way of saying that fisheries managers
weren't doing their jobs, and in a decade of turmoil where fisheries were being shut down
and closures were almost daily media events, managers were understandably sensitive.
When several British Columbia First Nations later became interested in salmon gene
banking, the government of British Columbia formally declined to support it.
But the decline in the British Columbia salmon fisheries was undeniable, and after relentless
criticism from conservation NGOs, fisheries agencies in British Columbia began to change
their policies on genetic diversity. The first development was a reversal of decades long
reliance on salmon hatcheries that provided large numbers of genetically simiiar fish for
stocking streams. Hatcheries came to be seen as another 'technical fix', and in the mid-1990s
the federal fisheries minister stated publicly that genetic diversity was important and needed
to be conserved. Fishing openings that could adversely affect small, genetically unique
stocks were closed in a courageous attempt to reduce the 'editing out' of genetic diversity that
mixed stock fisheries entailed. DFO began developing a new Wild Salmon Policy that specifi-
cally elevated genetic diversity to a cardinal principle. In 1998, the department contracted the
training of its own technicians in gene banking and began collecting selected stocks from
several salmon species. In 2002, the department took over the gene banking programme
entirely, essentially importing a technology it had abandoned research on 15 years ago.
The point js not that DFO is doing its own gene banking but rather the painful process by
which fisheries managers became sensitized to the importance of genetic diversity. In 15
years, one government department went from funding its own research on genetic conser-
vation to reinventing it at many times the original cost. Multiply this experience by the thou-
sands of fisheries departments in the world, and add in the youth offish farming as an activity
that relies on genetic diversity, and you have some idea of the gulf between plant and aquatic
genetic resources. Aquatic genetic resources hav6 always been lhere» but their significance
has laeen hidden because they were the basis for the Iftst great; wild harvest indulged in by
humankind ̂  fjshirjes. It was only when fisheries began to falter, and aquaeulture began to
make demands for starting material, that aquatic gfenetic resources deemed to matter.
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What to conserve?
Because so little is known about fish species and stocks that may become
important to aquaculture, industry and conservation in the future, it is important
to conserve not only currently economically valuable aquatic genetic resources but
also those that may be useful in the future. In southern countries, fisheries have
generally proceeded in the complete absence of information on the very existence
of individual genetic stocks. In other words, there has been a tendency to focus on
abundance of fish stocks that are economically valuable now rather than the
genetic diversity needed to ensure future value.
The mobility offish and the financial and technical constraints to gene banking
are two factors that differentiate fish genetic resources conservation from crop and
forestry genetic resource conservation (Hodgkin and Ouedraogo, 1996). Yet there
is another consideration. Sustainable management of aquatic biodiversity depends
on conserving the many diverse aquatic organisms that make up food webs and
contribute to maintaining environmental quality (Pullin and Casal, 1996). While
an ecosystem approach to conservation would help sustain ecosystem health while
protecting individual species, creating genetic resource policy that reflects such
complex ecosystem needs has never been done before. In the past, governments
have been reluctant to adopt an ecosystem approach to fish conservation,
primarily because of cost, conflicting economic interests, and scientific uncer-
tainty. This attitude is changing, but the practical ability to 'manage for bio-
diversity' is still limited, probably because it is so daunting. If every aquatic
organism depends on every other one, which one do you conserve?
Taking communities into account in conservation policy
The three interdependent components of sustainable development are a
sustainable economy, sustainable ecosystems, and sustainable communities. It's
well understood that government and industry have a responsibility to conserve
ecosystems that, if protected, will provide the natural capital for future genera-
tions. Healthy economies and healthy ecosystems in turn contribute to main-
taining healthy communities. The part that's often overlooked in the equation is
the important role that traditional communities, as opposed to government or
industry, can play in conserving ecosystems - provided they have the right, the
means and the motivation to do so.
The importance of community stability to the conservation of aquatic resources
may seem obvious, but it has not always been front and centre in policy making. In
the market-based economy, the chips fall where they may. Traditional community
livelihoods can disappear for any of a number of reasons, including the inability to
compete with large-scale commercial fisheries (or aquaculture) and the destruction
of fish habitat as a result of logging, mining, or urban development. Many long
established indigenous and local communities have developed a careful balance
between maintaining stable local economies and sustaining the ecosystems needed
to support them. When local economies are disrupted, traditional ecosystem
management systems are disrupted as well. Local people need livelihoods that are
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both conservation based and economically sustainable. Case Study 1 graphically
illustrates how dependent ecosystem conservation can be on the protection of local
fisheries livelihoods in areas like Brazil's Rio Negro.
The countries that have ratified the CBD (almost all the countries in the world)
are committed, under Article 8(j), to maintaining and promoting traditional
community practices relevant to the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity. Governments can use a variety of tools to do so. These may include
actively promoting co-management of aquatic ecosystems and resources, devel-
oping programmes to support the expansion of sustainable fisheries livelihoods,
and directly involving communities in making policy. In addition, as suggested by
Article 8(j), they can ensure that indigenous and local communities share in the
benefits resulting from the use of aquatic genetic resources. Carefully considered
benefits, whether monetary or non-monetary, can strengthen the economies of
fishing communities in a way that takes ecosystem sustainability into account as
well. We will discuss how this might be achieved in later chapters.
BANKING BLUE GENES:
Collections of aquatic genetic resources
Aquatic genetic diversity can be conserved in three ways:
• By protecting the habitat of aquatic creatures from urban development, dam
building, forestry, pollution, etc.
• By regulating fishing.
• By collecting and storing genetic material (eg fish sperm or whole fish) in gene
banks that can both guard against extinction and preserve material until science
is ready or able to use it (eg to enhance farmed stocks).
Ideally, all three of these approaches complement one another. Ironically, the third
approach - by far the simplest and least expensive - has proven to be the most
difficult to implement.
Where once farmers in local communities stored seeds from one year's harvest
to use in the next, today an elaborate system of international gene banks stores
genetic material from around the world, in trust for the benefit of all humankind.
For example, the International Rice Genebank, established in 1977, now holds in
cold storage more than 90,000 samples of cultivated rice and wild species, donated
by more than 100 countries. The IRRI states on its website (www
irri.org/GRC/irg/biodiv-genebank.htm) that the seeds are held in trust and are
made available to the world's scientists in the public and private sectors.
As we'll discuss later, the rules for access to genetic resources collections held by
plant gene banks are one of the most troublesome issues for policy makers (Who
really owns the seeds? The gene bank? The country that provided them? The
communities from which they originally came? The farmers whose ancestors
developed new strains either accidentally or by design?). The point is that someone
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had the foresight to make sure that plant genetic resources around the world are
conserved for humanity's best interest, however that might be determined, and
governments around the world have come on board to encourage and support the
collections. Regardless of the politics, the theory of conserving what might be lost
forever and using it for future human (consumer and commercial) benefit is
sound. The same theory is equally applicable to aquatic genetic resources.
Current collections of aquatic genetic resources are usually maintained in gene
banks for aquaculture or conservation. Gene banks have already been introduced
in Chapter 1, and both end uses of gene banking rely on similar technologies and
pose similar questions of policy. In the discussion that follows, the emphasis is on
gene banks for aquaculture, but many of the issues regarding collection and access
are the same for gene banks aimed at research or 'restoration' of endangered stocks.
Why bank fish genes?
A gene bank is a collection of genetic resources. Collections may take many forms.
They may be living plants or animals conserved in situ (in place) or ex situ (at a
location remote from their natural habitat). Alternatively, they may contain only
reproductive material such as seeds, which can be stored for years before needing
periodic regeneration, or cryopreserved sperm, which can be stored indefinitely.
Either way, gene banks maintain the raw material for food security and the means
to breed better crops, farm better fish, or repopulate depleted stocks.
Agricultural gene banks have proven invaluable where an agricultural crop has
been devastated by disease, for example, the case of rice in Indonesia in the mid-
1970s. A gene for resistance to the disease was found in one sample of a variety of
rice collected in 1963 in India. Without its presence in a gene bank, it is unlikely
that a gene for resistance would ever have been found. There are over 460 plant
gene banks throughout the world, including approximately a dozen major ones
established under the auspices of the CGIAR. These gene banks all communicate
with one another and exchange material.
Fish gene banks could fill many of the same functions as plant gene banks, as
well as new ones, such as providing wild genetic material for efforts to rebuild
depleted stocks. Collections of aquatic genetic resources can be 'broodstock collec-
tions' ('living gene bank') or 'cryopreserved gene banks' of frozen sperm or
embryos. Broodstock collections take up space and are more expensive than cryo-
preserved banks to replenish and maintain. Most cryopreserved banks are for fish
sperm, although methods for freezing bivalve (oyster and clam) gametes and
embryos have recently made possible gene banks for these groups. There is still no
technology for gene banking of crustaceans (shrimp, etc).
The history of fish gene banks is short (approximately two decades) and
although there are a number of large state-run collections (for example, those in
Norway, India, Russia, and Finland), the bulk of the cryopreserved material is held
in small private or university-based banks whose numbers are nowhere near those
for plants. There is no coordination between these banks. Nevertheless, the range
of species held is broad, and techniques for new species are being developed all the
time. Those that do exist serve a variety of functions, including as repositories of
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wild genetic material as a source for breeding, private banks of genetically
improved broodstock, and banks of sperm collected by government agencies and
aboriginal groups as a means of assisting recovery efforts for wild stocks. Banks of
sperm from freshwater fish predominate, which reflects the preponderance of
cultured freshwater species rather than any greater ease of freezing gametes from
such species (marine species are in fact technically easier to cryopreserve).
Commercial use of frozen fish germplasm has already begun. For example, west
coast salmon farms in Canada have recently begun to draw on private gene banks
in their broodstock programmes (see Case Study 2), and genetically improved
tilapia strains bred from wild broodstock collected in Africa are represented in a
bank in the Philippines (Case Study 4). Fish breeders or conservationists without
access to these banks must rely on existing wild stocks to obtain the raw material
needed to rebuild depleted stocks and engage in selective breeding of farmed
stocks, and access will only come with the development of regional and national
policies on exchanging material held in fish gene banks.
The collection of genetic resources for fish is coloured by a sense of urgency that
reflects the extreme pressures on aquatic ecosystems. By the time aquaculturists
and hatchery managers make significant progress in developing genetically
improved broodstocks, there may be much less wild genetic material left to work
with. Overfishing and habitat destruction have both taken an immense toll, and
climate change may well contribute to further losses of aquatic genetic diversity.
Gene banking helps ensure that genetic variability of threatened fish stocks will
not be lost while efforts to restore and preserve habitat continue. For species with
economic value in aquaculture, gene banking safeguards biodiversity for later use
in selective breeding.
Policy implications: Getting local permission to collect
aquatic genetic resources
Future developments in cryopreservation technology will undoubtedly expand the
number of aquatic gene banks, and this will have implications for ease of use and
type of user. Before about 1995, for example, cryopreservation offish sperm
required costly equipment and laboratory facilities. With the introduction of inex-
pensive field kits, however, companies, fisheries agencies and aboriginal groups are
now able to create their own gene banks, relying on outside assistance only for
training and inventory management.
As the number of banks grows, so does the number of potential conflicts, espe-
cially as collections begin to concentrate on species and populations that are
declining. The most likely conflicts will be where access is sought to genetic
resources of commercially important species in areas where local and indigenous
communities have some management rights. Paradoxically, this conflict may be
worsened by the move towards greater local participation in resource
management, as local communities deal with more requests for genetic material
from locally managed stocks. Development agencies and governments cannot
encourage communities to manage their own resources, including genetic
resources, without also providing the policy tools for maintaining some degree of
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local control. In this sense, a request to extract genetic resources is no different
from a fishing incursion by a neighbour or competing stakeholder: both require
guidelines and policies.
The collection, storage and transport of plant and animal genetic resources has
been the subject of intense international debate for decades, and there is a growing
body of standards specifically for plants and animals. While the CBD is meant to
encompass all genetic resources, in reality it is the outcome of the debate on plant
and terrestrial animal resources. For aquatic animals, there are no standards
beyond what some local agencies and jurisdictions have set for themselves. The
Canadian DFO, for example, does salmon gene banking (for conservation
reasons) within the framework of existing rules on transplantation of gametes and
disease control, but there are no specific guidelines or policies for access and
benefit sharing. Canadian First Nations, several of which collect salmon genetic
resources (also for conservation and possibly including some of the same stocks
that DFO collects), may opt to operate according to their own internal guidelines.
The situation is like all ad hoc arrangements: convenient, and more or less
smoothly functioning until too many people get involved. As we have seen above,
increased involvement is inevitable. If policies are not developed to cope with it,
conflict will also be inevitable.
Increases in regulatory complexity for collection of aquatic genetic resources
will mean increased cost to collectors. As a relatively new commercial activity, fish
farming is likely to go through many cycles as species enter culture and become
established. For many species, a boom follows establishment of the first farms,
then is succeeded by a decline in prices (as supply increases) and the eventual
weeding out of players. Hence it is difficult to predict how commercial operations
will view any increase in costs associated with new policies for collection and
exchange of genetic resources. Regulations that apply to the industry are still being
developed for other areas (pollution, certification, other environmental effects), so
it's reasonable to assume that farms will take new policies on genetic resources in
their stride.
Meanwhile, fish farmers wait for access policies to be developed. Case Study 2 at
the end of this chapter describes the dilemma of a salmon farmer, frustrated and
thwarted in his attempts to collect 'pure' broodstock from a spawning stream
because the government had yet to turn its mind to policy development.
Steps towards an international system for aquatic genetic
resources
The present plant gene banking system has grown out of many decades of
collection of plant genetic resources and their use in developing new crops. It has
followed the metamorphosis of genetic resources from the 'heritage of
humankind' to the subject of the largest international convention ever signed,
from an era when disinterested collectors were welcome in local communities to a
time where national governments are shutting down access. It primarily serves the
needs of crop breeders working with highly evolved breeds grown on a large scale
in monoculture in simplified ecosystems.
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As we have seen, aquatic genetic resources are important not only in large-scale,
intensive aquaculture (the closest parallel to modern agriculture), but also in
small-scale farming systems that are more connected with natural ecosystems, as
well as in the production of wild stocks that continue to be provided by ecosystems
that are essentially unaltered. The collection and use of aquatic genetic resources
for these kinds of endeavours is just beginning. In some ways this is a good thing
for policy makers, because with the CBD in place in so many countries the
ground-rules are far clearer than they ever were for plants. The problem for aquatic
genetic resource collections is thus less one of knowing the rules and profiting
from the experience in the plant world, and more a matter of organization and
coordination. One similarity is, however, very clear: as in agriculture, aquaculture
seed supplies are becoming concentrated in fewer and fewer hands as fish farmers
look to outside sources for fish seed (Welcomme, 1999). In some cases they may in
fact have no choice, and local varieties with desirable culture characteristics may
actually be supplanted by species or varieties being promoted by seed companies.
Nevertheless, many fish farms still depend on collection of wild broodstock, and
research on genetic modification of farmed fish relies heavily on the analysis and
selection of traits from a wide diversity of wild stocks.
One of the main problems with having a number of disconnected collections
that have been assembled for various reasons (aquaculture, conservation/
enhancement, pharmaceutical, pure research) is that there is no common ground
or purpose. A private company maintaining a bank of catfish sperm for their aqua-
culture operations is unlikely to travel in the same circles, read the same journals or
attend the same meetings as a research scientist with a gene bank of zebra fish
sperm or a government biologist collecting wild salmon genetic material for
conservation. All of them may be unfamiliar with the CBD. If one considers that
gene banking of aquatic organisms has been going on, in small, scattered
programmes like these since the mid-1970s, two things are clear: Firstly, a lot of
aquatic genetic resources are being collected, managed and used for many
purposes. Secondly, the standardization so evident in plant gene banking
(collection techniques, preservation techniques, consent and publication of
holdings) is completely absent.
There are, however, clear signs that this situation will change. Since the late
1970s, FAO has convened periodic consultations and conferences on aquatic
genetic resources, aided in the 1990s by World Fisheries Trust and ICLARM (now
World Fish Center). This series of consultations led in the late 1990s to recog-
nition that there already exists a large amount of information on aquatic genetic
resources. Drawing on the experience of FAO in creating the Domestic Animal
Diversity Information System (DADIS), World Fisheries Trust and FAO began to
promote a similar consolidation and standardization of aquatic animal diversity
information. The programme, provisionally called Fisheries Information Network
on Genetic Resources (FINGER), began with an expert consultation in Rome in
November 2001, and has now progressed to a pilot study to collect existing infor-
mation on key species.
Although FINGER goes well beyond the collections of aquatic genetic
resources held in gene banks (it includes, for example, gene sequences from
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aquatic organisms, as well as museum collections) it is probably a necessary step in
the creation of a gene banking system anything like the one that exists for plants.
It will certainly have some basic differences from the plant system, but it will defi-
nitely be a powerful tool for policy creation, because the system will establish stan-
dardized communications between isolated collections, as well as rules for access to
information on the collections.
Although building the system will take time, it will eventually afford a unified
picture of the state and extent of aquatic genetic resource collections. If a unified
gene banking system for aquatic organisms ever does emerge, it will reflect the
diversity of uses and motives revealed by FINGER.
ACCESS TO AQUATIC GENETIC RESOURCES COLLECTIONS
Countries' interdependence on genetic resources
Even the most biologically self-sufficient countries look to other parts of the world
for genetic resources for crop development. Wheat originated in the Near East, but
the genes that led to semi-dwarf wheats came from Japan via the US and Mexico.
Disease-resistant genes found in Central America may support crop yields as far
away as India (Crucible Group, 1994). The deliberate movement of aquatic
species out of their countries of origin is much more recent, and less extensive,
than that of plants, primarily because of the relative difficulty of transporting fish
over long distances (although movement of alien species 'by accident' is another
matter). With the exception of a few widely cultured species, the diversity of a food
fish species is likely to be confined to a country or a group of neighbouring coun-
tries.
The exceptions to this rule are, however, significant. Tilapias, for example, are
an African fish now cultured all over the world (see Case Study 4), and the Atlantic
salmon is now cultured widely in North and South America, thousands of kilo-
metres away from its original habitat. In both cases, culture of the transplanted
domesticated species has caused controversy related to genetic effects on native
species, and has even reduced the options for culturing them. When a subsistence
farmer wants to supplement his income with small-scale fish culture, farming a
local species may not be an option, especially when (as in Brazil, for example) the
state is actively promoting tilapias.
Interdependence among countries for crop genetic resources has been a primary
stimulus for international collaboration in their exchange and use. Examples are
the formation of the CGIAR germplasm collections, and efforts to develop a
multilateral system for access to genetic resources and the sharing of benefits.
There is much less evidence of such collaboration in the fish world, although this
may change as further progress is made in fish breeding efforts and exchange
(Raymond, 1999). The existence of regional aquaculture networks such as the
Network of Aquaculture Centres in Asia is evidence of such a trend, as is FAO's
work towards establishing the FINGER information system for aquatic animal
genetic resources.
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Kinds of demand for access
As we have seen, collections of aquatic genetic resources are developing in an ad
hoc way. Pharmaceutical and aquaculture companies, research institutes and
government agencies have been the primary initiators. In addition, some
indigenous communities have recently begun cryopreserving fish sperm.
Communication about the nature, purpose, location and indeed the very existence
of collections is poor. As communication improves, demands for access to collec-
tions (now so commonplace for plant genetic resources) will begin to occur. What
will these demands be like, and what should be the policies to deal with them?
Examples of access demands might include a government agency requesting
genetic resources collected by a conservation society, an aquaculture company
requesting genetic resources held by an indigenous community, or a university
researcher wishing to experiment with genetic resources collected by government,
industry or a local community. All such requests will raise a number of issues, not
all of them related to ownership. For example, are the genetic resources (which
may exist in the frozen state) any different from the fish that provided them? Does
the requesting party need to go through the identical permission steps followed by
the original collector? If the genetic material is to be transported outside the
original watershed, who grants permission?
Clearly if there are no policies in place regarding the original collections, the
situation will only get more complicated once requests are made for access to
them. This is illustrated, for example, by CGIAR's (2001) development of guide-
lines for the acquisition and transfer of aquatic germplasm. The guidelines are
designed to comply with Article 15 of the CBD, which provides that access to
genetic resources shall be on mutually agreed terms and subject to the prior
informed consent of the contracting party (country) providing the resources. The
guidelines require CGIAR Centres to obtain 'proper, formal permission from the
relevant authorized government body prior to collecting or acquiring any
germplasm' by way of a letter of agreement, germplasm acquisition agreement, or
other legal document, contract or agreement. While the guidelines may satisfy the
requirements of Article 15, there is no guarantee that nations of origin have
developed policies that govern access to collections within the country or to
aquatic genetic resources generally. In most countries such policies are non-
existent or haphazard at best, yet their development will be essential to achieving
the CBD's objectives.
The following examples illustrate some of the difficulties created by current
policy gaps.
Canada: Cultus Lake sockeye
One characteristic of genetic resource collection, especially those in gene banks
from which samples can literally be taken 'off the shelf, is their unpredictable
utility. A current example is provided by the case of Cultus Lake sockeye salmon.
Cultus Lake sockeye are a much diminished population of British Columbia
salmon that spawn in a small lake attached to a tributary of the Fraser River.
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Representative males of the stock were gene banked in 1995 by the Canadian
DFO, as part of a study demonstrating the utility of cryopreservation technology.
The samples remained in storage for six years, paid for by the departmental
research laboratory originally involved in their collection. Recently, two events
raised the profile of the collection. First, the Cultus Lake stock became critically
depressed, to the extent that it was proposed for listing under the new Species At
Risk Act, and a separate division of the same fisheries department began to
contemplate using the collection to restore the stock, and indeed to add to the
collection.
Second, a new parasite began to decimate many of the salmon stocks in the area,
including the Cultus stock, and the material frozen in 1995 had a sudden interest
for researchers wanting to compare gametes from present day stock with stocks in
'pre-parasite' days. The upshot is that a stock cryopreserved almost at random is
now the subject of discussion between two government departments, which will
have to share a limited collection. A neighbouring First Nation, whose sockeye
stocks have been hard hit by the same parasite, is now interested in taking part in
any expanded gene banking operation in the coming years.
Brazil: DNA fingerprinting and cryopreservation offish sperm
Another example is from Brazil, where the recent acquisition of Canadian tech-
nologies for fish gene banking and DNA fingerprinting has created local capacity
not only for collection, storage and exchange of genetic resources (in the form of
frozen sperm) but also for amassing information on the genetic structure of fish
populations. Both the banked gametes and the DNA sequence information have
potential application in conservation, management and aquaculture. The
government of Brazil has been careful to insist on a clause in the technology
transfer agreement that stipulates that no genetic material shall leave the country,
and there are regulations in place within the country that theoretically control the
access to aquatic genetic resources both by Brazilian nationals and by foreigners.
Outsiders must, for example, secure the cooperation of a Brazilian institution
before collecting any biological material, and IBAMA grants a special scientific
collecting licence to Brazilian scientists to collect specimens for research.
Neither arrangement says anything about the acquisition or transfer of genetic
resources between sectors within the country. However, collections of migratory
fish genetic resources are slowly being built up in Brazil by universities, the private
sector and government. Transfer between sectors is entirely feasible. An example
might be the use of cryopreserved wild genetic resources for aquaculture trials by a
university extension department, resulting in development of an improved brood-
stock that could then be provided to farms throughout the country. Yet there are
no formal national policies to control such transfers. The government of Brazil is
clearly sensitive about genetic resources leaving the country, but how they are
moved around within the country and between sectors seems not to be regulated.
Both of the technologies in this example - cryopreservation and DNA finger-
printing - are rapidly expanding into new countries and organizations, and both
are capable of quickly generating highly mobile collections of genetic resources or
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genetic resource information. DNA fingerprinting is especially powerful and, once
the technology is in place, demands very little in the way of sample collection. A
tiny clip of fin or even a single scale is enough to provide valuable genetic infor-
mation about the population being studied, and that information has value not
only for management of stocks but also potentially for breeding. The proposed
FINGER referred to earlier would provide a 'home' for such information, and by
its very creation stimulate the development of policies on its sharing.
Access to indigenous collections
The ability to cryopreserve fish sperm in the field means that collections can be
started by anyone. If an indigenous group is involved, the need for policy becomes
acute. For example, several collections of salmon genetic material, including those
of the Carrier-Sekani and Shuswap First Nations in Canada, are maintained inde-
pendently of any government agency. Collectors notify the DFO of their intention
and receive 'permission' to take sperm from salmon, but one need only consider
the implications of the ongoing treaty process between First Nations and
government to imagine a number of scenarios for which there is presently no
policy framework whatsoever:
• Does a First Nation really need the permission from the government?
• If a company requests a sample of genetic material from a First Nations gene
bank, who adjudicates the request, and against what criteria?
• If the company wants to start its own collection in a First Nation's 'territory', to
whom should they apply for permission?
• Once gametes are 'on the shelf, should they continue to be treated as though
they are simply part of a fish that was freshly collected for research purposes?
Questions like this need to be confronted when developing policy. In the case
described above, the only existing permitting mechanisms deal exclusively with
living fish or their gametes, and are intended to prevent disease transmission or the
transfer offish from one watershed to another. Gene banking is not even contem-
plated.
Access to locally developed breeds
Small-scale fish farmers often invest years of selective breeding effort in developing
broodstocks that thrive in local conditions. The original broodstock need not
necessarily be an indigenous species. In Vietnam, for example, a farmed strain of
the indigenous common carp may be an important reservoir of genetic diversity
with characteristics that are important for poor families. This particular strain,
grown in rice fields, is valuable because it does not leave terraced fields when they
are periodically flooded. An 'improved' strain of carp, with better growth perfor-
mance, is now being promoted for rice field culture, yet this new strain requires
significant physical improvements in the pond environment. The biodiversity
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value of the existing strain is now being recognized, and represents a considerable
investment on the part of farmers over many years (Edwards et al, 2000).
The situation is analogous to a farmer cultivating a crop variety that represents
several generations of improvement. The result, in both cases, is genetic material
with added value. In the plant world, the concept of farmers' rights arose to protect
this investment of effort, but there is no similar concept for aquatic farming.
MANAGING AQUATIC GENETIC RESOURCES:
Filling the policy vacuum
In 1992, the CBD emphasized the need for effective national policies for the
conservation and use of biodiversity and genetic resources. More than ten years
later, a few developing countries have put new laws into place, but most countries
have made little progress towards effective policies for aquatic genetic resources.
Such policies are needed not only to ensure better management but also to pave
the way for policies for access to aquatic genetic resources. The absence of clear or
enforceable policies regarding fisheries management, aquaculture development
and gene banking, for example, could complicate developing guidelines for evalu-
ating access applications. Clear policies, supported by adequate information, can
also facilitate the negotiation of access agreements by determining how the provi-
sions of an agreement can promote conservation, as well as the usefulness of
aquatic genetic resources to donor countries and communities.
Efforts to create aquatic versions of plant-related policies are doomed to failure.
While legal regimes governing the conservation and use of different types of bio-
diversity may share some common characteristics, it is also important to develop
policies that reflect the biological and social realities of the harvest of aquatic life.
Because so few of these are known, aquatic genetic resource policy is generally
conspicuous by its absence.
Conservation of aquatic genetic resources works at several levels, including
sustaining individual fisheries and ecosystems that depend on diversity. In recent
years the depletion of fish stocks has sparked an intense interest in fish genetic
resource conservation (Harvey et al, 1998). Conservation mechanisms can include
fishing quotas or prohibitions, habitat protection and restoration, gene banking,
and promoting sustainable community fisheries. The primary emphasis to date
has been on fishing limitations and habitat protection.
Yet the degradation of fish stocks and expansion of conservation programmes
comes at a time when the aquaculture industry's need for wild genetic material is
increasing rapidly. Moreover, the wild relatives of most farmed aquatic species
greatly exceed, both in abundance and genetic diversity, the farmed populations
(Bartley and Pullin, 1999), a situation that is the reverse of that for domestic
animal diversity. Hence there is still a reservoir of wild genetic diversity for
sustainable use. Unfortunately, there are few national or state policies for its
conservation.
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Development of policies governing fish gene banking is a good example of the
complexity of the problem, as it must consider the technology not only as an
insurance policy against extinctions but also as a source of genetic material for
breeding programmes. These are two very different applications that are usually
promoted by different stakeholders. Policy must also take into account how the
technology can affect spread of disease among watersheds, facilitate introductions
and transfers of stocks and species outside their natural ranges, and raise
ownership and control issues that arise not only out of collection of genetic
resources but also out of their potential use years or even decades later (Harvey,
1999).
The bottom line: Poor information equals poor policy
Policies for the conservation and sustainable use of aquatic genetic resources are
still poorly developed in most countries. Those that exist have tended to be
developed in reaction to crises, through closure of vanishing fisheries such as cod
in Atlantic Canada. Until recently, policy making for fisheries and aquaculture has
rarely considered genetic resources, concentrating instead on harvest levels of indi-
vidual species and protection of fish health. Mismanagement of aquatic genetic
resources has continued in spite of growing public awareness of environmental
issues (Hartley and Pullin, 1999).
Several related factors contribute to the current policy vacuum. In addition to
limitations on knowledge of aquatic compared to other types of biological
resources, the inaccessibility of the aquatic realm and the difficulty of policing
what cannot be seen act as deterrents. Lack of understanding of the genetic
structure offish populations has been an obvious impediment: if genetic diversity
is not yet described, how can it be the subject of policy? And until recently, the
myth that aquatic production is inexhaustible has prevailed, and fish have been
viewed as common property available to all takers, within a wide range of access
regimes. Policies on using aquatic genetic resources also have to take into account
public concerns about the use of genetically modified organisms and environ-
mental impacts of industrial aquaculture, and need to acknowledge uncertainty
about the functioning of genes and genotypes in aquatic systems both in nature
and on farms (Bartley and Pullin, 1999).
Barely scratching the surface: Limitations to scientific knowledge
Most aquatic genetic resources have yet to be characterized (Correa, 1999). Many
are still undiscovered, while the genetic fine structure of those species that are
known has only begun to be studied. Unlike terrestrial life, aquatic life inhabits a
hidden and relatively inaccessible environment. Despite repeated calls for
'ecosystem-based management' of fisheries, knowledge of aquatic ecosystems is far
less complete than that of terrestrial ones.
Although the majority of known species are terrestrial (May, 1988), some
marine biologists have suggested that 80 per cent of all species that will eventually
be discovered will be aquatic (Plotkin, 2000). For example, only about 45,000 out
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of a potential million freshwater species have been described (McAllister et al,
1997). The potential for new discoveries of aquatic organisms that can be farmed
or extracted for useful chemicals is huge, and maximizing the potential for aqua-
culture development alone will depend on a much better understanding of wild
fish stocks and their properties.
Identification of new marine species largely follows academic interests,
although any interesting finds are likely to prompt at least a preliminary look from
the pharmaceutical industry. Scientific research itself requires access to genetic
resources quite apart from any later collection for 'economic' purposes, yet encour-
agement of research is vital to understanding the value and threats to aquatic
genetic resources. Strategies for their use and conservation cannot be developed
without this knowledge.
The FAO of the United Nations maintains fishery production statistics that
represent one of the best data sets on aquatic resources and are relied upon for
management decisions. However, such statistics are based on harvest and do not
include a complete assessment of stocks (Bartley and Pullin, 1999).
Moreover, they are heavily compromised by the ability of individual nations to
report them and hence give a very imperfect picture of the biodiversity of oceans
and especially of inland waters.
Limitations of traditional knowledge
Traditional knowledge of plants contributes enormously to the development of
improved crop strains in the agriculture industry and of drugs in the pharmaceu-
tical industry. The knowledge held by traditional fishing communities can
complement and help focus research activities and is an important asset in deter-
mining the properties of aquatic genetic resources. Familiarity with fish migration
routes, spawning cycles and the habitat preferences of different species, for
example, has been passed from generation to generation and today can contribute
to efforts to identify desirable characteristics for breeding farmed stocks and
conserving wild ones. Especially in southern countries, communities may also
have knowledge of marine organisms and their toxic or medicinal properties that
may be useful in the development of drugs and other products.
But plant and aquatic genetic resources differ greatly in both the nature and
extent of traditional knowledge, a key point that affects the development of access
policy and to which we will return at length in Chapter 4. Much of the knowledge
that has proven most useful in the genetic modification of plants relates to domes-
ticated crops and has been accumulated by farmers over hundreds or thousands of
years. Some rural communities have a lengthy (but much shorter) history of pond
aquaculture, primarily in developing countries, but no experience farming species
currently favoured in industrial aquaculture. What traditional fishing com-
munities can offer is extensive knowledge of aquatic ecosystems and their
management. What they lack, as Chapter 4 will illustrate, is the type of knowledge
of genetic resources that collectors are likely to need — an important deficiency that
could well bar community efforts to negotiate benefits as long as countries specif-
ically link benefit-sharing rights to traditional knowledge.
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Research needs
Scientific understanding of aquatic species and ecosystems is a necessary foun-
dation for conservation of aquatic genetic resources. Research on aquatic genetic
resources is not only far less advanced than for plants but also faces additional
complications associated with the complexity of aquatic ecosystem interactions
and the relative inaccessibility of aquatic ecosystems. Within the last decade, the
fisheries management literature has become dominated by calls for 'ecosystem-
based management'; however, the same literature acknowledges that the scientific
understanding of aquatic food chains is nowhere near where it needs to be for this
change in management to occur. At present, the only true ecosystem-based
management that can occur in fisheries is to set aside protected areas or no-take
zones, a kind of ecosystem management by default.
Both developed and developing countries have paid relatively little attention to
research and development of aquatic genetic resources. In the US, for example,
only 1-2 per cent of the total federal investment on biotechnology has been
devoted to marine biotechnology and aquaculture (Correa, 1999). In Canada, it is
only in the last decade that governments have invested heavily to identify genetic
differences between salmon populations, and it was not until 1999 that the federal
government, which has management authority for salmon, formally declared
conservation of genetic diversity an important management goal. In Africa, fish
are fairly well known at the species level, but within species genetic diversity (the
genetic resources of species) has hardly been studied. Even for African tilapias, the
genetic resources of which have been studied to some extent, the information
available on genetic resources covers less than 40 per cent of the about 70 species
known (Abban, 1999) - and this is the aquatic animal whose culture is spreading
fastest around the world. Developing countries need all the support they can get to
strengthen their aquatic biodiversity information systems and scientific capacity.
Although the importance of research on aquatic genetic resources is now appre-
ciated more than ever (as can be seen from the rapid increase in publications on
fish genetic structure), spending cuts in many countries have taken a significant
bite out of research. The result has been a shift towards corporate sponsored
research, which tends to be focused on practical, profitable applications.
Partnerships, for example, between a university and a corporation, can obviously
bring their own problems if they mean that work is skewed towards industry
needs. It may mean putting the cart before the horse because the cart carries the
cash. Logically, basic science should precede and lead to applied science, but
applied science is more likely to receive corporate funding. The relatively un-
developed state of research on aquatic genetic resources, combined with the urgent
need for information, means that it is particularly susceptible to this bias.
Much of the basic research on genetic resources that has already been done in
the plant world, before access requirements became an international issue, remains
to be accomplished in the fish world. This research includes the all important
characterization of genetic make-up at the subspecies (population or strain) level,
where gains from selective breeding are likely to arise. We have already referred to
the explosion in this kind of research, primarily using the tools of microsatellite
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DNA analysis, for salmonid fishes. Microsatellite research requires the collection
of tissue samples from individual fish (usually a small 'clipping' of fin) and while
the procedure is non-invasive it results in the carrying away of genetic material.
Until southern fisheries research laboratories acquire the technology for DNA
fingerprinting, a process that is still in its early stages, genetic material will need to
be taken from its country of origin for study. If scientific researchers are subject to
the same access rules as corporate bioprospectors, DNA studies or indeed any kind
of biodiversity research project may be subject to cumbersome and expensive
access negotiations. These may further discourage research, especially given the
limited ability of research institutions to provide compensation. Yet without the
basic knowledge of aquatic biodiversity that research provides, governments will
find it difficult to evaluate access applications objectively (Grajal, 1999).
It's a conundrum that will prove difficult to resolve. In the meantime, biologists
and taxonomists in many national biodiversity research institutions are finding it
increasingly difficult to collect genetic material even within their own countries,
and to do their work in the field to generate basic scientific knowledge (Ruiz,
1998). The lag in aquatics-related knowledge means that access to aquatic genetic
resources for basic research may be even more crucial than in plant research, and
impediments are likely to delay advances in uses of aquatic genetics resources,
especially in aquaculture.
Public concerns about genetic modification
One reason policy makers are sometimes reluctant to deal with genetic resources is
that genetic modification is such a hot issue for the general public. Public concerns
about ethical, environmental and health issues related to the use of aquatic genetic
resources differ in nature and extent from those about use of plant genetic
resources. Concerns about environmental impacts of industrial aquaculture
include, for instance, the impact of fish farm escapees on the integrity of wild
stocks, the possibility of spread of disease, and the impacts of farming on local
ecosystems.
'Genetic modification' has only recently entered the public vocabulary, but it
hasn't taken long to become controversial, and public and media concerns are
frequently exacerbated by confusion about its meaning and implications. The
media focus on polarized views has simply clouded the picture. Genetic modifi-
cation of crops by companies such as Monsanto may receive more attention than
work done on fish, in part because so many food products contain genetically
modified ingredients (notably soy derivatives). However, concerns about uses of
aquatic genetic resources are in some respects more intense because a higher form
of life is involved. Many people even refuse to eat farmed fish. For these people,
genetically modified 'super fish' are even less acceptable. Even the idea of a fish
gene being implanted in a strawberry to improve frost resistance is abhorrent to
some, even though the end result may be a berry identical in taste and appearance
to any other.
In addition to worrying about the possible health risks of eating antibiotic-
treated fish, and especially fish from genetically engineered varieties, some
80 BLUE GENES
consumers may feel it's inappropriate to tamper with the genetic structure of living
creatures. A representative of the US Food and Drug Administration, charged
with evaluating Aqua Bounty's request for permission to market the genetically
modified 'Super Salmon, noted that 'ethical concerns among the public over the
appropriate use of animals are issues not evident with transgenic plants, and may
affect public acceptance of transgenic animals as food sources' (Environmental
News Network, 22 October 2001). While this may exaggerate the extent to which
public perceptions offish and plant products differ, the distinction does appear to
influence marketing approvals and will most certainly affect policy. One has only
to consider the spate of official government pronouncements that follow any
announcement of advances in human cloning to appreciate the position of policy
makers.
Efforts by concerned citizens (and policy makers) to make informed judge-
ments on genetic modification issues are frequently confounded by misinfor-
mation. For example, the article quoted above also stated that 'genetically
engineered salmon are designed to grow between 10 and 30 times faster than
natural salmon' - a tenfold exaggeration of Aqua Bounty's description of the
growth rate of the 'Super Salmon'. Distortion of information to support strong
positions is a common failing of advocacy groups on both sides of genetic modifi-
cation issues and simply magnifies public confusion.
In the same way that public interest in wildlife conservation focuses on the 'cute
and cuddly', concerns about genetic modification offish tend to target species like
salmon that capture the public imagination either because they are prized for their
taste or because they are romanticized for their appearance and dramatic life
cycles. By comparison, the genetic modification of mundane species such as tilapia
appears to generate little public attention, perhaps in part because the fish is rarely
sold unprocessed in northern countries. If more people were aware they were
eating tilapia in their fish burgers, this situation might change.
For all these reasons, informed public understanding of the role of aquatic
genetic resources in sustainable development and food security, and of the
complexities of environmental and health issues, is vital to sound policy devel-
opment. In the plant world, the international collaboration referred to above has
helped promote public awareness. For example, the International Plant Genetic
Resources Institute (IPGRI) has tried to increase awareness of the benefits of agri-
cultural biodiversity among policy makers in developing countries, using an
approach that targets the media, NGOs and governmental officials (Raymond,
1999). Given the greater complexity of issues surrounding the use and conser-
vation of aquatic genetic resources, there is a need to enhance both public and
policy makers' understanding of these issues. In many respects, public under-
standing is as vital as scientific knowledge in creating conservation and use policies
that are needed to support the development of access policies.
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Box 2.2 The Value of Sciettce
Policy makers, like any decision makers, want 'facts', They blend these facts with social and
moral considerations and come up with what seems to be a fair compromise™ a policy, in the
case of aquatic genetic resource policies, both scientific and traditional knowledge are
important. We have already seen that traditional knowledge has potential value when it can
lead people to genetic resources, but how important is science?
First, what is science? Science is a tool for describing the natural world in unambiguous
terms. Science works to reduce uncertainties, although it never eliminates them completely.
Scientists are taught the scientific method, which involves asking answerable questions. The
results of scientific enquiry are continually being refined and, along with traditional
knowledge, provide two legs of the three-legged stool on which human societies sit (the third
leg is moral and spiritual beliefs).
Science is important to policy making in several ways. Firstly, it is fundamental in unequiv-
ocally describing genetic variability. Taxonomy identifies genera and species; behavioural
biology describes where they may be found; and genetics helps us draw the blueprints of
their DNA. Science also tells us about the status of aquatic genetic resources through catch
statistics, tagging studies and censuses. Thirdly, and perhaps most important, ecosystem
studies tell us how each component of genetic variability interacts with every other level of
the food chain - a very important insight that can help us predict the effects of removing that
variability from the system.
Policy makers need all of the above kinds of scientific information. The status of genetic
resources alone is enough to illustrate the importance of science - if people have no idea of
how many members of a species or population actually exist, and their prospects for
continuing to exist, how can they devise policies for sharing access? In another example,
one of the most commonly heard calls following the signing of the CBD was for more
taxonomy, because it is impossible to create policies on genetic resources that have not
been described. The Global Taxonomy Initiative of the CBD was recently created in response
to the 'taxonomic impediment' to the sound management of biodiversity, and is evidence that
this call has been heeded.
What happens when policies on aquatic resources are made in the absence of adequate
information? A good example is in the management of freshwater aquaculture in countries
where invasive, exotic species are being promoted. In Brazil, for example, tiiapia farming is
promoted by the Ministry of Agriculture, while the management of wild fish stocks is more
closely allied to the Ministry of Environment. If neither is aware of the degree of invasion of
tilapias into natural waters - something that is measured by science - how can fair policies
be created? If sterile tilapias are created - also a product of science - how does this devel-
opment alter policy?
Another example is from temperate aquaculture, namely the farming of salmon. There is
now widespread concern that escaped farmed salmon will breed with wild stocks and cause
a fundamental change in their genetic make-up, To create fair policies on farming - which w
have already seen involves the collection of genetic resources - people need to know the
incidence and risks of this kind of hybridization and its probable outcomes. These answers
can only be provided by scientific enquiry.
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GLOBAL INITIATIVES FOR IMPROVED MANAGEMENT OF
AQUATIC BIODIVERSITY
To judge by the number of international agreements related to the conservation
and use of aquatic biodiversity, everyone's agreed that the situation is pretty
desperate and it's time for concerted action. The problem with international agree-
ments is that (a) they're not always binding on member countries, (b) countries
whose participation is most crucial all too frequently opt out, and (c) at the
national level, it may take a long time to grapple with domestic complications and
conflicts when it comes to implementing high-minded principles. In the case of
aquatic genetic resources, the problem is that many governments have been far too
preoccupied with difficult plant genetic resources issues to pay much attention to
fish.
International agreements related to aquatic biological
diversity
While most international agreements on aquatic biodiversity focus on fishing,
they frequently mention principles that have direct relevance to the management
and sharing of aquatic genetic resources and can be a good starting point for policy
development.
Some of these agreements will be useful simply for background reference to
aquatic biodiversity issues. Examples of this kind of agreement include the United
Nations General Assembly Resolution on large-scale pelagic drift net fishing, the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the United
Nations Agreement on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Species and the
Kyoto Declaration adopted at the Conference on the Sustainable Contribution of
Fisheries to Food Security. The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (1971) provides
the framework for international cooperation on the use of wetlands and their
resources - a vast designation that embraces virtually all inland waters including
very large, periodically inundated areas that provide subsistence fishing for many
local communities.
Other agreements are more directly relevant. The FAO Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries is a good example. This comprehensive document, with its
accompanying Technical Guidelines, contains the principles of sustainable fish-
eries and is valid not only for nations but for communities as well. The code
promotes the sustainable use of aquatic biodiversity and includes (in Article 7,
Fisheries Management) sections on aquaculture and small-scale, subsistence and
artisanal fisheries.
Another good example is the Jakarta Mandate on Marine and Coastal
Biological Diversity, adopted by signatories of the CBD in 1995. The Jakarta
Mandate not only raised the profile of aquatic biodiversity (a very important
development for policies on access and benefit sharing), but also triggered a Plan
of Work whose activities include local and indigenous communities. A similar
process is currently under way within the CBD, namely the development of a Plan
of Work on Inland Waters. Once this plan of work is created and implemented the
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CBD will house not only the general principles on access and benefit sharing but
also the specific actions on marine and freshwater biological diversity.
Finally, the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), a global programme that
promotes sustainable use of aquatic biodiversity through product certification
('eco labelling') illustrates a practical application of the principles of sustainable
use of aquatic biodiversity. The MSC certifies individual fisheries using criteria
contained in the FAO Code of Conduct described above. Active since the mid-
1990s, the MSC originally concentrated on fisheries in developed countries. In
response to criticism that the certification process actually worked against small-
scale fisheries, the MSC recently began a programme of community certification
and is actively building networks that include community fisheries. This devel-
opment underlines the importance of local communities in fisheries management
and, coming from a pragmatic programme like the MSC, should encourage policy
makers interested in protecting the rights of those communities not simply to go
fishing, but to have a say in access to aquatic genetic resources in their territory.
Aquatic biodiversity issues: The countries' views
Signatories to the CBD have agreed to develop National Biodiversity Strategies
and Action Plans that describe the status and trends of biodiversity in their coun-
tries, important issues, and activities directed towards resolving problems. Not all
countries have produced the strategies, and the quality is highly variable.
Nevertheless, the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plans (NBSAPs) offer
a unique window into the national perception of biodiversity issues.
World Fisheries Trust (WFT) recently examined the NBSAPs of 52 countries in
terms of their coverage of aquatic biodiversity issues. The analysis was done as part
of a report on fisheries and biodiversity that provided national biodiversity
planners with a compendium of key issues and the materials they need to better
incorporate fisheries issues in biodiversity planning (World Fisheries Trust,
2002a). Although WFT's study concentrated on nations with 'outstanding
aquatic biological diversity', and included some of the major fishing nations as
well as developing countries, the findings are instructive for policy makers inter-
ested in access and benefit-sharing issues and the roles of local and indigenous
communities in conserving and using aquatic genetic resources.
If the content of National Reports to the CBD Secretariat is any indication of
national priorities, then it must be said that the WFT study on NBSAPs did not
uncover evidence of national concern over access to aquatic genetic resources.
Articles 15 and 8j (access and traditional knowledge, respectively) are generally not
explicitly represented, a situation that reflects the almost complete lack of national
policies on aquatic genetic resources. National biodiversity planners are much
more likely to worry about aquatic biodiversity in terms of assessment and moni-
toring or pollution reduction than from the standpoint of the sharing of genetic
resources.
However, the importance of aquatic biodiversity for local communities is re-
inforced in other ways. Of 17 issues in aquatic biodiversity identified by WFT, two
of the top three (in terms of frequency of citation by countries) were 'governance'
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and 'responsible fishing', each of which was cited by 70 per cent of the countries
examined. Calls for better governance were near universal, and generally represent
a desire to find new ways of including local communities in fisheries management.
'Alien species', 'native species' and 'aquaculture' were less frequently cited on their
own, but together totalled 80 per cent of the countries — a clear indication that the
raw material of aquatic genetic diversity is also a subject for concern among
planners.
These observations reinforce the main point being made throughout the
present book, namely that aquatic biodiversity is threatened, and local commu-
nities are demanding a greater choice in its management - but they also make it
clear that, for most national policy makers, control over 'aquatic genetic diversity',
is simply not being considered as something to which local communities have
rights. There are exceptions - for example Burundi's attempt to involve local
communities in preserving biodiversity, or Cameroon's difficulty in integrating
indigenous land claims into biodiversity planning - but by and large the issues of
equity and access are not perceived as important. This situation does not appear to
reflect any geographic or political bias because it pertains to both developed and
developing countries. It may not satisfy the Inuit people who are unwilling to
allow genetic prospecting of their Arctic charr stocks (Case Study 3), but it is the
political reality such communities must confront.
This reality may be explained by any of a number of factors, including a lack of
appreciation of the positive role indigenous and local communities could play in
the management of aquatic genetic diversity given the means to do so; a lack of
willingness to delegate authority to 'lower levels' of government, and an absence of
coordination among government agencies. However, assuming that a greater
demand for access to aquatic genetic resources materializes in the future, devel-
oping effective access and benefit-sharing policies should be a vital part of each
country's aquatic biodiversity strategy.
CASE STUDY 2. No POLICY, NO ACCESS? A salmon farmer's
frustrated efforts to collect genetically pure broodstock
A Vancouver Island fish farmer's efforts to collect salmon broodstock in Canada
illustrate the need for policy makers to quickly develop policies governing the
collection of aquatic genetic resources. As this case study illustrates, existing
policies for fisheries management are simply not adequate to deal with such collec-
tions, and may result in evaluations of applications based on irrelevant criteria.
Policy makers need also to ensure that access policies are broad enough to deal
with a wide range of issues.
Five species of salmon - chinook, chum, sockeye, coho and steelhead - return
from the ocean to spawn in the rivers of the Yukon Territory. For some chinook,
the journey lasts four months and covers more than 3000 km from the Bering Sea
to the creeks in the southern part of the territory where the fish originally hatched.
Yukon chinook support commercial and sports fisheries as well as indigenous food
fisheries. The fish is especially prized in Japanese markets for its high oil content.
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As in the Northwest Territory and Nunavut, authority to issue germplasm or
broodstock collection permits rests with the Canadian DFO. Like the Inuit, the
Yukon First Nations (indigenous peoples) have negotiated a land claims agreement
with the Canadian government. Under the terms of the agreement, the main
instrument for salmon management is the Yukon Salmon Committee, which
comprises both First Nation and non-First Nation members and makes recom-
mendations to DFO on fisheries management and policy. Applications to collect
broodstock are made through the Committee, and the Yukon DFO office issues a
collection permit provided the Committee approves the application and DFO has
no objections. The committee can refer applications to individual First Nations
bands, but does not yet have clear protocols for doing so.2
Creative Salmon Ltd, an aquaculture business farming both chinook and
Atlantic salmon in British Columbia, several hundred kilometres south of the
Yukon Territory, decided in the late 1980s to improve its operations by culturing
Yukon River chinook. Domesticating this strain would take several years and
require annual collections of eggs and sperm from the wild. It would also be
complicated in more southerly waters because of the strains exacting requirements
for day length and temperature.
Because chinook populations mingle in the Yukon River on the way to their
separate spawning grounds, Creative Salmon applied to DFO to collect brood-
stock from smaller tributaries where individual populations would already be sepa-
rated from the mixture in the river mouth and lower stages of the river. The
company could thus determine later the source of desirable characteristics it hoped
to amplify through breeding. It argued that the gene banking they planned to
carry out could also act as an insurance policy against the risk of extinction (a use
to which it is currently put by DFO for other salmonid stocks at risk in British
Columbia), and offered to leave half of the collected semen in the Yukon for local
conservation purposes. Creative Salmon concluded it would need 50 pairs of
parent fish to establish a diverse gene pool (the usual number recommended for
establishing a new broodstock), but would settle for five pairs.3 The company
began by collecting living adult fish and using their gametes (eggs and sperm) to
produce fry.
DFO refused the request to collect from isolated populations in tributaries
because it was concerned not only about setting a precedent for the collection of
samples outside areas open for fisheries, but also about the possibility of sub-
sequent collectors approaching First Nations bands for permission to collect
gametes in areas with restricted fishing.4 Instead, the department required Creative
Salmon to purchase broodstock from licensed commercial fishers harvesting
mixed populations, thereby eliminating the company's chances for genetically
pure stock.
Having obtained permission to collect gametes, although not from distinct
populations, Creative Salmon now faced the problem of arranging for incubation
of the fertilized eggs it would produce. The company was forced to keep the eggs
in the Yukon because quarantine regulations do not permit them to be moved
until they are certified to be free of disease, a process which takes about three
weeks, after which time the eggs would unfortunately be too fragile to move.
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Creative Salmon thus made an arrangement to pay a local hatchery, operated by a
private utility company, to care for the developing eggs - in effect to become a
living gene bank.
In the late 1990s, Creative Salmon decided that wild Yukon chinook genetic
material could now be incorporated in its breeding programmes by collecting
sperm and cryopreserving it, then using the frozen sperm to continue genetic
improvement of its resident broodstocks. The collection of eggs was therefore
phased out and replaced by a cryopreservation programme that allows the
company to continue its efforts to domesticate Yukon chinook. However, despite
the company's having invested in the collection of sperm samples over several
years, Yukon chinook are not yet being produced for commercial sale and Creative
Salmon has recovered none of its development costs.
At present there appears to be considerable confusion at all levels (including
government, fishing communities and First Nations) about the nature, role and
implications of gene banking in conservation and in the improvement of farmed
stocks. Some First Nations fishing communities have probably never heard of gene
banking; at the other extreme, some First Nations such as the Shuswap in British
Columbia have adopted short-term gene banking programmess, expressing frus-
tration with the absence of government policy and action. Others, such as the
Carrier-Sekani Tribal Council, have quietly pursued long-term gene banking
programmes in the interest of conservation and with the cooperation of DFO. In
the case of Yukon chinook, according to the chair of the Yukon Salmon
Committee (a member of the Teslin First Nation), Creative Salmon's efforts could
benefit Yukon First Nations involved in commercial fisheries by advertising the
qualities of Yukon chinook. The Committee may consider referring future
collection applications to band councils in territories where collections occur.5
In some respects, Canada faces greater challenges than other countries in devel-
oping access policies that address the question of indigenous communities' rights
to prior informed consent and benefit sharing. The Canadian Constitution and
the courts recognize the existence of indigenous rights in traditional territories,
but the nature of these rights remains to be defined in a complex process of treaty
negotiations (especially in British Columbia) that may take decades to complete.
Some indigenous peoples, such as the Yukon First Nation, have already completed
the negotiation of land claims that confer a combination of ownership and
management rights. Other indigenous peoples aren't involved in the treaty process
either because they have chosen to negotiate their rights through the courts or
because they signed treaties before Canada became a nation.
In the case of completed land claims negotiations in areas such as the Yukon,
Canada retains decision-making rights regarding the management of anadromous
fish such as salmon that spend part of their life cycles in the ocean — outside tradi-
tional indigenous territories. Generally, land claims agreements do not specifically
address the issue of consent to collection of aquatic genetic resources, and DFO
policy doesn't require consent. The most interesting aspect of the present case
study may in fact be that First Nations were not directly involved in the granting
of permission to collect - not because they were being deliberately excluded from
the process, but simply because the removal of genetic resources for the purpose of
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gene banking is not specifically addressed by any existing policy or legislation. But
collection of adults in the mixed fishery, as Creative Salmon eventually ended up
doing, is DFO's responsibility, so that agency ended up, de facto, ruling on a gene
banking request that may have more to do with stocks that spawn in First Nations'
traditional territory.
Canada, like many other countries, is still a long way from defining specific
policies on access and benefit sharing. Indigenous peoples are already sensitive
about collections of biological resources and research in their traditional terri-
tories. With a few exceptions, collection of aquatic genetic resources hasn't yet
become a controversial issue the way it has for plant collections in developing
countries, but it can be expected to attract greater attention as the demand
increases. Governments involved in the implementation of the CBD need to
anticipate such a trend and not lag in the development of appropriate policy.
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Chapter 3
Whose to Share? Ownership and
Control of Aquatic Resources
Farmed catfish, Brazil (Photo by Joachim Carolsfield}
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Chapter 2 discussed the need for better policies for conservation and use of aquatic
genetic resources. One of the biggest challenges to policy making is the question of
ownership of and control over aquatic genetic resources. Who has the right to
permit or deny access to genetic resources (whether salmon or seaweed or sponges)
and under what circumstances? It's a complicated enough question in the world of
plants and, as we shall see in this chapter, it's far more complicated when it comes
to fish — and not just because fish have a penchant for migrating large distances.
Unlike plant genetic resources, many of which already exist in collections, aquatic
genetic resources are still mainly gathered from in situ sources - ie from their
natural habitat in the wild.
During the past 20 years we've seen the international community replace the
traditional notion of genetic resources as common property with recognition of
national sovereignty over genetic resources. We've seen increasing tensions
between North and South over the patenting of inventions using genetic
resources. After concerted efforts by indigenous groups, we're seeing some coun-
tries beginning to recognize indigenous rights over lands and biological resources
to a far greater extent than has happened in previous decades. More generally, we're
seeing increasing support for the devolution of decision-making powers over
resource use to communities, growing out of a recognition that the best hopes for
sustainable development may lie in making use of local knowledge, skills and
motivation.
Translating theory to fact is another matter. There is no shortage of inter-
national conventions recognizing community and indigenous rights over genetic
resources and over their traditional knowledge of how to use them. As we shall see
later, dozens of countries are currently in the process of working out how to meet
their international commitments to expand community rights over genetic
resources - and countless research institutions worry that their access to vital scien-
tific and commercial information may be jeopardized if new regulations are too
strict. Uncertainty about how to respond to concerns about 'research chill' is one
reason why countries have been so slow to put access and benefit-sharing laws and
policies into practice. A second reason is uncertainty about whether to include
only genetic resources within the ambit of such laws or whether to require
community consent for access to all biological resources regardless of how they'll
be used.
The value of genetic resources depends as much on ideas as it does on control of
the resources themselves. Genetic resources are merely the raw material for
invention — useless without the knowhow to produce a new fish or plant strain or
develop a drug. The commercial value of genetic resources has sparked an
expansion in the law of intellectual property rights (IPRs) that has been every bit
as controversial as the expansion of laws restricting access. Should inventors be
allowed to patent life forms? If so, what constitutes invention? Should countries
providing genetic resources have the right of free access to inventions derived from
them? And how can provider countries make sure that intellectual property laws
aren't used by collectors to bypass national access laws?
Many indigenous and local communities have equally strong concerns about
control over access to genetic resources and the use of ideas, but with a different
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slant. With few exceptions, communities have little say in who gets to use aquatic
life or how they may do so. Indigenous movements in particular have been
pushing hard for greater recognition of ownership and control rights and have
some backing from international human rights agreements to support their cause.
In recent years the obvious value of traditional knowledge to users of genetic
resources has added fuel to the fire. Traditional medicinal uses of plants have
inspired the development of many pharmaceutical products. Seed companies have
benefited from the knowledge of generations of farmers in other parts of the
world. Who owns traditional knowledge and who has the right to consent to its
use?
OWNERSHIP OF AQUATIC GENETIC RESOURCES:
Agreements and claims
Unlike agricultural crops, aquatic life largely inhabits publicly owned territory.
Authority to manage fish genetic resources (which are still almost universally
thought of as 'fisheries') may be divided between different levels of government, as
in Canada, where the federal government manages ocean resources as well as fish
that migrate inland to spawn, while provincial governments are in charge of inland
fish. In some cases, management authority may also be devolved to indigenous
groups such as the Nunavut people of northern Canada, whose land agreement
with the federal government gives them the right to control access to biological
and genetic resources. Depending on national constitutions, laws and adminis-
trative practices, there may be a chain of management authority that includes
national governments, state/provincial governments, local governments, un-
organized indigenous and local communities, and local cooperatives such as those
that hold exclusive fishing rights in the Philippines.
The concept of fish being caught for food is straightforward enough, but when
fish take on the grander identity of'aquatic genetic resources', everything changes.
Under that guise, they're being used as broodstock for aquaculture operations, or
perhaps their DNA is being transplanted into a different species. In those circum-
stances, it might be said, a fish is no longer a fish but a collection of 'genetic
material' - or, as the CBD puts it, 'material ... containing functional units of
heredity' (eg sperm, eggs or DNA). When fish are used as aquatic genetic
resources, ownership takes on a whole different level of importance — both because
that fish may be worth much more as a genetic resource than as a barbecued fillet
and because the knowledge of how to use the fish as a genetic resource has its own
separate worth — more on this later in the chapter. The bottom line is that the
multiplicity of fisheries management regimes in different countries can't do the job
of determining who has the right to collect - or permit the collection of - an
aquatic genetic resource. It doesn't help matters that it may not always be easy to
tell whether a fish is being used simply as a fish (eg a cardinal tetra for display in an
aquarium) or as a genetic resource (a tetra for breeding), as our earlier discussion of
the ornamental fish trade in the Rio Negro (Case Study 1) made clear.
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For most of the 20th century, aquatic genetic resources were considered
common property, available for everyone's use regardless of the location of the
resource or the nationality of the user. Two international agreements in the early
1990s radically changed the rules for ownership and control of aquatic life. These
were the UNCLOS and the CBD.
Ocean resources: The Law of the Sea
The Law of the Sea came into force in 1994 and has been signed by more than 130
countries. An international agreement that sets conditions and limits on the use
the oceans, including the seabed, UNCLOS establishes the rights and obligations
of coastal states in contiguous waters, sets conditions for the conduct of marine
research, and obliges countries to provide access to surplus catch.
Sovereignty
UNCLOS both defines and limits coastal countries' sovereignty over the seas and
their biodiversity. Coastal states can claim full sovereignty over their territorial sea
to a maximum of 12 nautical miles (22.2 km) (Article 3). Beyond the territorial
sea, UNCLOS creates a 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in which
coastal countries can claim exclusive rights for exploration, exploitation, conser-
vation, and management of all natural resources (living or non-living) on the
seabed and in its subsoil, and overlying waters (Article 56). Some countries have
not yet ratified UNCLOS, and many have not yet claimed their EEZ. Beyond the
EEZs are the high seas, to which all countries have open access rights. The CBD,
in Article 22, confirms the rights and obligations established under UNCLOS and
requires all parties to implement the convention consistently with those rights and
obligations.
Research
UNCLOS grants each coastal state the exclusive right to regulate, authorize, and
conduct scientific research in its territorial sea (Article 245). However, each state is
required to consent, in normal circumstances, to scientific research projects in
EEZs or on the continental shelf (which includes the territorial sea) by other states
or international organizations 'to increase scientific knowledge of the marine envi-
ronment for the benefit of all humankind' (Article 246). In turn, foreign
researchers must provide information on their research activities, accept the partic-
ipation of the coastal state research programmes, and allow the coastal state access
to all data and samples derived from the marine scientific research project (Article
249). These provisions, designed to facilitate access and benefit sharing at the
national level, apply to waters adjacent to coastal communities, as the territorial
sea begins at the low water line.
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Surplw catch
Each state must determine its capacity to harvest living resources within its EEZ.
If it is unable to meet the allowable catch it has established, it must provide other
states access to the surplus (Article 62). While this provision is clearly intended to
apply to food fisheries, it could theoretically apply as well to other life such as
seabed invertebrates.
Inland waters: National sovereignty
Biological diversity flourishes most richly in tropical regions while the countries
with the technology to make the most advanced use of genetic resources are
generally the northern, most developed countries. Consequently, the benefits
from the commercial use of genetic resources have largely been enjoyed by
companies in the North. Yet, following the new found global concern about dis-
appearing biodiversity, the responsibility for conservation inevitably falls on the
poorer southern countries. The rush for genetic resources by transnational corpo-
rations has been unfavorably compared to Europe's colonization of southern coun-
tries, two centuries earlier, to gain access to the raw materials needed for the
Industrial Revolution (eg Shiva, 1997).
During the negotiations leading to the CBD, some southern countries insisted
on recognition of national sovereignty over genetic resources as a condition of
agreeing to the CBD. In theory, recognition of national sovereignty meant the
ability to control access and negotiate a fair share of the benefits arising from the
use of genetic resources.
The CBD is the most comprehensive international instrument for the
management of biodiversity. Its three objectives are the conservation of biological
diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing
of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources. The extent of
global commitment to the CBD is reflected by the fact that, by June 2004, it had
been ratified by 188 countries - almost all of the nation states in the world (with
the notable exception of the US). While the Convention doesn't have the force of
law, ratification signifies a commitment to enact national laws to bring its provi-
sions into effect.
In addition to recognizing national sovereignty, the CBD creates rights and
responsibilities for member countries regarding access to genetic resources. It calls
on all Parties to 'create conditions to facilitate access to genetic resources for envi-
ronmentally sound uses' by other Parties. It requires provider countries' informed
consent to access to genetic resources and calls on collecting parties to share with
provider countries 'in a fair and equitable way' the results of research and devel-
opment and the benefits arising from commercial and other uses.
Recognition of national sovereignty under the CBD means that aquatic genetic
resources in the wild are owned by the country in which they are located. National
sovereignty over public lands extends as well to inland waters (with rare excep-
tions, such as in some Scandinavian countries) and to the aquatic life they contain.
Although the CBD recognizes sovereign rights over genetic resources, it must be
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borne in mind that tenure and ownership systems are neither uniform across all
countries nor clearly defined in any given country. Ownership rights may range
from traditional common tenure to state enforced private rights to land and
natural resources, including biodiversity (Columbia University, 1999). The fact
that aquatic genetic resources are more likely than plant genetic resources to be
publicly owned has significant implications for the management of access. One of
these is that the resources commonly exist within the territories of traditional
communities that may have rights to control their use.
The implications of national sovereignty for conservation and
aquaculture
National sovereignty over genetic resources is clearly a done deal, but whether it
will advance the cause of conservation is debatable. Certainly that wasn't the moti-
vation of the developing countries that insisted on recognition of national
sovereignty in return for signing the CBD. They were more concerned with having
a substantial say in the burgeoning international trade in genetic resources - not
that they could be faulted for resentment over past exploitation by northern coun-
tries and corporations. Nevertheless, for the CBD's conservation objective to
succeed, both developing and developed countries will need to come to the real-
ization that it's in their own best interests to prevent the further erosion of genetic
diversity.
It was not without good reason that the FAO International Undertaking
formally adopted the concept of genetic resources as the common heritage of
humankind. The reasoning of that agreement was that the principle of free
exchange was essential for the most beneficial exploration and use of genetic
diversity for plant breeding and other scientific purposes. As Jain (1994) points
out, as the world's population continues to grow rapidly, it will become increas-
ingly important to identify new genetic variability for higher crop yields. This will
require a great deal of international cooperation in research, including the ready
exchange of plant genetic resources and new technologies.
If that's true for plant genetic resources, it will also be so for aquatic genetic
resources during the next two decades. Developing countries went from
consuming 45 per cent of the world's fish to 70 per cent today. It is expected that
by 2020 that figure will increase to close to 80 per cent (IFPRI, 2003). Given the
declines in wild fish populations, it appears likely that capture fisheries will be
unable to meet the demand and that the gap will need to be filled by a growth in
farmed production. Existing aquaculture operations have barely tapped the possi-
bilities offered by genetic diversity among food fish species.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the efficiency with which the aquaculture
industry is able to meet global food needs will depend to a large degree on effective
international cooperation in sharing genetic material and knowledge. As national
access laws are still in the formative stages and are being written with an almost
exclusive focus on plants, it's too early to say how big an impact national
sovereignty (and, for that matter, emerging community rights of consent) will
have on international sharing offish genetic resources. It would be both ironic and
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unfortunate if the door to best quality fish genetic resources was to be shut at a
time when aquaculture is poised to overcome its environmental shortcomings and
begin to make a major contribution to global food security.
Ownership in traditional communities
National systems for ownership of genetic resources are often very much at odds
with traditional community practices. Most traditional communities in devel-
oping countries have continued to apply their own tenure system for biological
resources, while the state enforces private and public property rights on goods and
resources, and intellectual property laws on industry and commerce. Some tradi-
tional tenure systems regarding genetic resources are grounded on collective
ownership or heritage, and sometimes, particularly in the case of medicinal plants,
on religious and mystical considerations (Khalil, 1995).
In many cases where governments have asserted sovereign rights over genetic
resources, the land remains under traditional community tenure. The end result is
that the state reaps the benefits from agreements for the use of resources, while the
burden of conservation might be said to rest with the communities. The danger is
that, once communities have lost control over local resources as well as the ability
to practise traditional livelihoods, they may lose as well both the knowledge and
the motivation to take care of local ecosystems. The choice between doing
whatever it takes to feed one's children and conserving an endangered fish popu-
lation is no choice at all.
Although the CBD's provisions apply to agreements at the national level, they
also take into account the role of traditional communities in conserving and using
biodiversity. Article 8(j) requires Parties to the CBD to 'respect, preserve and
maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local commu-
nities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant to the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity' and to encourage the equitable sharing of benefits
arising from the use of such knowledge, innovations and practices. Article 8(j)
confers no rights to communities but is based on the premise that sharing in
benefits from the use of genetic resources will help contribute to their conservation
and sustainable use.
How to implement Article 8(j) has been one of the greatest challenges for CBD
Parties. Discussions at the Conferences of the Parties have generally assumed (a)
that the use of genetic resources generally depends on traditional knowledge and
(b) that those using genetic resources are usually based in countries other than the
provider country. As we'll explain in the following chapter, the first, critical point
is far less true for aquatic than for plant genetic resources. Indigenous peoples,
local communities and their advocates have high hopes that Article 8(j) will mean
greater recognition of community rights over traditional resources, but this may
not be the result for fishing communities if these rights are tied to an intimate
knowledge of genetic resources.
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Recognition of indigenous peoples' rights
In the traditional cultures of indigenous peoples in widely separated parts of the
world, the concept of 'ownership' has little meaning. First Nations participants at
a workshop we hosted during the preparation of this book emphasized that they
consider it inappropriate to refer to fish as 'resources' — genetic or otherwise.
Indigenous peoples' attitudes about equality or 'oneness' of all living creatures,
while they may be an essential part of spiritual beliefs, are likely to be rooted in a
common sense recognition that surviving in a natural ecosystem requires main-
taining the cycles of species, and that ownership is superfluous where there is
abundance to be shared.
But times change. Today, claims of ownership make a frequent appearance in
the rhetoric of the indigenous rights movement - but mainly as matter of political
necessity in campaigns to win legal recognition of the right to use lands and bio-
diversity in traditional areas of occupation. 'Ownership' and 'title' are words well
understood by courts that may have more difficulty relating spiritual beliefs to
Western property law.
Ownership of land and control over aquatic life has become a contentious issue
in coastal and riparian indigenous communities because of the broad extent of and
fragility of fish habitat, the traditional importance of fish for sustenance, and
frequent uncertainty about rights of access to fisheries. Recent attention to fish as
genetic resources has added a new twist that isn't an issue for plant genetic
resources: in the case of migratory fish, several indigenous communities may claim
traditional ownership and the right to be consulted by a collector regardless of
where broodstock is collected if a fish passes through their territory at some stage
in its life cycle.
Most countries have made little progress towards resolving indigenous rights
issues. This will undoubtedly impede efforts to facilitate access to genetic resources
in indigenous communities. One notable exception is the Philippines, which under
the 1997 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act extends a prior informed consent
requirement to virtually all potential uses of natural resources in recognized
indigenous territories. Another is Canada, where court decisions recognizing
indigenous rights have led government negotiations of treaties with some indigenous
peoples. Case Study 3 at the end of this chapter, although it describes an unsuccessful
negotiation with indigenous communities for access to broodstock, illustrates one
useful model for access negotiations with communities with co-management or
ownership rights.
Although there is no unanimity among indigenous groups about the approach
proposed by the CBD — some have turned their backs on the Convention, while
others are actively working with national governments to develop workable access
laws - there is naturally widespread scepticism about how Article 8(j) will be inter-
preted to ensure fair treatment and meaningful benefits for communities.
In 1993, the Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples confirmed their right to 'own, develop, control and use the land and terri-
tories, including the total environment of the lands, air, waters, coastal seas, sea
ice, flora and fauna and other resources which they have traditionally owned or
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Box 3.1 Plant Precedents on Sharing Genetic Resources: The International Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
The CBD's recognition of national sovereignty over genii© resources represented an about-
face from another international agreement more than a decade earlier. In 1981', member
countries of the UN FAO adopted the International UAderiaNing on Plant Genetic Resources
as an instrument to promote international harmony in matted regarding access to plant
genetic resources for food and agriculture. The purpose of the; UrKfertgkiiig, to be monitored
by the Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (CGFRA), was to 'ensure
that plant genetic resources of economic and/or social interest, particularly for agriculture,
will be explored, preserved, evaluated and made available for plant breeding and scientific
purposes' (CGFRA, 2002).
The International Undertaking's recognition of genetic resources as the 'common heritage
of mankind' was in large part a response to a demand from developing nations to keep plant
genetic resources in the public domain and to put a brake on further privatization of agricul-
tural genetic resources. Their concerns included gene banking m northern countries of
seeds produced by southern farmers; the accumulation of seed companies under the
control of transnational corporations; and the implementation of monopoly Plant Breeders'
Rights (essentially a patent) over crop varieties, limiting farmers' access to breeders' lines
and finished varieties.
Conflict over access to plant breeders' lines in the years following the approval of the
International Undertaking led to a 1989 annex recognizing farmers' rights as a counter-
balance to plant breeders' rights;. Among other things, farmers' rights established the rights
of farmers and, their communities to participate fully in the benefits derived from plant
genetic resources. By the early 1990s, as the privatization of agricultural research and
patenting of plant genetic resources in industrial countries increased, developing countries
were expressing disillusionment about the effectiveness of the International Undertaking
arid promises to implement farmers' rights. Consequently they proposed replacing the
concepts of common heritage and open access with national Sovereignty and benefit
sharing to allow nation states to better control and benefit from their biological resources
(GRAIN, 2000a). The enshrinement of these principles in the CBD necessitated a renegoti-
ation of the international Undertaking to ensure harmony between the two agreements.
The result was the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture, approved by FAO member countries in 2001 after seven years of difficult nego-
tiation. The treaty is intended to meet the needs of both plant breeders and farmers, guar-
antee the future availability of plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, and ensure
fair and equitable sharing of benefits. The agreement, which covers 64 food crops
accounting for 85 per cent of global human nutrition, places some constraints on intellectual
property over the seeds in the multilateral system and imposes obligations for benefit
sharing when accessed seeds are commercialized. Civil society organizations such as
Genetic Resources Action international (GRAIN) and the Erosion, Technology and
Concentration Group (ETC), while acknowledging the treaty as a step forward, also criticize
it for not guaranteeing farmers' rights and doing too little to ensure equity and benefit
Sharing.
The history of the International Undertaking illustrates the increasing tension between
developed and developing countries over Ihe expansion of intellectual property rights and
the demands of developing countries and farming communities for greater control over their
genetic resources and the use of traditional knowledge developed by farmers. It also under-
scores the almost exclusive emphasis on plant genetic resources ih international negotia^
tions on access and beftefit sharing. The International Undertaking ahd the treaty that
succeeded it were mad& necessary by the interdependence among countries for access to
crop germplasm needed to ensure global food security.
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Box 3.1 continued
While there is currently no parallel interdependence in access to fish germplasm, the
expanding importance of aqyaeultufe in meeting global food needs may ultimately create
the need to address similar issues to those that have dominated the negotiations towards the
revised International Undertaking - most notably the compatibility between intellectual
properly rights protection and the protection of communities providing aquatic genetic
resources for international aquaculture development.
otherwise occupied or used'. In 2001, the International Indigenous Forum on
Biodiversity (IIFB, 2001) told the CBD Working Group on Access and Benefit
Sharing that the 1993 UN Declaration represented the minimum acceptable stan-
dards and that the trust needed to meet the CBD objective of access, and that
benefit sharing wouldn't come without recognition of the rights of indigenous
peoples. How far to go in that direction remains a challenge for countries intent on
facilitating access to genetic resources. Some indigenous groups see the CBD
encouragement of benefit sharing with communities as a way to avoid tackling the
hard issues that come with recognition of indigenous rights, especially if benefit
sharing is limited only to those communities that can prove genetic resources users
need their knowledge - and if benefits are solely tied to conservation objectives.
The growing litany of 'biopiracy' complaints suggests that countries may find it
increasingly hard to separate access issues from indigenous rights issues.
THE PRICE OF INVENTION: Intellectual property law and
aquatic genetic resources
Patent applications have caused no end of controversy in the use of plant genetic
resources. Naturally, a seed company that develops a genetically modified strain of
millet resistant to a fungal infection, for example, considers it a top priority to
protect its invention so that competitors don't copy it and flood the market with a
cheaper version. But what if the company came up with the idea by modelling its
invention on another strain developed by farmers in a traditional agricultural
community? The last few years have seen a succession of international disputes — a
notable example being the outcry that arose when a US company attempted to
patent Basmati rice despite its long history in south Asia. What if a pharmaceutical
company succeeds in developing and patenting a pain-killing drug after hiring a
researcher to visit shamans in the Amazon, learn about their healing practices, and
bring back samples of their medicinal plants for analysis in the US?
Obviously, the ownership of ideas (whether scientific inventions or traditional
knowledge) has been the source of far more wealth than the ownership of genetic
resources in their physical state. The global trade in plant genetic resources is big
business, estimated by ten Kate and Laird (1999) to be several billion dollars
annually, so it's hardly surprising that the scramble to get legal protection for
products and processes has had some significant impacts on developments in intel-
lectual property law - developments that have been almost entirely shaped by
plant genetic resources issues.
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As we mentioned in the previous chapter, the number of genetically modified
fish strains developed in the past couple of decades is infinitesimal compared to
the number of plant strains. Pharmaceutical companies are struggling to find
powerful cures based on marine organisms, but the vast majority of drugs inspired
by compounds existing in nature are based on plants - by 1996, only two of the
top selling 150 pharmaceuticals were derived from marine organisms (Brush and
Stabinsky, 1996). Nevertheless, there may be sufficient parallels between some
uses of plant and aquatic genetic resources — for example, between plant and
marine bioprospecting and between farmed fish and crop enhancement - that
patent law agreements can safely accommodate both types of activity.
Where the intellectual property comparisons between the two fields diverge
most dramatically is in the area of traditional knowledge. There is simply no
parallel in traditional fishing villages to traditional farmers' knowledge of crop
breeding and to other communities' knowledge of medicinal plants. This might
seem a matter of no great note were it not for the fact that several emerging
national biodiversity laws, based loosely on the CBD guidelines, spell out the
rights of traditional communities in terms of the knowledge they contribute to the
use of aquatic genetic resources. There is no doubt that traditional fishing commu-
nities have a wealth of knowledge that comes from the importance offish as food
or ceremonial object — including knowledge of fish life cycles, migration habits,
habitat preferences and of techniques for catching fish — yet it is likely to be largely
irrelevant to uses for breeding. As we'll show in this and the following chapters, a
too rigid interpretation of laws tying community rights to traditional knowledge
could mean significant future conflicts (as the trade in aquatic genetic resources
becomes more common) and run counter to the CBD s objectives of promoting
conservation, sustainable use and equitable sharing of benefits.
Pandora's patent box: Fighting for the right to own genes and
genetic inventions
By protecting the ideas of inventors from unauthorized use by others, intellectual
property law (including patents, copyright, trademarks, industrial designs and
trade secrets) protects an inventor's economic interests and the interest of society
in encouraging new inventions that may benefit the public. A patent is a legal
certificate that gives an inventor exclusive rights to produce, use, sell or import an
invention for a fixed period, usually 17 to 20 years. A patent application must
demonstrate that an invention is useful (have industrial application), novel
(recent, original and not already publicly known), not obvious to a person skilled
in the technology and more inventive than mere discovery of what already exists in
nature. Patents can be granted for products, specific uses of products (eg use of a
drug to cure cancer but not for purposes yet to be discovered), and processes used
to create a product.
The law of patents was developed in 19th-century Europe to protect inventions
of factory machinery and excluded the protection of living materials, foods and
medicines. However, demands for protection of inventions related to commercial
uses of genetic resources have revolutionized patent criteria, and the state of the
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law remains in flux in the wake of new scientific advances and amid controversies
about the patenting of life and the role of traditional knowledge in invention. In
the 1960s, the US legislated the right of plant breeders to patent seeds, preventing
others from selling the same variety, and in 1980 the US Supreme Court accepted
the first patent on a genetically altered micro-organism. By 1997, the US had
granted 69 patents on animals (Correa, 1999).
Keeping track of the current state of the law is further complicated by the fact
that different countries take different approaches to patent law. The European
Patent Convention provides that microbiological processes are patentable but
'essentially biological processes' are not, thereby excluding plant varieties obtained
by conventional breeding. No such restriction exists in the US (Crucible Group,
1994). Decisions by the US Patent and Trademark Office to grant monopoly
rights over plant, animal and human genetic materials have sparked a rush to
collect, map and patent genes, based largely on their potential. Developing coun-
tries have been under pressure to recognize US patents, although many developing
countries exclude patent protection for plant varieties and animal races (Correa,
1999). Both the scope of protection and the rights of patent holders continue to be
expanded as the law continues to evolve in industrial countries. By contrast, devel-
oping countries such as Argentina, Brazil and India have set limits by allowing
patents on processes but not products and by requiring patent holders to make
socially useful products available in the domestic market (Grenier, 1998).
Genetic modification of animal life (the 'Harvard mouse' is a controversial
example) has drawn attention to the need to address demands to allow patents on
living creatures. Pharmaceutical companies and bioprospectors collecting on their
behalf have been actively patenting processes to develop drugs and cosmetics
derived from research based on aquatic genetic resources that range from marine
invertebrates to algae. Patenting of new fish varieties (such as the Super Salmon
and Arctic char varieties) and of processes used in their development has been
more limited but can be expected to increase significantly as the aquaculture
industry expands. The US Patent and Trademark Office led the way by approving
a patent protecting a method of increasing the growth rate of a transgenic salmon
(Correa, 1999).
The adaptation of patent laws to cover genetic resources is still controversial. A
cotton gin is a very different type of invention from a cotton (or catfish) gene.
Patenting of living materials not only raises ethical questions, it also frequently
raises concerns about the novelty of inventions', especially when an inventor may
have relied for inspiration on traditional knowledge. Historically, while tech-
nology exporting countries have been quick to develop patent legislation to
promote new development, technology importers have had little reason to develop
their own patent laws. Developing countries have been understandably reluctant
to embrace universal patent laws relating to uses of genetic resources (as TRIPS
proposes) because applicants from industrialized countries are the primary benefi-
ciaries (GRAIN, 1998a). As Halewood (1999) notes, the net effect of global-
ization of intellectual property laws through agreements such as TRIPS and the
North American Free Trade Agreement has been primarily to benefit developed
countries in the use of genetic resources.
WHOSE TO SHARE? OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF AQUATIC RESOURCES 101
Plant breeders have pushed for an extension of intellectual property rights to
include new varieties produced by breeders. There are no equivalent mechanisms
for aquatic genetic resources, but these are likely to develop, albeit with modifica-
tions that reflect the fact that few aquatic animals have been domesticated (Bartley
andPullin, 1999).
TRIPS: Controlling access to genetic inventions
All countries that are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are
obliged to implement TRIPS. The agreement focuses on the importance of intel-
lectual property rights in promoting trade liberalization. The emphasis on intel-
lectual property in WTO agreements is a response to the explosive growth in
information technology and biotechnology in international trade as well as the
desire of some industrial countries to protect products from intellectual 'piracy' in
foreign markets (Crucible Group, 2000).
TRIPS requires all member states to set minimum standards of intellectual
property protection, thereby ensuring a far higher degree of global uniformity
than previously existed. Patents must be available for inventions in all fields of
technology without discrimination, whether products are imported or locally
produced. Article 27 requires member states to adopt national level intellectual
property systems for all products and processes, including pharmaceuticals,
modified micro-organisms and microbiological processes. Unlike the earlier inter-
national undertaking, TRIPS clearly applies to inventions derived from aquatic
genetic resources.
Negotiations on the passage of TRIPS highlighted the very different viewpoints
of industrial and developing countries on the extent to which patenting of
biological diversity-related inventions should be permitted. The most contro-
versial section of TRIPS has been Article 27.3(b). While it allows countries to
exclude plants and animals as well as essentially biological processes from
patentability, WTO members must provide protection for plant varieties either by
patents and/or by an effective sui generis system - that is, a unique system of rights
for a specific item or technology. The exemption for plants and animals remains a
controversial issue, with some developed countries facing strong pressure from
industry to push for the removal of the exemption. Some critics of TRIPS argue
that doing so would undermine the CBD by depriving countries of the right to
prohibit IPRs on life forms and by diminishing their ability to negotiate a fair
share of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources (GRAIN, 1998a).
During a 1999 review of TRIPS, a group of least-developed countries proposed,
unsuccessfully, that TRIPS should contain a provision that patents must not be
granted without the prior informed consent of the country where the genetic
resources originated (Martinez, 2002). In 1998, an Organization of African Unity
(OAU) model law proposed a prohibition against patents on inventions derived
from biological resources obtained from member countries.
In essence, developing countries were pressured into accepting TRIPS in return
for the promise of the economic advantage created by improved opportunities for
trade. Some developing countries objected to the imposition of Western notions
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of 'inventions' in parts of the world where many important innovations had
occurred in an evolutionary and informal manner in farming and other local
communities. While TRIPS has helped allay industrial countries' concerns about
foreign piracy of corporate inventions, it has simply fuelled concerns in developing
countries that Westernized patenting law may simply accelerate biopiracy of the
types of traditional innovations described in Chapter 4.
Indigenous groups have condemned TRIPS as flying in the face of indigenous
traditions of treating community knowledge as a shared resource and as essentially
forcing indigenous peoples to adopt Western patent laws in order to prevent the
commercial appropriation of their own knowledge. In the opinion of one group,
TRIPS pushes indigenous peoples to 'play in a game in which the rules are defined
by the opponents' (Tauli-Corpuz, 1999).
WHO OWNS TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE?
What happens if, without a community's permission, a company patents a
product or process made possible by the use of the community's traditional
knowledge? While it is true that many indigenous communities have a history of
freely sharing their knowledge about wild plants and animals, they may have
concerns about the unauthorized use of their knowledge that have nothing to do
with compensation but a lot to do with issues such as a lack of respect for a living
creature or deceitful dealings with a community, etc. Patent offices rarely require
applicants to disclose whether an idea has been appropriated from a traditional
community. Even if a traditional community wanted to seek recourse, using the
avenues of Western legal systems might be both contrary to its beliefs and unaf-
fordable (Box 4.2 below illustrates a notable exception, in which an indigenous
group felt so betrayed that it took the patent holder to court).
Interest in access to traditional knowledge about plant genetic resources has
grown by leaps and bounds as the gene rush seeks out new sources of potentially
valuable information - like the gold rushes of earlier centuries, making a valuable
find may be a long shot, but the potential rewards may be so high that it's worth
the effort and the risk. That's why the question of who owns traditional knowledge
and how communities can control its use has become such a big issue in recent
years, as illustrated in the section below on biopiracy. It's also why international
agreements like the CBD have placed so much emphasis on using the demand for
traditional knowledge as a rationale for the expansion of community rights. As
we'll see in the next chapter, while this may be a sensible approach in the plant
world, it may have little relevance for aquatic genetic resources.
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Box 3.2 The Wapishana Go to Court: The Case of the fish Killing Plant
The Wapishana are experiencing what many other indigenous groups and local societies are
suffering with alarming frequency throughout the tropics: the appropriation of traditional
knowledge by pirates passing for scientists, researchers, missionaries, environmentalists,
activists of indigenous people's rights, and other disguises,
JULIO CESAR OENTENO (CENTENO, 2000)
Several Wapishana indigenous communities living jrt the Amazon basin atong the Brazil-
Guyana border have long used their knowledge of the toxic properties of the cunani bush to
catch fish. When the chewed leaves are thrown into a river, fish in the immediate vicinity
reportedly leap out of the water and soon die. The fish can be eaten immediately, with no
alteration in their taste and no side effects on humans.
A British biochemist who had spent years living with the Wapishana and studying their
traditional uses of plants heard about the unusual properties of the cunani. After he left the
country, he undertook extensive research to isolate active ingredients of some of the plants
he had collected. He then registered patents in the US and Europe on active ingredients in
cunani that are believed to act as powerful stimulants to the nervous system or as neuro-
muscular agents that can prevent heart blockages. He also patented active ingredients of
tipir, the nut of the greenheart tree, which the Wapishana had long used to stop bleeding and
prevent infection and is being investigated for anti-malarial properties.
When Wapishana chiefs heard what the biochemist had done, they accused him of
stealing the knowledge of their ancestors And elders in order to sell it to pharmaceutical
companies. As one Wapishana woman put it, This knowledge has always been with the
Wapishana. It's part of our heritage and now; is being taken from us without any payment'.
The biochemist expressed puzzlement at the uproar. He pointed out that his discoveries
were the result of a lifetime spent decoding the ingredients in traditional Wapishana
remedies. The patents were justified, he argued, by the results of his own intellectual effort
(Singh, 2000a; Veash, 2QQO). After an extensive campaign, the Wapishana people eventually
succeeded in overturning the cunani patent but not the tipir patent. In addition, at least one
chief prohibited all future visits by researchers, whatever their purpose might be.
Drawbacks of IPRs protection of traditional knowledge
The TRIPS agreement sparked considerable protest among advocates of
indigenous and local communities who believed that it would erode the alread
fragile rights of communities to control the use of their knowledge. One of the
biggest issues has been whether a product derived from traditional knowledge can
truly be called an invention - one of the prerequisites for the right to patent. After
the TRIPS agreement, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
attempted to address the issue through its Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources. The Committee looked at ways to
take traditional knowledge systems into account in the development of IPRs
systems through sui generis approaches - that is, unique mechanisms for providing
legal protection for holders of traditional knowledge.
Some indigenous movements have been sharply critical of the WIPO approach
arguing that sui generis protection of traditional knowledge rights is nothing more
than an attempt to assimilate indigenous rights into 'Western' property systems
and bypass the real issue - the rights of indigenous peoples to direct control over
lands and resources in traditional territories.
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Opinions are divided about the usefulness of IPRs in protecting community
interests. Some people believe that IPRs as they currently exist can serve the
purpose by allowing users of genetic resources to generate revenues from their
inventions and share the revenues with countries of origin or local communities.
Others believe that existing IPRs are not only inadequate to protect the rights of
indigenous peoples but also represent one of the greatest threats to the conser-
vation of biodiversity (Crucible Group, 2000). Indigenous and local peoples
generally express a desire to link the protection of indigenous and local knowledge
with territorial rights and the right to self-determination - a position that has been
reiterated in a wide variety of international and local peoples' declarations and in
statements in international multilateral fora (Halewood, 1999).
Theoretically, IPRs could be used to protect the knowledge and innovations of
indigenous and local communities. However, differences in Western and
indigenous legal concepts make it impractical. Communal property is the
prevailing system used in most traditional societies to control access to basic
resources, and even in cases where esoteric knowledge is the exclusive intellectual
property of individuals, families, shamans, clans or lineages, these owners cannot
necessarily commercialize the knowledge without the permission of the whole
community or tribal elders (Posey and Dutfield, 1996).
The use of patent law as it currently exists is also problematical because of the
difficulty of defining the source of traditional knowledge, accumulated over gener-
ations, and therefore its novelty. Use of customary laws is another option, but
many nations do not recognize customary law and national legal systems may
conflict with unwritten customary laws. Finally, indigenous peoples view any use
of intellectual property law with deep suspicion because of its association with past
exploitation of traditional knowledge. Shiva (1997) characterizes intellectual
property law as a modern form of colonization extended to the interior spaces, the
'genetic codes' of life forms, made possible by the treatment of genetic resources as
a common heritage - a view that resonates with many indigenous rights groups.
Sui generis protection of community rights
The inadequacy of patent law as a means of protecting traditional knowledge has
led some community rights advocates to propose the use of sui generis alternatives
to achieve the same end. 'Sui generis refers to rights that are designed to be unique
for a specific purpose and are not covered by existing legal systems. The TRIPS
agreement requires WTO member countries to protect plant varieties either by
patents or an effective sui generis system, but does not define what that means. The
term has become common jargon without any universal understanding of its defi-
nition, perhaps in large part because sui generis systems are largely still in the
formative stages. Canadian land claims agreements with indigenous peoples,
referred to in Case Studies 2 and 3, are one recent example of sui generis recog-
nition; recent laws in countries like the Philippines that are specific deal to the
protection of community rights are another.
One proposed model for sui generis protection is a system of community intel-
lectual property rights that would establish the legal right of communities to
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protect knowledge developed communally rather than by an identifiable indi-
vidual — primarily to protect farmers' rights to control access to seed. The Crucible
Group (1994) suggested that, in order to be effective, community intellectual
property rights need to be entrenched in national legislation with reciprocal recog-
nition by other countries, supported by an international database for tracing
germplasm. Under such a system, plant varieties developed by communities might
be deposited in germplasm banks along with registration data (such as the date,
place and community of origin), enabling the source to be determined if
complaints arose about appropriation of traditional knowledge by outside
interests.
While there are no analogous issues in the use offish germplasm, a community
IPRs system could conceivably be useful for the protection of other types of tradi-
tional knowledge of aquatic genetic resources — for example, by providing for the
documentation of knowledge of medicinal uses. One model community intel-
lectual rights act, suggested by a Third World Network discussion paper, proposed
meeting the patent law novelty requirement by describing indigenous peoples as
innovators because they have developed knowledge unknown to the outside world
(Singh Nijar, 1998). Posey and Dutfield (1996) suggest that such a law would be
compatible with the TRIPS call for sui generis IPRs protection and with Article
8(j) requirements. As discussed in the following chapter, this type of legal
protection has far more relevance for terrestrial than for fishing communities
because examples of traditional innovations using aquatic genetic resources are far
less frequent.
Posey and Dutfield (1996) propose a more expansive system of 'traditional
resource rights' that moves beyond the narrow limitations of knowledge
protection. In their view, existing international agreements (eg on human rights,
right to self-determination, land and territorial rights, and intellectual and cultural
property rights) provide the basis for overlapping and mutually supportive
'bundles of rights' that would encompass not only IPRs protection but also the
control of resources, which indigenous peoples view as central to self-determi-
nation. Posey points out that while the privatization or commoditizing of property
is often contradictory to indigenous peoples' spiritual beliefs, indigenous and
traditional communities are increasingly involved in market economies, and that
the right to development and conservation are mutually supportive. Traditional
resource rights would also recognize the inextricable link between cultural and
biological diversity. Posey suggests that they could be implemented locally,
nationally or internationally and could guide both international law and national
legislation.
BlOPIRACY: Plain dealing or patent theft?
The urgency of addressing the question of community rights over genetic
resources has been heightened in recent years by a flurry of complaints about
biopiracy. The Crucible Group (2000) defines 'biopiracy' as the taking of genetic
or biological resources without the prior informed consent of local people or a
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competent state authority for access and benefit sharing under mutually agreed
terms.
Most frequently, charges of biopiracy are related to the use of plant genetic
resources and often are spurred by patents of discoveries that are in some way
related to the use of traditional knowledge of farmers or of indigenous commu-
nities. One much publicized example was the attempt by a US company to patent
Basmati rice. Another was the dispute between the pharmaceutical company
researcher and the Wapishana people, described in Box 3.2.
Had there been an access and benefit-sharing law in place, the Wapishana might
have negotiated an agreement with the biochemist to share in the profits from any
future royalties or obtain some other more immediate reward, or they might
simply have denied him permission to make collections or refused to give him any
information about their traditional uses. They might also have demanded benefits
that he felt unable to provide without knowing whether his research might lead to
a deal with a pharmaceutical company or the development of a marketable
product. Article 8(j) of the CBD is intended to deal with exactly this type of situ-
ation. Situations like the one involving the Wapishana have occurred many times
in different parts of the world, as traditional communities attempt to earn recog-
nition for the value of their plant knowledge, and examples of benefit-sharing
agreements are beginning to occur with more and more frequency.
Biopiracy and aquatic genetic resources
It's hard to imagine aquatic resources parallels for the biopiracy examples described
above. One might have occurred if Aqua Bounty had developed and patented the
'Super Salmon' after learning from indigenous people about the anti-freeze prop-
erties of the ocean pout, which were used to create the new strain. Even then, the
company might have argued that the desirable characteristics of the pout were
obvious to any observer. Traditional knowledge of aquatic biodiversity may be
abundant but is not necessarily relevant to uses of aquatic genetic resources such as
aquaculture and the development of pharmaceutical products from animals that
live in areas that are inaccessible to local people.
Nevertheless, complaints about biopiracy of marine organisms are not
uncommon. Indeed, one of the main catalysts for the passage of access legislation
in the Philippines in 1995 (see Case Study 5) was a series of newspaper articles on
biopiracy of marine invertebrates (and of plants) by foreign collectors. After the
law came into effect, the complaints continued, and communities began targeting
the government for not properly enforcing the law and for its lax requirements for
obtaining community consent.
When the US-based pharmaceutical company Neurex Inc isolated and patented
the toxin SNX- 111, produced by the Philippine sea snail Conus magnus, civil
society organizations took both the company and government to task. The stakes
were large: sales of the pain-killing drug derived from the toxin reportedly earned
Neurex more than US$80 million during the first year of marketing. Critics
charged that the government supported biopiracy by funding research by scientists
at the Marine Science Institute (MSI) who collaborated with the University of
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Utah in collecting specimens, isolating the toxin and forming a private company
to capitalize on the snail (Bengwayan, 2001).
Previously, collectors for the MSI would purchase specimens from fishermen in
several areas of the country, who gather different varieties of cone snail for their
ornamental value and have no use for the meat.1 Philippines law (Executive Order
247) now requires foreign collectors to partner with Philippines research institu-
tions, which must get community consent for collections (whether or not tradi-
tional knowledge is needed by collectors). To comply with regulations under the
law, MSI holds public information sessions in communities where collections of
marine organisms are proposed and must also obtain permission from local
government representatives. Critics of the process note low turnouts at infor-
mation sessions and suggest that local people may not even be aware that marine
bioprospecting is taking place in their communities (Batungbacal, 2000).
Making informed consent requirements both fair and feasible is a tough chal-
lenge. If the consent process is too cumbersome and expensive, collectors may
simply go to other, more 'friendly' countries if the organisms they're looking for
can be obtained elsewhere. For both countries and communities, it's a question of
how to develop effective regulations without killing the goose that might lay a
golden egg.
The Philippines law distinguishes between collections for academic and
commercial purposes. Getting a fair share of whatever profits may arise from
research by foreign collectors continues to be an issue for countries that have not
yet passed laws regulating access. In the Bahamas, University of California
researchers obtained a permit for the collection of soft coral, without charge and
with only the condition that they file reports on their work. The university sub-
sequently obtained a patent on a production process that was in turn sold to a
company that marketed it to the cosmetic company Estee Lauder, which used it in
the development of beauty products. The Bahamian government unsuccessfully
attempted to negotiate royalty payments from the extracting company, which
responded that it might simply move its collection activities to more accommo-
dating Caribbean countries where the same species is abundant. The Bahamian
government is now in the process of developing legislation to govern access to
genetic resources.
University of California researchers have also been criticized for patenting the
anti-inflammatory agent pseudopterosin, a compound found in sea whips in the
Caribbean and subsequently incorporated in a skin cream also marketed by Estee
Lauder. The average annual royalty income received by the university for patented
pseudopterosins is reported to be more than US$750,000 (Singh, 2000b).
While bioprospecting for marine invertebrates gets most of the attention,
biopiracy concerns sometimes extend to fish as well. The Amazon region has been
hard hit by illegal trade in wildlife, and the Brazilian government attempts to be
vigilant in stemming its flow. However, given the size and remoteness of the
region, enforcement of environmental law is a stupendous task. In another
example of suspected aquatic biopiracy, a German aquarist who planned to breed
ornamental cichlid varieties (cichlids include important food fish such as tilapias
and tiny ornamentals prized for their bright colours) travelled to Brazil to collect
108 BLUE GENES
Box 3.3 Biopiracy Debates in Brazil
The chief prosecutor for the Brazilian State of Amazonas, who opened an inquiry into
biopiracy in 1997, estimates that about 20,000 individual plant samples are illegally removed
from the country every year. Scientific laboratories generally receive the samples and infor-
mation from third parties who dont say where they came from.
How is the information obtained? A representative from IBAMA notes: 'The scientists
congregate in small frontier towns. Then they ask the Indians what they would do if they had
a headache, muscle pains or a bad stomach. The local people then take them into the jungle
and show ihem which plant they would use to cure those symptoms. The scientists pay the
Indians a little money, then take the plant back to their labs. There, they discover the prin-
ciple by which the plant works and sell their preliminary research on to the pharmaceutical
companies for development'.
Robert Smeraldi, director of the Friends of the Earth Amazon programme, notes: 'There is
widespread smuggling of genetic material by unauthorized companies. I'm not talking about
respectable pharmaceutical companies being directly involved, but I do believe they could
benefit from illegal research'.
A Brazilian cancer specialist was sharply criticized by the media after receiving close to
US$1 million from the American National Cancer Institute to analyse a number of Amazonian
plants. His critics argued that if information taken from indigenous peoples is used to
develop the world's first anti-cancer drug, the Indian tribes might lose out even if the cancer
specialist himself does not profit. In his defence, the researcher noted: 'While we continue to
talk and worry about biopiracy, fewer people are out there actually studying the Amazon,
which is a serious form of scientific neglect. Of course biopiracy happens, but we have to
balance this against not researching the rainforest at all. Ultimately that is much more
damaging to mankind' (Veash, 2000). We will return later to the subject of 'research chill',
particularly in Case Study 5.
wild specimens in the middle Rio Negro. When apprehended by a representative
of IBAMA, the Brazilian Institute responsible for enforcement of protected species
laws, the collector was examining the viscera of cichlids to determine their natural
diet. He had apparently obtained written permission from the nearest munici-
pality but had not sought the necessary approvals from IBAMA. He was deported
and ordered not to return.2
The money that changes hands in the collection of ornamental fish can stymie
the most determined efforts at enforcement, especially in areas like the Amazon -
the largest and perhaps most ungovernable river basin in the world. Rohter (2001)
reports that zebra fish from the Xingu River are so valuable that specimens are used
as local currency and that dealers' profit margins are comparable to those in the
cocaine trade, with a particularly rare specimen bringing as much as US$600 from
a Japanese collector. Although Brazil has attempted to control sales to prevent rare
species from being wiped out, black market dealers continue to thrive. Rohter
quotes a regional IBAMA representative as stating that, with only five agents to
monitor all wildlife in an area twice the size of New Jersey, little can be done to
protect illegal traffic. A tropical fish expert at the Emilio Goeldi Museum in Belem
notes that tropical fish dealers routinely file false customs declarations and
shipping waybills to get around restrictions, yet that there is little public interest in
the problem (Rohter, 2001).
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Stopping unauthorized collection of aquatic genetic resources is a challenge at
the best of times. Access laws are unlikely to work unless government has the
political will and provides the necessary funds for enforcement. This support may
be absent in both developed and developing countries depending on the degree of
cooperation among different levels of bureaucracy and of coordination among
policy structures. Bribery of officials may create an additional impediment in
countries where it is a common tradition.
Opposing views on biopiracy
Even when the approval of national agencies and indigenous communities is
received, charges of biopiracy may still arise. Indigenous communities may grant
permission for collections to occur without understanding (or in some cases being
adequately informed of) the true purpose of the collection, as in the case of the
Wapishana and the cunani plant. Collectors may take unfair advantage of commu-
nities that lack the capacity or the necessary information to negotiate fair deals.
Even if the purpose of collection is fully understood, agreements may be perceived
to be grossly unfair. Indigenous people may receive a pittance for the right to
collect or may be offered royalties that never come to pass or are minuscule in
relation to profits. A 1998 estimate placed annual global sales of pharmaceuticals
at US$300 billion, of which between 25 and 50 per cent are derived from genetic
resources (ten Kate and Laird, 1999). With almost 70 per cent of the total number
of ethnolinguistic groups in the world living in 225 regions of the highest
biological importance (WWF, 2000), it may be assumed that indigenous commu-
nities have been and will continue to be primary sources of the genetic resources
needed for pharmaceutical development.
As the Wapishana example illustrates, biopiracy applies both to physical
resources and the knowledge that makes their value immediately evident to
collectors. Communities face challenges on both fronts: protecting their
knowledge against misuse or appropriation under foreign intellectual property
laws; and protecting resources over which they may have no legal authority. Very
often, in the eyes of communities, the greatest perpetrators of biopiracy are not
foreign interests but levels of government in their own countries that exercise
authority over 'public' resources nationwide and deny indigenous and other
communities a say in who collects plants, fish and animals in community terri-
tories. In several countries, struggles for the right to self-determination are fuelled
in large part by frustration over lack of access to traditional resources and
exploitation by outside interests who have no obligation to seek community
consent once having received the consent of governments. Corporations may face
accusations of biopiracy even when they have conscientiously complied with all
government regulations or have negotiated with communities in what they believe
to be good faith. So may collectors from scientific institutions who depend on
access to genetic resources for basic research, and whose findings are freely
published.
Accusations of biopiracy may relate to activities ranging from the collection of
individual animals (eg rare Brazilian ornamental fish) to the entire system of
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collection of biological and genetic resources — what Shiva (1997) describes as the
sequel to colonization of countries, in which 'colonies have now been extended to
the interior spaces, the 'genetic codes' of life forms from microbes and plants and
animals, including humans'. As Dutfleld (n.d.) points out, noting that
exploitation of genetic resources has even been called 'the slavery of the new
millennium', such rhetoric may in fact undermine legitimate efforts to gain fairer
treatment for countries and communities that seek a more level playing field.
While the term 'biopiracy' may sound inflammatory to some, the issue raises legit-
imate questions about fair play for countries and communities that provide
aquatic genetic resources.
CASE STUDY 3. AN INDIGENOUS COMMUNITY SAYS NO:
Negotiating access to charr broodstock in northern Canada
Countries take many approaches to the recognition of indigenous rights of
ownership and control over aquatic genetic resources. Canada has been actively
involved in the negotiation of treaties with indigenous peoples. The Inuit, a people
along the Arctic coast, recently completed an agreement that recognizes both land
and resource rights. The Canadian DFO retains a role in the management of sea-
going fish, but communities have the right to prior informed consent to collection
offish broodstock.
Arctic charr, the northernmost species in the family Salmonidae, has long been
a staple in the diet of Inuit peoples on the coast of the Arctic Ocean in Canada.
While some charr inhabit landlocked lakes, most are anadromous, migrating in
late summer from the ocean to rivers and lakes to spawn, and reaching a weight of
up to 11.3 kg. During recent years the popularity of the fish in urban markets has
increased, creating an additional source of income for Inuit fishers in northern
Canada. But charr are slow growing, and the genetically unique subpopulations or
stocks of charr are extremely sensitive to overfishing. Consequently, Inuit commu-
nities developing sustainable management plans have had to grapple with how
best to conserve a diminishing resource while supporting local fishing economies
(eg Holman Hunters and Trappers et al, 1994).
The Northwest Territories Scientists' Act requires consent of local communities
before any scientific research is undertaken in the Territory. Enacted in 1974, the
Act was one of the earliest examples in a developed country of legislation that
reflects emerging international principles for respecting indigenous knowledge
and returning benefits to knowledge holders and their communities (Mann,
1997). In 1993, Canadian Inuit concluded negotiations of a land claim agreement
with the government of Canada. The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement estab-
lished principles of Inuit priority in the harvesting of marine resources and of
ownership over the resources in Inuit-owned land and marine areas.
Soon after the 1993 land agreement came into effect, Canada's DFO began
refusing fish harvesting, research and farming permits in the Nunavut region
unless the prior consent of local communities had been obtained. Icy Waters, the
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major charr farming company in the Arctic, proposed a joint venture with Inuit
communities and an Ontario university research group to set up a new company,
Suvaaq Inc., to improve the company's existing broodstock that were based on
previous DFO collections. Under the proposal, each of seven participating Inuit
communities would receive a 5 per cent equity stake in the new company in
exchange for sperm from six male Arctic charr from two separate stocks found in
waters near the communities. Icy Waters suggested that Inuit communities would
also benefit through education and practical experience in fish farming and access
to genetically improved stocks as these were developed. The business proposal
provided that each community would own its original fish contribution but that
hybrid lines resulting from cross breeding would be owned by Suvaaq (Mann,
1997). The proposed project would result in Icy Waters gaining access to a total of
14 genetically distinct charr stocks through local communities.
Final approval of the proposed project required consent from the communities
(through local Hunters and Trappers Associations), DFO and the Nunavut
Wildlife Management Board (Mann, 1997). The latter body, established under
the land claims agreement to oversee the protection and wise use of wildlife and
wildlife habitat for the benefit of the Inuit and other residents, advises the govern-
ments of Nunavut and Canada, which maintain decision-making authority. The
nine-member board includes four Inuit representatives and four from the
Canadian and Nunavut governments.
Several difficult issues emerged during negotiations on the proposal. Local fish-
ermen worried that the sale of genetically improved farmed fish would have a
negative effect on markets and prices for wild caught fish (Nunavut Wildlife
Management Board, 1998). Icy Waters attempted to allay this fear by suggesting
that successful farming could benefit local fisheries by reducing commercial
harvesting pressure on wild stocks, ensuring a valuable sport fishery, and
increasing consumer awareness of charr.3 Ownership issues added a further
complication. These included not only concerns about Suvaaq ownership of
successive generations of charr hybrids but also the possibility that the university
research group might try to obtain a process patent based on genetic mapping of
charr (Mann, 1997). Mapping would accompany the collection of genetic
resources and was necessary in order to ascertain whether the genetic differences
between the collected populations were significant. Finally, some Inuit expressed
concern that the project showed a lack of respect for charr and that the spirit of the
charr might take revenge on the Inuit people if the project went ahead, a not
unusual sentiment among native people who may accept technologies as a
necessary evil yet still feel uncomfortable with the spiritual implications of altering
nature.
Ultimately, communities withheld their consent and the Wildlife Management
Board turned down the proposal. Icy Waters was later able to obtain broodstock
from two charr stocks from one community that had consented to their collection
prior to the land claims agreement, and the company still pays royalties to that
community. These broodstock were subsequently cross-bred with the company's
base stock.4
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Icy Waters described the failed negotiations as expensive and time-consuming,
complicated by the difficulty of dealing with several different levels of authority,
the need to negotiate with several communities over a vast land area, a high level of
confusion about the implications of fish farming, and a long history of local
suspicion of southern interests.
Some of the issues that characterized the Icy Waters negotiations - such as the
patenting of products and processes - surface frequently in negotiations of agree-
ments for access to genetic resources. However, the Icy Waters example also illus-
trates that collectors of aquatic genetic resources may face extra complications that
are unlikely to occur in negotiations for access to plant genetic resources. For
example, the need for genetic diversity of broodstock may necessitate negotiations
with several communities over a wide area (because genetic differences, at least in
salmonids, usually reflect geographic separation), and in different government
jurisdictions, adding to the cost and complexity of negotiations. Indigenous
communities may also hold spiritual beliefs that create significant concerns about
the movement offish from their natural habitat - in addition to potential environ-
mental concerns about introduction of fish into areas where they are not
indigenous. Suspicion or confusion about possible effects offish farming on local
fishing economies is common, and will also hamper negotiations. And because
government policies for fish conservation and use are still at the stage where the
genetic fine structure of fish populations is poorly represented (and, in fairness,
usually not even known), the ground-rules are often less clear than in the plant
world. The Icy Waters case is typical in that genetic mapping of the collected
stocks would have taken place as they were collected. In other words, the genetic
distinctness of the resources in question was not even known.
What chiefly distinguishes the communities involved in the Icy Waters negotia-
tions from many others in the world is that they have substantial degree of control
over the of use their genetic resources and the clearly recognized authority to
withhold consent.
Most indigenous and local communities around the world (and in Canada, for
that matter) have no such authority. This is one among many factors complicating
the efforts of countries to develop access laws and policies that acknowledge in a
meaningful way the importance of involving local and indigenous communities in
decisions regarding applications for access.
Chapter 4
Thinking Locally: Rights of
Indigenous and Local Communities
Sorting ornamental fish after the night's catch, Rio Negro, Brazil (Photo by David Greer)
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TRADITIONAL COMMUNITY PRACTICES AND
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION
The CBD came into being because the countries at the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) acknowledged the
need to conserve global biodiversity for the well-being of humanity. The
convention notes the importance of helping indigenous and local communities
maintain traditional knowledge and practices relevant to conservation, and recog-
nizes the need to encourage the equitable sharing of benefits derived from the use
of community knowledge and innovations.
Acknowledging the rights of communities to control access to genetic resources
and receive meaningful benefits is not simply a question of fair treatment or
political pragmatism. The simple fact is that rural and indigenous communities
also have the motivation and the knowledge to make conservation happen -
provided they have the authority to watch out for the health of local ecosystems
and the wherewithal to make a sustainable living from them. And therein lies the
problem.
Studies in Latin America, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region have noted that
global biodiversity is most highly concentrated in areas inhabited by long-term
communities, many of which have developed stable and sustainable resource
management systems (Posey, 1993). The same areas also contain a high concen-
tration of poor communities. Economic desperation is a powerful disincentive to
conservation where the choice is between protecting nature and feeding the family.
This is nowhere more true than in fishing communities, which figure prominently
in any list of the poorest communities in the world (FAO, 1998). Eating or
bartering the last sea turtle egg is still preferable to starving, no matter how many
conservation NGOs would like you to stop.
There are dangers to romanticizing the historical relationship of rural and
indigenous communities with their natural environment, and to oversimplifying
changes to that relationship. Nevertheless, it remains true that many indigenous
and local communities hold a rich store of knowledge about the management of
biodiversity and how to sustain the ecosystems that support it. Communities that
have been devastated by the loss of autonomy and by subsequent poverty may still
maintain practices that make an important contribution to biodiversity conser-
vation. It is important also to remember that community conservation
approaches, methods and priorities in conservation may be very different from
those promoted by national agencies. This does not mean that traditional
community conservation practices are less effective, but may simply reflect the fact
that local custom derives from a different knowledge base and is less subject to
influence from complex and competing political agendas.
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Box 4.1 Managing Fisheries Abuttdaiice: Traditions of the Nuu-ehah-nulth in
British ColtofttMa
The Nuu-chah-nutth peoples of Canada's west coast once enjoyed a stable and prosperous
economy based on an intricate knowledge, developed over thousands of years, of the
natural cycles of marine life. In February, families moved Into; the inlets for the herring spawn.
Spring was the best time for halibut fishlrtg and seal hunting and brought the migrations of
humpback and gray whales, which the Nuu-ehah-nulth hunted by canoe. In midsummer, the
focus turned to salmon returning to spawn in the rivers and stream^ of Clayoquot Sound -
first the sockeye, and later Chinook and chum. Throughout the year, regardless of what other
foods were available, shellfish were always abundant.
The Nuu-chah-nulth passed their knowledge of marine species from one generation to
another through an elaborate system of songs, dances, masks and medicinal arts that were
protected as inherited family rights, Equally important in ensuring the careful management of
resources was the system of property rights, An extended family lived in a house under the
leadership of a chief who acted as custodian of salmon streams and other resources. Rather
than concentrating wealth, the structure of rights was designed to ensure the sharing of
resources throughout the community. The position of chief was considered to be more a
responsibility than a privilege. This was reflected in the potlatch ceremony, in which elab-
orate gift giving demonstrated the wealth and prestige of a chief, but more importantly,
encouraged the continuing distribution of wealth throughout the community.
By the late 19th century, the Canadian government had banned the potlatch, removed
Nuu-chah-nulth children to residential schools to encourage their assimilation into Canadian
society, and confined the Nuu-chah-nulth people to small 'reserves', limiting their access to
the fisheries that had sustained their economy for many thousands of years. Today the Nuu-
chah-nulth, like many other west coast indigenous peoples, are involved ih lengthy land
claims negotiations with the provincial and federal governments. These negotiations will help
define the nature and extent of aboriginal rights already recognized by the courts and in the
Canadian Constitution (Ecotrust Canada, 1997). In the meantime, indigenous communities
remain, by and large, the poorest in Canada.
Traditional practices are far more prevalent in some communities, especially in developing
countries, than in others. In common with many other indigenous peoples that depend on
fisheries, the Nuu-chah-nulth in recent years have formed management partnerships with
other fisheries stakeholders to take advantage of many of the scientific tools of fisheries
management, including sophisticated research techniques such as DNA fingerprinting and
gene banking of salmon stocks. Hatcheries, which run counter to some indigenous beliefs,
are nevertheless a tool used by several First Nations in the Nuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council;
even salmon farming, controversial throughout the west coast of Canada, has been
accepted by some groups within the council. Obviously indigenous communities cannot
simply return to a simpler time when respect for nature happened to coincide with abun-
dance, and there is not always unanimity on how to respect traditional beliefs and practices
while living in modern times.
The poverty barrier in fishing communities
The poverty of many traditional communities is rooted in the loss of ownership or
control over traditional lands, especially in developing countries. In many cases,
land held in common by villagers or indigenous peoples has throughout history
been taken over by governments or lost to colonial powers, local elites or military
juntas. Often the result has been the loss of traditionally sustainable livelihoods
and a resulting dependence on outside economies. This in turn has often led to the
break-up of traditional communities or the erosion of traditional cultures as rural
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people migrate to cities or struggle to maintain economic and cultural stability
against the pressure of dominant cultures and in the face of depletion of or lack of
access to traditional resources. The pattern recurs time and again.
In the Philippines, a 1992 survey by the National Statistics Office found that
95.3 per cent of 718,267 fishing families in the country were in the low-income
group (Herrin and Racelis, 1992). The widespread degradation of freshwater,
marine and coastal resources, a low level of education, lack of skills for partici-
pating in alternative livelihoods, and lack of political empowerment all contribute
to the poverty of fishing communities. Any attempt to address poverty must
address all of these issues.
In some cases, poverty may have origins in the loss of traditional lands; in others
it may be a result of overfishing by roaming industrial fishing fleets that depop-
ulate local stocks in any number of communities. Often landlessness and over-
fishing are linked in a vicious cycle. In Bangladesh, many rural fishing
communities have lost their lands to conversion for agricultural purposes by
'patron classes'. This loss of land has led to a greater reliance on fish for food, and
the resulting overfishing has depleted fish stocks in rivers, lakes and ponds, and
damaged aquatic ecosystems. Increasing landlessness and poverty have also
resulted in the incidental loss of traditional pond aquaculture, as poorer farmers
can no longer afford to grow the larger carp species that form the mainstay of the
aquaculture network (Lewis et al, 1996).
From one perspective, the recurring pattern of poverty and landlessness of
fishing communities may simply be a cold historical reality - the way of the world.
Obviously issues of poverty, domination and exploitation have neither easy expla-
nations nor easy solutions. The impact of trade liberalization on poverty has been
the subject of intense debate in recent years. Although proponents of trade liberal-
ization argue that rural communities will benefit through the trickle down effect
of lower prices, others (eg Madeley, 2000) are equally adamant that liberalizing
trade rules has reduced food security and exacerbated poverty in developing coun-
tries in addition to loosening environmental protection regulations. They argue
that rather than moving the world towards sustainable development, trade liberal-
ization has in fact hampered it, and that the real solution lies in revitalizing
communities.
On 23 September 2000, The Economist argued in an editorial that trade liberal-
ization can only benefit the poor by advancing the sharing of technology and
encouraging higher incomes. It concluded that reversing the trends of global-
ization would be 'an unparalleled catastrophe for the planet's most desperate
people, and something that could be achieved ... only by trampling down indi-
vidual liberty on a daunting scale'. The real question here is whether individual
liberty or the liberty of communities to control their own environment and
economic opportunities is more likely to alleviate poverty. Community advocates
who criticize the impact of globalization are quick to point out that the roots of
poverty often lie in the loss of control over resources and the loss of sustainable
livelihoods as a result of dependence on a market economy and legal system that
elevates individual rights over what is good for the community. As Berlin (1997)
notes, people are being asked to replace the idea of the common with the concept
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of individual well-being, rather than simply giving one more emphasis than the
other, with the result that individual citizens feel estranged from their community
to the detriment of both.
Providing indigenous and local communities with the means and incentive for
effective biodiversity conservation cannot be achieved unless the poverty cycle is
broken. Sharing benefits from the use of aquatic genetic resources can be a useful
tool for improving the economic and social well-being of communities provided
that benefits are carefully designed to address the root causes of poverty rather than
the symptoms. Benefits that achieve this objective may be non-monetary - for
example, programmes to promote alternative fisheries livelihoods that are
sustainable and strengthen the social fabric of a community. A community that
has the right to informed consent to the collection of aquatic genetic resources
must also have the right to decide what type of benefits it wishes to negotiate, but
governments designing benefit-sharing frameworks should take the initiative to
plan for a broad range that takes into account the relationship between poverty
and threats to conservation.
The sustainable development debate makes it clear that the role of traditional
communities must be reconsidered for the sake of future economic and social
security. Increasing their ability and incentives to ensure conservation of aquatic
genetic resources will ultimately depend on innovative solutions that depart from
past practices, including:
• Restoration or enhancement of rights of access and ownership where possible.
• Meaningful participation in aquatic genetic resource management decisions
and policy development.
• Appropriate mechanisms for maintaining and protecting traditional knowledge
of genetic resources.
• Policies on informed consent for access to aquatic genetic resources and equi-
table benefits.
• Capacity to develop sustainable fisheries livelihoods.
Women's participation in community fisheries
Women dominate key subsectors in fisheries (Townsend, 1998). Although the
participation of women in community fisheries may be less visible than that of the
men who bring in the catch, it is usually significant, whether it involves net
mending, processing, marketing or catching fish. In the freshwater ornamental
industry, for example, women may play an active role in the collection of fish. A
study in Malawi found that about 30 per cent offish processors along Lake Malawi
are women and 21 per cent offish farmers in the country are women (Brummett,
1994). In Bangladesh, notes White (1992), the participation of women in
marketing has consistently been underestimated; women's mobility has restricted
their participation in the marketplace but has not necessarily constrained their
activities in less visible market transactions, where they may play an
entrepreneurial role. In poor rural households in countries like the Philippines,
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women in fishing villages may undertake multiple fishing-related activities in
addition to household management (Illo and Polo, 1990).
Some critics of globalization suggest that trade liberalization has accentuated
gender inequality in developing countries and has generally had a negative impact
on the lives of women involved in food production in developing country commu-
nities. Madeley (2000) notes that in most African countries, women produce 60 to
75 per cent of food and have been disproportionately affected by the drying up of
credit and the surge of food imports resulting from trade liberalization. Migration
of male workers in some countries has generally increased the workload of women
carrying both domestic and economic responsibilities. Vandana Shiva (2000)
comments that, under economic globalization, women who produce for their
families and communities are treated as 'non-productive' and 'economically'
inactive. In her view, the devaluation of women's work, and of work done in
sustainable economies, is the natural outcome of a system constructed by a capi-
talist patriarchy. Because many women in the rural and indigenous communities
work with nature's processes, their work is often contradictory to the dominant
market-driven 'development' and trade policies. 'Feeding the world' becomes
disassociated from the women who actually do it and is projected as dependent on
global agribusiness and biotechnology corporations.
Townsend (1998) notes that concerns about gender discrimination include the
propensity of development agencies to focus on male activities. He suggests that
plans for development in any sector, including fisheries, must take account of
differences in gender roles and the fact that the relative lack of influence of women
in decision-making makes them particularly vulnerable. In the design of benefits
for fishing communities — especially benefits oriented towards the promotion of
sustainable livelihoods — it will be important to ensure that women's as well as
men's livelihoods are taken into account. And in the end, it is probably less
important that everyone involved in some aspect of fishing on the Sao Francisco
River in Brazil be called a 'fisher' than that the women processing and marketing
the fish have their labour officially recognized as contributing to the pension that
is every Brazilian's right.
Distinctive cultures of fishing communities
A study commissioned by FAO (2001) found that the degree to which fisheries
management practices and policies strengthen or weaken small-scale community
fisheries is directly related to the level of understanding of community fishing
cultures. The study found that communities that have relied on fishing through
many generations generally share two characteristics:
• Small-scale fishermen develop intimate, detailed, and function-oriented
knowledge about the aquatic systems in which they operate and about the
species of importance to them.
• Participation in fishing often involves the entire community. While the primary
producers are usually men, women play a dual role in household maintenance
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and in fish processing, marketing and distribution. The systematic division of
labour also includes roles for children and the elderly.
Communities take a collective approach not only to the sharing of labour but also
to the sharing of the catch and the development of systems of community-based
management, which may be very different from 'scientifically based' management
by government authority. By focusing on individual rather than community
interests and on conservation of stocks of importance to outside commercial fish-
ermen, government policies may disrupt community management systems.
Anything that affects traditional fisheries systems is likely to affect the entire
community. Small-scale fishing cultures adapt to risks and uncertainties by taking
a conservative approach to fishing, maintaining occupational pluralism, estab-
lishing share payment occupational systems, and developing beliefs, taboos and
ceremonies that support the maintenance of traditional fishing livelihoods.
The disruption of small-scale fisheries by high-technology competition often
leads to a vicious cycle of fisheries depletion, poverty, and loss of cultural identity.
Over harvesting by 'outside' fishermen under state licensing frequently destroys
traditional livelihoods. In addition, many communities lose access to their tradi-
tional fishing grounds. The progression of industrial development towards isolated
communities adds the threat of pollution of aquatic ecosystems in addition to
opening up access routes from the outside world. Even coastal tourism industries
can contribute to the disruption of traditional economies. The increasing depen-
dence of fishing communities on outside work and distant markets can further
erode lifestyles and cultures.
Communities dispersed along coastlines and mainly dependent on marine
ecosystems close to home are particularly vulnerable to resource depletion. The
limited political power of small communities makes them particularly vulnerable
to external threats, especially from large-scale fisheries that may get substantial
subsidies from the home country or may even be foreign vessels. The inability of
poor community fishermen to obtain financing for technological innovations
constrains their ability to remain competitive and is often another factor
contributing to poverty. The scenario of fishing communities being deprived of
traditional, collective fishing lifestyles and cultures, and lacking the means to
adapt to competitive market economies is all too common.
Lewis et al (1996) shows how the problem of maintaining traditional lifestyles
is not restricted to capture fisheries. Many traditional pond farmers in Bangladesh,
one of the poorest countries in the world, have lost their livelihoods as a result of
state support for 'more valuable' agricultural production of monocultured crops.
Rural fish farmers have had little say in the transformation of ponds to farmland,
because they rarely own the land. Those losing their livelihoods include not only
pond farmers and their families but also the people who collect the wild fingerlings
needed to supply them. Pond farms that survive tend to be run by large
landowners and supply more lucrative urban markets rather than the needs of
rural local communities.
Development projects to improve fisheries livelihoods may have unanticipated
negative effects if traditional cultural practices are not taken into account. A case
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study by J Kurien (FAO, 2001) describes the decline in the well-being of commu-
nities in a coastal region of India as a result of policies supporting the expansion of
a modern shrimp exporting industry. Previously, access to fisheries and the allo-
cation of fisheries resources had been regulated by communal traditions and insti-
tutions that emphasized the sharing of seafood and of incomes, as well as
promoting community-based participation in fisheries management and
providing an effective means of conflict resolution. Not only did shrimp exporting
provide comparatively little employment, but it resulted in the degradation of
marine ecosystems, a consequent reduction in traditional catches, and loss of
employment for women in seafood markets. Other development efforts,
promoting competitive individualism oriented to markets rather the communities
themselves, led to the erosion of cultural traditions that had long guided social and
economic life in the region, resulting in new social and political divisions.
Technological advances can be blamed for much of the damage to aquatic
ecosystems in the past. Fisheries policy makers are gradually moving towards an
ecosystem-based approach rather than simply focusing on commercially valuable
species. However, protecting the interests of communities and small-scale fishing
may be as important as protecting aquatic ecosystems, and indeed will likely hold
the key to ecosystem health in the long run. The real challenge for policy makers
will be how to do so in the face of pressures from large-scale fisheries operations
and in political systems that are driven by the guiding principles of individual
competition and economic growth.
The important role of traditional community practices in maintaining aquatic
biodiversity has been clearly recognized in the CBD and other international agree-
ments, and it is arguable that future fisheries policies should make the promotion
of the well-being of small-scale fishing communities their first priority. Even if this
doesn't occur, it will be crucial to design policies (both for biodiversity
management and for access to genetic resources) that are beneficial to small-scale
community fisheries. At the very least, this will require paying close attention to
the cultural characteristics of fishing communities, making every effort to revi-
talize traditional management practices and knowledge systems, and promoting
participation in policy making.
A few of the new national laws and regional guidelines on access to genetic
resources (discussed in Chapter 5) make a point of guaranteeing access for
indigenous and local communities to biological resources in their territories.
Constraints on access have long been a sore point in fishing communities that have
effectively been denied access under fisheries regulations. Communities whose
traditional fishing cultures and practices have eroded during recent decades may
also need assistance restoring and enhancing small-scale fisheries. National access
policies and access agreements can help the development of sustainable fisheries
livelihoods in concert with other benefits such as the improvement of community
health and education.
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INDIGENOUS VIEWS ON THE COLLECTION AND USE OF
AQUATIC GENETIC RESOURCES: A workshop in Canada
If the right of indigenous communities to provide or withhold access to genetic
resources is taken for granted, as it is in several emerging national laws, then access
policies and parties seeking to obtain access will need to respect indigenous views
on the use of aquatic genetic resources. Obtaining consent from indigenous
communities is not simply a matter of negotiating acceptable benefits. Negotiators
and policy makers need to be aware that, while indigenous peoples may bring a
variety of different perspectives to the negotiation table, their views on the use of
fish may be different from the 'Western' concept of resources to be gathered,
bought and sold. In addition, indigenous approaches to negotiations may be
complicated by broader concerns about indigenous rights. The tension between
indigenous peoples and the Canadian government is instructive in this respect.
To date, collection of aquatic genetic resources in the waters of western and
northern Canada has largely been restricted to obtaining broodstock for salmon
farming and enhancement of wild stocks, with limited collection of samples of
marine organisms for screening by pharmaceutical companies. The rules for
collection in traditional territories of indigenous peoples (now known as First
Nations) can be complicated. The federal government has the authority to manage
ocean resources (as well as sea-going fishes and their inland habitat), while other
inland fisheries are the bailiwick of provincial governments.
Anyone (including First Nations people) wanting to collect fish germplasm or
broodstock for aquaculture or wild stock enhancement must:
• Apply for and obtain a scientific collection permit from DFO, Canada. The
permit identifies the stock or species that may be taken, where and when it may
be collected, and the objectives of the collection.
• Obtain a permit from the federal/provincial Introduction and Transfers
Committee if the collector intends to move broodstock or germplasm from one
watershed to another.
Although there is no formal requirement for collectors to consult with indigenous
peoples before applying for a scientific collection permit, DFO, Canada expects
them to do so. If a collector fails to provide proof of adequate consultation, it is
unlikely that a permit will be provided.1
How land claims negotiations affect access
Canada was the first country to ratify the CBD and soon afterwards established an
'ad hoc open-ended working group', including strong First Nations represen-
tation, to discuss ways of implementing Article 8(j) - the requirement for
indigenous community consent and benefit sharing. As First Nations become
more familiar with Canada's legal commitment to implement the convention and
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Article 8(j), it is possible that they may use it as a bargaining chip during treaty
negotiations.
The current absence of formal policy requiring First Nations consent to collec-
tions is in large part a result of the uncertainty surrounding these negotiations.
With few exceptions, representatives of colonial governments did not negotiate
treaties with indigenous peoples in western Canada. Instead they appropriated
indigenous lands and designated small 'reserves' for First Nations peoples to live
on. For the past several decades, the federal and provincial governments have been
engaged in arduous negotiations with many First Nations to negotiate treaty rights
for ownership and control of traditional lands and natural resources. Control over
access to fisheries in traditional territories is almost always an issue on the table.
The first successful land claims agreements were implemented in the early
1990s with the Inuit peoples of northern Canada. These agreements provide for
fisheries co-management between the federal government and the Inuit and
require prior informed consent from indigenous communities for access to aquatic
genetic resources. Subsequent negotiations with other First Nations have proven
to be far more complicated, partially because of the central involvement of
provincial governments (northern Canada, home of the Inuit, has always
remained under the sole jurisdiction of the federal government). Traditional terri-
tories claimed by First Nations in British Columbia for the purposes of treaty
negotiations, for example, cover almost the entire area of Canada's westernmost
province.
First Nations priorities
In 1999, WFT hosted a First Nations workshop in Victoria, British Columbia, to
discuss principles that need to be taken into account in the formulation of
community and government policies on aquatic genetic resources management
and access. Participants included fisheries commission representatives from seven
First Nations in British Columbia, Yukon Territory and the Northwest Territories:
Carrier-Sekani, Gitxsan, Haisla, Nisga'a, Shuswap, Teslin-Tlingit and Inuvialuit.
Also attending were representatives of the Yukon Salmon Committee and
Northwest Territory Fisheries Joint Management Committee, both of which
include indigenous members.
While there was consensus on some issues, workshop participants were
reluctant to agree on a set of principles without the approval of their elders.
Instead, they suggested that the workshop be used as an opportunity to identify
starting points for further discussion among First Nations about access policies.
The workshop focused primarily on five questions:
• What are aquatic genetic resources?
• How should they be used?
• Should they be moved from their place of origin?
• How should traditional knowledge be treated?
• How should First Nations deal with requests for access?
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The following is a summary of key points made by participants, and provides a
valuable insight into the indigenous view of genetic resources.
What are aquatic genetic resources?
• Aquatic genetic resources include all aquatic biological diversity, freshwater and
marine, living and non-living. The elders say we can't separate the living from
the non-living in the web of life.
• Distinguishing between 'living' and 'non-living' resources is artificial - we
consider all things to have life; even the earth is alive with micro-organisms.
• Calling aquatic creatures 'resources' suggests a hierarchy that is not part of our
beliefs. We coexist with all creatures and look on them as equals — not
'resources'. Instead of being asked to adapt our thinking to the 'European' way,
we should ask the international community to adapt their thinking to the
indigenous way. Imagine replacing 'aquatic genetic resources' with 'people' — we
don't put one in authority over the other. That concept needs to be fully under-
stood.
What uses of aquatic genetic resources are acceptable?
• The further you move towards DNA identification, the further you move from
an indigenous perspective. Categorizing organisms into small boxes is a
'European', not an indigenous, approach. Ecosystems are complex, and policies
for managing creatures must show an understanding of the whole - not just the
pieces.
• When people talk about sperm cells and genetic resources, we see fish. The
environment is like a whole body - if you remove a toe, then you have to learn
to walk again.
• Uses of aquatic genetic resources must respect all components of aquatic
biological diversity.
• Genetic resources come from living beings, and we have been taught not to
interfere with animals at that level. Animals and fish must be treated with
respect. This has implications for everything from handling fish to genetic
transfers. Many indigenous people believe that genetic manipulation and
moving fish away from their natural territory is the highest form of disrespect.
• Removing genetic resources and raising fish in culture is against the beliefs of
the elders because they don't have the power to 'give away' genetic resources. If
they go along with it and receive some benefit, it's only because it might happen
behind their backs if they didn't.
• Gene banking is a useful way of rehabilitating declining stocks, but the
emphasis should be on conservation-based fish management, based on genetic
diversity, rather than on the yield-based management approach that
government uses. Maintaining genetic diversity is integral to indigenous rights
and title.
• We need to increase escapement of stocks to traditional fisheries areas instead of
focusing only on areas of heavy commercial use. While supplementation of
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stocks is acceptable, our people are opposed to genetic alteration or manipu-
lation.
• It is questionable whether genetic material should be used to restore an extinct
species. Species evolve naturally to adapt to changing conditions - and some
naturally disappear. To understand the traditional perspective we need to
include ourselves. We are not above the salmon - yet we wouldn't store our own
DNA in case our people become extinct.
• It is important to consider whether genetic materials should be collected at all.
As soon as we start collecting them, we create the potential for companies to
come in and scoop them up.
Should genetic resources be moved from their place of origin?
• Genetic resources are inextricably linked to their origins. Genetic materials
should not be used anywhere outside the watershed from which they are taken.
• Government agencies and groups that collect fish make decisions on where to
transplant stocks based solely on management perspectives without always
considering genetic implications. Indigenous communities must have a say in
where the material goes.
• Those who control access have a responsibility to people elsewhere. Great Lakes
natives say we have a responsibility to make sure no more Pacific salmon stocks
get into Atlantic areas. We also hear concerns about Atlantic salmon being
moved into the Pacific. The position of First Nations, as articulated by the
British Columbia Aboriginal Fisheries Commission, has been to oppose the
introduction of exotics. Within the freshwater domain, similar opposition
could reasonably be expected with respect to Arctic charr.
How should traditional knowledge be respected and protected?
• Many people assume traditional knowledge is from centuries ago, but it can
also mean current practices. It's not just an old way of doing things but a very
successful base of knowledge that has allowed people to survive and flourish for
thousands of years.
• In some cases genetic resources may have no clear link to community uses.
However, it may be wrong to assume that there is no local or traditional
knowledge of marine animals collected for pharmaceutical research. It may
simply be that indigenous peoples are reluctant to share their knowledge, even
though they have uses for a creature. Even if they don't, it is still necessary to tell
them how a genetic resource will be used in order to get prior informed consent
for its collection.
• Elders are often reluctant to share information with outsiders when they see
their knowledge exploited and distorted. They want to ensure that traditional
knowledge is not misused.
• Traditional knowledge can empower indigenous people to dictate their own
policies based on their traditional needs. Government fails to recognize the
importance of traditional knowledge in the management of resources and often
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conducts studies and research without consultation. Proper consultation and
respect for traditional knowledge are essential.
• We shouldn't filter traditional knowledge through science. Traditional ecological
principles are spiritual in nature, and we can't look at them scientifically. We send
our young people to universities to try to understand the European view, and it's
just as important for governments to learn about and understand the view of
indigenous peoples. Science has helped provide an understanding of ecosystems,
but this needs to be reconciled with the holistic understanding that indigenous
people have.
How should access to genetic resources be controlled?
• No one owns genetic resources - only the Creator.
• Genes and can't be owned - patent law isn't relevant. Nor is patent law meant to
apply to material we process without knowing its applications. With many
different groups involved in the management of genetic resources, adequate
planning is needed to avoid ad hoc responses to proposals. Indigenous peoples
are in the best position to ensure responsible uses of resources in their terri-
tories. In the absence of tools to deal with ownership of genetic resources,
indigenous peoples are in the best position to exert fiduciary control.
• Indigenous people should have the first right to say what is done with genetic
materials. They should have control over access, use and distribution.
• The rights held by indigenous and local communities are primary but not
exclusive. In the Inuvialuit Territory, for example, the hierarchy of rights and
responsibilities is as follows: community, Inuvialuit people, people of Canada,
world.
• Some companies put pressure on governments to provide access by what is
essentially blackmail — eg by threatening to stop research. Before permitting
access, communities must know what will be done with a genetic resource.
Companies such as pharmaceutical firms may only care about the product,
whereas indigenous communities may give priority to process. If the integral
nature of physical and spiritual healing is important, they may not wish to let
resources from their territory be turned into pharmaceutical products.
• Indigenous peoples should consider creating corporations to protect their rights
to control access.
• Resources should not be bought, sold or traded without community approval.
Applications for use of genetic resources should go through each First Nation's
resource council.
• Many indigenous communities are reluctant to approve access to genetic
resources without honourable agreements, based on thorough consultation,
that ensure an adequate return of appropriate benefits to communities.
• Indigenous communities need to develop policy principles especially to deal
with problems associated with bioprospecting, collection of broodstock and
outplanting.
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Many of the views expressed by participants in the workshop are probably typical
of indigenous communities anywhere in the world. Government policy makers
setting guidelines for access to aquatic genetic resources in indigenous commu-
nities need to take into account significant differences between the worldviews of
indigenous and mainstream societies. This is not an easy task, and the propensity
for rhetoric is strong, on both sides of the table. In the workshop summarized
above, for example, the stated abhorrence of DNA identification techniques needs
to be reconciled with one British Columbia First Nation's interest in using those
same techniques to analyse ancient salmon remains in order to establish territorial
use patterns and so strengthen its treaty case. First Nations are caught between
strong traditional beliefs and a deluge of technologies their elders never envi-
sioned, and these kinds of inconsistencies need to be taken in good faith if any
progress is to be made.
The worldviews of indigenous peoples are shaped by their continuous occu-
pation of the same ecosystems since the earliest times. They take a holistic
approach to the management of aquatic ecosystems, based on the belief that
humans are equal to and do not rule over other species. Consequently, the concept
of species as 'resources' for human use is a foreign notion. So are the concept of
private ownership of resources and of ideas pertaining to their use. Historically, the
survival and prosperity of indigenous peoples depended on sharing ecological
knowledge within and among communities and on respecting the natural balance
of ecosystems without placing human uses first. To indigenous peoples,
'sustaining' ecosystems does not mean determining how much you can take out
without doing damage but rather living harmoniously with other species,
receiving nature's surplus as a gift. In this sense, the 'ecosystem approach' to
conservation that is increasingly gaining favour originated with indigenous
peoples. Hence the value of maintaining and promoting traditional ecosystem
management practices.
Traditional knowledge of ecosystem management was preserved through genera-
tions by incorporating it into cultures — through song, dance and art, for example.
Today, indigenous peoples may be reluctant to share traditional knowledge with
outsiders (or to provide consent to access to resources) not only because they want
to ensure reasonable compensation but also because of cultural beliefs about respect
for species and about treating them simply as raw material for human invention.
These beliefs also may explain in large part indigenous peoples' scepticism about
scientific research in their territories and about the validity of scientific knowledge
based on reducing ecosystems to their basic elements. Monetary (or non-monetary)
benefits may seem meaningless to a community that objects to the basic premise of
treating fish as genetic resources. All too often the real incentive for indigenous
communities to consent to the taking of genetic resources is desperation to find
ways out of poverty brought on by the erosion of their cultures and loss of tradi-
tional livelihoods. Indigenous peoples of the world continue to push for the recog-
nition of their rights to self-determination and control over genetic resources in
their traditional territories. Even where this recognition has not been achieved, it is
important that national governments promote benefit-sharing arrangements that
are acceptable to indigenous communities.
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THE KNOWLEDGE KNOT: Traditional knowledge and access
to aquatic genetic resources
Article 8(j) of the CBD requires national governments to encourage the equitable
sharing of benefits arising from the use of the knowledge, innovations and prac-
tices of traditional communities. Traditional knowledge is especially important for
the use of plant genetic resources. New crop varieties developed by seed companies
may be based on strains produced by generations of traditional farmers. Similarly,
traditional knowledge of medicinal uses of plants may provide a shortcut for phar-
maceutical companies making decisions to invest in research and development of
new products, either by synthesizing or modifying compounds found in plants
used by indigenous peoples or by marketing botanicals.
Although some countries have a lengthy history of pond aquaculture, industrial
aquaculture is a relatively new activity, and the enhancement of farmed fish strains
relies almost exclusively on collection of wild broodstock. There is no real parallel
in fish farming to the situation in the plant world, where the experience and
knowledge of traditional farmers makes a major contribution to crop devel-
opment. Nor is there any strong parallel in marine bioprospecting to the need for
indigenous knowledge in developing drugs based on traditional uses of medicinal
plants.
As following sections in this chapter indicate, traditional communities have
extensive knowledge of aquatic genetic resources. It's not a question of whether the
knowledge exists but what type it is and whether collectors need it for the most
predominant uses of aquatic genetic resources - aquaculture and pharmaceuticals
development. Fish breeders may look to local communities for help in finding and
catching broodstock. In some cases as well, they may tap into local knowledge of
physical characteristics - for example, colorations and markings of prized orna-
mentals in remote jungle rivers. However, the bottom line is that there's no
comparison between aquatic and plant genetic resources uses in the type and level
of dependence on traditional knowledge.
The reason this distinction is so significant is that Article 8(j) of the CBD has
become the baseline for the development of several national laws regulating access
to genetic resources in indigenous and local communities. The implementation of
Article 8(j) has for many years been the subject of many at CBD meetings
involving not only national governments but also advocates for indigenous and
local communities. Discussions have focused primarily on how to set up effective
guidelines for community consent and benefit sharing, with little attention paid to
the issue of how governments will define what types of knowledge confer the right
for benefits or what happens when community knowledge is not relevant to the use
of genetic resources. As Chapter 6 demonstrates, lack of clarity about these issues
continues in the laws that have been developed to date.
With plant issues dominating the debate over Article 8(j), community
knowledge of fish genetic resources hasn't made it into the agenda. That will
undoubtedly change once collection of broodstock from communities becomes
more common and the question arises: if community knowledge isn't essential for
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the actual use of aquatic genetic resources, what rights do communities have to
provide informed consent for access or to receive benefits? In the meantime, those
involved in the making of access policy need to be aware of fish and plant distinc-
tions and ensure that policies take those distinctions into account.
Traditional knowledge of aquatic biodiversity
Traditional ecological knowledge (sometimes referred to as indigenous knowledge
or local knowledge) is a term commonly used to describe community knowledge,
in some cases evolving over hundreds or thousands of years, of local ecosystems. It
may form the basis for local decision-making for all facets of community life,
including natural resource management, nutrition, food preparation, health,
education, and community and social organization (Warren et al, 1995).
Indigenous knowledge of aquatic resources and ecosystem relationships has
been passed orally from generation to generation and may be incorporated into
cultural practices (eg songs, dances and art) that ensure its preservation and conti-
nuity. Typically, indigenous knowledge of aquatic resources includes fish location,
movements, and other factors explaining spatial patterns and timing in aquatic
ecosystems, including sequences of events (such as fish catches, marine mammal
sightings, aquatic blooms), cycles (eg fish migration, spawning, tidal changes,
lunar influences), and trends (eg decreases in catches, early thaws, rainfall patterns,
and changes in migration and spawning patterns; Posey, 1999). Although discus-
sions of traditional knowledge often focus on indigenous peoples, the ecological
knowledge developed by non-indigenous fishing communities with a lengthy
history is also substantial.
The relevance of traditional knowledge to conservation
Many fisheries managers (as well as scientists and policy makers) have been scep-
tical about traditional knowledge. Indigenous knowledge tends to be holistic in
nature (in contrast to the reductionist scientific approach) and closely tied to
beliefs about the unity of nature and spiritual qualities of animal life. Many
indigenous peoples strongly object to describing aquatic life as 'resources' because
the term justifies human domination of nature and implies a lack of appreciation
of living creatures as equals with a spiritual life of their own.
Scientific scepticism about the mingling of practical knowledge and spiritual
beliefs has been heightened by the romanticizing of traditional knowledge in
support of indigenous rights movements. Commentators unconcerned with
political correctness have asked, did indigenous peoples practise sustainable
management because they purposefully lived in harmony with nature, or simply
because they lacked the technology to exploit natural resources beyond sustainable
limits? And has the level of traditional fisheries knowledge been exaggerated to
increase its effectiveness as a negotiation tool? Johannes and Ruddle (1993) noted
that environmentally destructive practices coexisted with conservation efforts in
indigenous societies just as they did in all other societies. Blench (1998) rejects the
image of indigenous peoples as natural conservationists, and cites numerous
THINKING LOCALLY: RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 129
instances where the disappearance of megafauna in recent prehistory was the direct
result of human activities. For example, fossil evidence suggests to some
researchers that the Polynesians had severe impacts on local fauna as they colo-
nized the Pacific (Pimm, 1995). Some anthropologists reject the notion of the
'ecologically noble savage' and argue that expecting indigenous peoples to
continue using only traditional technologies and low-impact subsistence strategies
places an unfair responsibility on them and denies their right to develop according
to their own preferences (Dutfield, 1999).
Nevertheless, many indigenous and traditional societies do have a history of
living sustainably, in part as a result of the perception that all components of
natural landscapes are directly useful or usable resources — in contrast to the
prevailing economic view that few resources have production value (Toledo,
1991). From that perspective, the effectiveness of some indigenous peoples in
conserving aquatic genetic resources, while it may be linked to spiritual beliefs, is
rooted in a very practical understanding of the importance of protecting
ecosystems. The suddenly popular 'ecosystem approach' to resource management
- basing management decisions on the ability of ecosystems to support resource
use without damage - is not so different from long-standing principles held by
indigenous peoples (although it is exceptionally difficult to achieve in practice).
These principles in turn are based on and support an understanding of aquatic
resources and ecosystems that, while not scientific in nature, can nevertheless be
comprehensive.
The simple truth is that, to live sustainably from resources that are not pushed
to the limit requires little more than experience and common sense; it's only when
multiple users push resources to the breaking point that science needs to be
enlisted.
Fisheries management that emphasizes commercially important species over
ecosystem interactions bears much of the responsibility for diminishing fish
stocks. The more recent move to 'ecosystem-based management' has produced
some innovative results. Protected areas have proved a useful conservation tool,
although limited by the fact that they tend to be small and scattered. The highest
aquatic genetic diversity is often located in traditional communities simply
because people naturally set their roots down in areas with the greatest natural
abundance. It therefore stands to reason that promoting the restoration and main-
tenance of traditional knowledge and practices, as Article 8(j) seeks to do, is a
useful conservation objective.
While much attention has been focused on the importance of traditional
knowledge for conservation, its economic value to communities is also vital. Many
activities and products based on traditional knowledge are important sources of
income, food, and health care for large parts of the populations in developing
countries (UNCTAD, 2000). Moreover, many of the cultures from which tradi-
tional knowledge is collected are more endangered than the ecosystems in which
they reside (Reid et al, 1993), and there is increasing recognition that the loss of
cultural diversity is intricately linked with the loss of biological diversity (Crucible
Group, 2000). Consequently, conservation of aquatic genetic resources and
conservation of communities cannot be considered in isolation from one another.
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The continued availability of aquatic genetic resources will depend on conser-
vation at the community level. As Dutfield (1999) has pointed out, there is no
need to provide moral justification for compensation, as industrial users of genetic
resources would benefit, as would the biosphere and humankind. When genetic
resources in communities are treated as a common heritage while those in indus-
trial laboratories are treated as private property, the burden of conservation falls
unfairly on communities; in this context, compensation should be defined as
payment not for past services but for future options (Brush and Stabinsky, 1996).
While such arguments are generally made on behalf of rural farmers, they are just
as valid for fishing communities.
The relevance of traditional knowledge for collectors
Collections for pharmaceutical and industrial use
In inland indigenous communities, medicinal uses of plants have always been vital
to the well-being of local people. The same holds true for uses of plants by fishing
communities. However, for obvious reasons, fishing communities may have little
familiarity with the types of marine organisms sought by pharmaceutical
companies. In the first place, the organisms may inhabit relatively inaccessible sea
beds. Second, while many marine organisms have enormous potential for
medicinal uses, it usually takes sophisticated scientific knowledge to tap into them.
Familiarity with the toxic characteristics of cone snails or corals doesn't necessarily
lead to the knowledge needed to use them for healing.
Collections of ornamental fish
Traditional knowledge is more relevant to the ornamentals trade than for any
other use of aquatic genetic resources. Many ornamental stocks are highly
localized in remote areas and because their activity is often nocturnal, they can
only be captured by local people thoroughly familiar with their habits and habitat.
In addition, aquarium hobbyists are prepared to pay high prices for wild spec-
imens from strains that haven't previously been distributed. Collectors, whether
their purpose is breeding or distribution of wild specimens, need information
about the characteristics of local populations (such as coloration patterns, shapes
and growth characteristics) that may make them attractive to buyers. They also
need information about where to find the fish.
Breeders of some species may collect all the broodstock they need from the live
trade in ornamental fisheries. Or, as in the case of species such as guppies, mollies
and neon tetras that have been cultured for years, breeders may never need to
collect more specimens from the wild. The biggest demand for wild specimens for
breeding - and for the traditional knowledge that facilitates collections - will
likely occur for species or populations previously unknown to collectors or previ-
ously considered too difficult to breed. As Case Study 1 illustrates, the number of
species being cultured is constantly expanding as a result of advances in breeding
technologies.
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One feature that distinguishes the ornamentals trade from collections of plant
genetic resources is the coexistence of collections for breeding and for the trade in
live fish. Neither government agencies in provider countries nor local fishers may
have any way of knowing whether collected specimens will be used for culturing or
simply sold to hobbyists that have no interest in breeding fish. Similarly, there may
be no way of telling whether collectors are seeking out local knowledge with the
intention of trying to breed fish collected from the wild. This simple reality creates
a difficult hurdle for policies that work on the assumption that the purposes of
collections of genetic resources are well understood and that the only challenge is
determining whether access to traditional knowledge is needed for their use. In the
case of the ornamentals trade, neither of these facts can be easily ascertained.
Collections for food fish fanning
While industrial aquaculture has a very brief history, rural pond farming has
occurred for hundreds of years in some developing countries — thousands in the
case of carp in China. Even though local communities involved in pond farming
may have developed a substantial body of knowledge, a shorter history is not the
only factor differentiating traditional knowledge in fish farming communities
from that in crop farming communities. While it is possible for new strains to
evolve in pond farming, their appearance may just as easily occur by accident as by
design. At any rate, it is highly unlikely that breeders involved in industrial aqua-
culture would choose to collect broodstock from pond farmers rather than simply
collecting fish from the wild.
Collectors of wild broodstock for food fish farming may be looking for a
different type of knowledge than that supplied by ornamentals fishers. In addition
to knowledge of fish habitat, migration routes, life cycles and fishing techniques,
communities with a lengthy history of fisheries dependence may also supply useful
information about characteristics such as nutritional value (taste and oil content,
for example), rate of growth, and hardiness. However, as in the case of the orna-
mentals industry, food fish breeders are far less likely than collectors of plant
genetic resources to actually need access to this local knowledge. The British
Columbia salmon farmer (Case Study 2) who planned to enhance his stocks with
broodstock from the Yukon River didn't need anyone to tell him that a salmon
population from cold northern waters would have the high oil content that he
needed for the Japanese market. Similarly, when Aqua Bounty inserted a gene
from the ocean pout to develop the 'Super Salmon', it was already obvious that the
pout was capable of surviving in freezing waters. And the Icy Waters Company
(Case Study 3) had no real need to tap into the knowledge of Inuit communities of
local populations of Arctic charr that the company wanted to collect to improve its
farmed stocks.
There are three basic reasons why the need for access to traditional knowledge
for the enhancement of farmed stocks is likely to be limited:
• Community knowledge of wild populations primarily relates to fish habits
rather than the characteristics of interest to breeders.
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• Scientific knowledge of desirable characteristics of wild populations may
already be well developed.
• Communities may have no traditional use for some species or populations of
current or future interest to farmers (eg some marine species that inhabit waters
far removed from any traditional communities).
The type of traditional knowledge most likely to be useful to breeders is how to
catch and collect broodstock. For example, some large-scale pond owners in
Bangladesh hire people in traditional fishing communities to collect fish from the
wild because they know where and how to set nets for hatchlings and what types of
hatchlings are most desirable for farming (Lewis et al, 1996). Broodstock sought
for selective breeding are also often more easily found by local people. The situ-
ation is somewhat parallel to the ornamental industry's reliance on the traditional
knowledge of local fishermen about catching fish for breeding and sale. Does this
type of knowledge contribute to the use of aquatic genetic resources? That might
be considered a stretch, but the question is important for three reasons:
• With few exceptions, it's the only type of traditional knowledge that's particu-
larly relevant to the collection of aquatic genetic resources.
• Article 8(j) can be read to mean that countries only need to share benefits from
the use of genetic resources with communities whose traditional knowledge has
made their use possible.
• Consequently, if national access laws base the consent and benefit-sharing
rights of communities on provision of knowledge associated with the use of
genetic resources, fishing communities could be shut out of the benefit-sharing
equation.
Who needs traditional knowledge? A do-it-yourself guide to
biodiversity
Years ago, when international travel was the province of the wealthy, tourists
needed a local guide to find the best hotels, the most interesting hikes, and the
special restaurants where only the locals ate. Now that air travel is affordable,
bookstores have entire sections devoted to local lore; some, like the very successful
Lonely Planet and Rough Guide series, even specialize in taking the tourist off the
beaten track. The new guidebooks are a direct result of market demands.
Local people know their way around; nobody would argue with that. Tourists
and hunters do better if they have guidebooks or guides. It's not surprising that,
when it comes to biodiversity coveted by 'outsiders,' local people are presumed to
be the fastest way to the source. They've been husbanding or harvesting obscure
plants and animals for generations, the argument goes, and their traditional
knowledge of which organisms do what, and where to find them, is the best
possible database for anyone wanting access to that biodiversity. That's the
reasoning of the CBD, whose Article 8(j) has established traditional knowledge as
the linchpin of access and benefit-sharing arrangements. Traditional knowledge,
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says the CBD, is the key. Bioprospectors need to work with traditional knowledge.
From traditional knowledge flow the benefits.
But what if there is no traditional knowledge of an interesting piece of bio-
diversity? Or, what if there is, but it's not the only knowledge? Does that mean the
plant or animal can't be collected, analysed, copied? Not at all - but it may mean
that, since benefit sharing is so closely wedded to traditional knowledge by the
CBD, and since national governments are all tailoring their access policies to the
same pattern, the community can be bypassed.
Collecting biodiversity by relying on traditional knowledge is like turning back
the clock on international tourism. It assumes that local guides are the only ones.
They aren't. For a hundred years, scientists have been studying plants and animals
in faraway places. Enthusiastic academics captivated by nature's infinite variety
have spent entire careers collecting and describing biodiversity. There is much that
they don't know, but the cumulative body of academic knowledge of biodiversity
should not be underestimated. Graduate students without the slightest interest in
profiting from their research have crawled through the rainforest and dived on
tropical reefs for decades and continue to do so for the simple reason that the
eating habits of a fire ant or the defence mechanisms of a rare nudibranch are fasci-
nating to them. Financial gain doesn't enter into it.
So if the bioprospector - the 'biodiversity tourist' - is looking for, say, a tropical
plant that produces a potent insecticide, or a wild tilapia strain that could be used
to breed a superior animal for farming, does he have to go to the local village
authority or medicine man in Thailand, or to the family in Ghana who knows
about the tilapias that have been there for centuries? Not really, because there's an
American botanist in Hat Yai who went native years ago and knows every plant in
the forest; and there's a professor from a university in Europe who's been studying
those native African tilapias for 30 years. By now, these people are the local
knowledge.
This is the situation policy makers need to grapple with when designing access
and benefit-sharing policies. If outside experts are capable of collecting bio-
diversity without local help — if, in other words, traditional knowledge can be
dispensed with — then invoking Article 8(j) of the CBD in order to restrict access
to genetic resources leaves a loophole big enough for a Land Rover full of samples
to drive through.
As methods for building biologically active molecules and transferring genes
become more sophisticated, the role of wild biodiversity will change. Wild bio-
diversity will become more and more of a. starting point for a drug or chemical or
high-yielding broodstock, not a pilot-scale factory that simply needs to be scaled
up. And the role of traditional knowledge will decrease accordingly, because the
piece of biodiversity that proves useful may have no traditional interest whatever.
It is risky to establish the value of something against a shifting baseline. If access
and benefit sharing are tied to traditional knowledge as part of a strategy to
promote and protect that knowledge, the strategy may backfire. Traditional
knowledge is a cultural legacy that should be preserved and perpetuated, but its
advocates cannot afford to link its survival to a market that may not exist much
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longer. In many cases, for example a bottom-living marine animal offshore from a
fishing village, the presumption of local knowledge verges on the ludicrous.
Benefits to traditional communities can play a vital role in promoting the
conservation of aquatic genetic resources, especially when tied to the building of
sustainable local economies. But if the right to receive these benefits is based solely
on the contribution of traditional knowledge, then provider communities may be
able to claim no right at all. Other access and benefit-sharing rules need to apply.
NO KNOWLEDGE, NO BENEFITS?
The shortcomings of Article 8(j)
As discussed in the following chapter, many countries are in the early stages of
developing access and benefit-sharing laws to meet their CBD commitment. How
to draft provisions related to community consent and benefit sharing remains one
of the most difficult issues to address. The handful of countries that to date have
developed or implemented legislation have taken different approaches to the
question of whether community rights to consent to the collection of genetic
resources depends on the contribution of traditional knowledge to their use of
genetic resources. The Philippines and Costa Rica require community consent for
all requests for access to genetic resources. By contrast, Brazil and Peru tie the right
of consent to the provision of traditional knowledge.
At meetings on the implementation of the CBD, Parties to the Convention
have wrestled for years with how to interpret Article 8(j) in national legislation and
what requirements to make for informed consent by communities. Finally, in
2001, the Sixth Conference of the Parties (COP) to the CBD approved the 'Bonn
Guidelines' on access and benefit sharing. The guidelines recommend that
informed consent of indigenous and local communities be required for collection
of genetic resources with or without associated knowledge, 'in accordance with
their traditional practices, national access policies and subject to domestic laws'.
This is encouraging news for fishing communities whose aquatic genetic resources
may be sought by collectors in the future. However, as neither the CBD nor the
guidelines are binding on Parties to the Convention, it remains uncertain whether
different governments will follow the Philippines or the Brazilian route.
Many countries fear that the right to informed consent to access may be the thin
end of the wedge for community demands (especially among indigenous peoples)
for extended rights of ownership and control of lands and biological resources and
a consequent erosion of national sovereignty and control. While such concerns
may be justified (especially in light of international human rights agreements
supporting such an extension in the case of indigenous peoples), the main reason
for ensuring that communities have the right of consent with or without
knowledge associated with the use of genetic resources is that the objectives of the
CBD won't be achieved if countries don't acknowledge that right. This is the major
shortcoming of Article 8(j) - by implying that benefit sharing should be limited to
communities providing knowledge, it fails to recognize that the conservation and
sustainable use of genetic resources will be attained only if indigenous and local
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communities have the incentive and wherewithal to carefully manage biological
diversity. But consent and wherewithal depend on being able to negotiate benefits
that alleviate poverty and build the capacity to develop sustainable livelihoods and
healthy economies and cultures. This is especially true for fishing communities
and the conservation and sustainable use of threatened aquatic biodiversity.
CASE STUDY 4. GENETIC IMPROVEMENT OF FARMED TILAPIA:
Lessons from the GIFT project
ICLARM, now the World Fish Center works with farmers, scientists and policy
makers to help the rural poor increase their income, preserve their environment,
and improve their lives through the sustainable use of aquatic resources. An
ICLARM project for the development of improved strains of tilapia for rural pond
farmers reveals the complexity of issues that policy makers face when developing
regulations for access to aquatic genetic resources. It also illustrates the limitations
of thinking of benefits strictly in monetary terms.
Background
Tropical finfish currently account for about 90 per cent of global aquaculture
production for food. Most species currently farmed are genetically very similar to
wild, undomesticated stocks. For aquaculture to be able to meet the expected
global increase in demand for fish protein, there is a need for improved strains that
are faster growing, resistant to disease, and suited to a variety of pond farming
conditions. The situation is analogous to the early days of agriculture.
In developing countries, small-scale pond farming can provide nutrition and
income in addition to recycling otherwise wasted nutrients to improve soil fertility
and subsequent crop production. Many attempts at pond farming fail because of
inadequate knowledge of sound farming practices, poor water quality, and lack of
access to fish that are adapted to pond farming conditions. Tilapias, for example,
mature and reproduce so quickly that, even if a farmer overcomes other obstacles,
he may end up with a large population offish too small to be marketable.
Although the majority of Africans rely on fish as their primary source of animal
protein, pond farming has generally failed to flourish in Africa. Yet tilapia, a
species native to the continent, has proven to be one of the biggest success stories
in pond farming in many Asian countries (particularly the Philippines, China and
Thailand). Tilapias are a major source of protein for the poor in Thailand because
they cost half as much as other freshwater species such as catfish and snakehead.
The fish is also widely and profitably farmed in the southern US.
Some of the recent success of farmed tilapia production in Asia is a result of a
breeding programme by ICLARM. In the early 1990s, ICLARM developed a new
strain of tilapia by cross-breeding several strains of Nile tilapia (Oreochromis
niloticus). Neither genetically modified nor transgenic, the new strain has been
developed using traditional selective breeding methods under the Genetic
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Improvement of Farmed Tilapia (GIFT) programme. Tilapias were first intro-
duced from Africa to Southeast Asia in the 1970s, and the GIFT strain was
developed from collections made in four African countries in the late 1980s and
from four existing collections in the Philippines. Two decades later, following a
further series of ICLARM projects, tilapia farming in rural Africa may finally be
about to get a fresh start.
The beginnings of GIFT
In the mid-1980s, ICLARM developed an aquaculture programme based on the
recognition that more productive and profitable aquaculture in developing coun-
tries would depend on development of better breeds of farmed aquatic organisms
and better farm environments. Tilapias were chosen as test species because of their
importance in warm water aquaculture and their usefulness in investigating the
application of genetics in aquaculture. The proposed programme, which
employed both in situ and ex situ conservation of genetic resources, would
proceed in three phases: documentation of genetic resources (wild and farmed);
evaluation of their culture performance; and the use of germplasm in breeding
programmes. This programme became the foundation for the GIFT project,
which was started in 1988 with the objective of developing more productive stocks
of tilapia by selection for high growth rate and other economically important traits
(eg disease resistance and maturation rate), and providing the improved strains to
national and regional testing programmes and thence to fish farmers (Pullin et al,
1991).
The GIFT project involved a collaboration between ICLARM, Institute of
Aquaculture Research of Norway (AKVAFORSK), and three Philippine institu-
tions: the Freshwater Aquaculture Centre of Central Luzon State University, the
Marine Science Institute of the University of the Philippines, and the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. The Philippines was chosen as the site for GIFT
because of farmers' need for more productive fish, a well developed national seed
supply system, and availability of technical support. AKVAFORSK would
contribute practical experience in fish breeding programmes.
Initial steps in the GIFT project included the documentation of tilapia genetic
resources in Asia and Africa, establishment of a collection of promising strains of
Nile tilapia from Africa and from existing Asian cultured stocks, and evaluation of
the wild Nile tilapia germplasm from Africa, along with existing cultured stocks in
the Philippines in a wide range of farming systems and agroclimatic conditions.
In 1988, the GIFT team travelled to Africa to collect breeders and fingerlings of
Nile tilapia in Egypt, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal. This was done in collaboration
with national research institutions in each of the four countries (Gupta et al, 2000)
as well as the University of Hamburg; the Musee Royale de 1'Afrique Centrale in
Tervuren, Belgium; the Ghana Institute of Aquatic Biology; the Suez Canal
University in Egypt; and Baobob Farms in Mombasa, Kenya. The eight tilapia
strains eventually used for the GIFT study included four African wild strains and
four domesticated strains from the Philippines. Three of the African strains
(Egypt, Kenya and Senegal) were found to perform as well as or better than
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domesticated strains used by Philippine fish farmers. Combining germplasm from
the African strains with the farmed Philippines strains formed the basis for
creation of a gene pool for selective breeding, with positive results (Pullin et al,
1991;Eknathetal, 1991, 1993).
International concerns about the use of aquatic germplasm
In 1992, ICLARM organized a meeting on International Concerns in the Use of
Aquatic Germplasm, with the objective of providing clear priorities and directions
in fish-breeding research and approaches that would benefit small-scale, resource-
poor fish farmers in developing countries (ICLARM, 1992). The group recom-
mended that GIFT undertake a further sampling of wild tilapia populations in
Africa, with guidance from the FAO Code of Conduct for plant genotype
collection, in order to reexamine the potential benefit of cross breeding. It noted
the potential of GIFT to significantly improve the productivity of tilapia farming
and the intention of GIFT trustees that the improved strains be freely provided,
through the appropriate national authority, to tilapia farmers in participating
countries. The primary beneficiaries would be five Asian countries with significant
tilapia production.
As African access to the GIFT strain would not be likely in the short term, the
group suggested that ICLARM recognize the African contribution by increasing
its commitment to African aquacultural development, although there was much
uncertainty about how this might be done (ICLARM, 1992). One meeting
participant later commented: 'The Biodiversity Convention does not provide
regulations for compensation for past contributions. However, as it is important
that Africa conserves wild tilapia relatives to keep them available for future use,
some benefits accruing from utilization of tilapia germplasm must be returned'
(Rosendal, 1992).
The group considered the need to safeguard innovations through patenting but
concluded it was not likely to become an issue in the foreseeable future (ICLARM,
1992). It also noted the lack of recognition by researchers of the importance and
relevance of local knowledge of fish genetic resources and habitats and suggested
that ICLARM explore ways to disseminate information on the existence and
possible usefulness of local knowledge.
Distribution of GIFT strain to farmers
By the fifth generation of selection, the GIFT fish had achieved an average genetic
gain of 12—17 per cent per generation and a cumulative increase of 85 per cent in
growth compared to base populations. Testing of the second generation in four
other countries (Bangladesh, China, Vietnam and Thailand) also revealed higher
growth rates and better survival rates than in local strains. Dey (2000) concluded
that 'the adoption of the improved strain will increase tilapia production and
consequently the total fish production in a country, enhance profitability of fish
farming, decrease tilapia prices, increase consumption of tilapia and other fish for
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non-fish farming producers and GIFT adopting farmers and increase the welfare
of the country's economy as a whole'.
Prior to the official termination of the GIFT project in 1997, its partners
decided to establish a private, non-profit foundation called the GIFT Foundation
International to commercialize the GIFT strain in the Philippines through part-
nerships with the private sector, thus generating funding to continue with selective
breeding and research on GIFT fish. ICLARM provided germplasm to the
Foundation and to a Philippine institution. Later ICLARM provided breeders
from the sixth generation to a Norwegian aquaculture company, GenoMar ASA,
for further improvement and marketing. At the same time, the GIFT Foundation
was selling/disseminating the GIFT strain in the Philippines and ICLARM was
providing it, through the International Network on Genetics in Aquaculture
(INGA), to other Asian countries that requested it.2
The GIFT Foundation established six accredited hatcheries in the Philippines
near the greatest concentration of tilapia grow out production farms. Small-scale
farmers (operating ponds ranging from 2000 to 3000 m2) can now buy GIFT
fingerlings from these hatcheries, although the cost is higher than other available
tilapia strains.3 As poor farm practices or environmental problems can inhibit the
effective use of the improved GIFT strains, the Foundation has begun providing
technical support to Philippine farmers of the GIFT strain. Farmers in other coun-
tries can obtain the GIFT strain through government agencies that have received
breeding material from the GIFT project or through INGA at no cost. In
addition, the Foundation has entered into a commercial relationship with
GenoMar, which is expected to make the GIFT strain available in other countries
through hatcheries set up for the purpose.4 In 1999, GenoMar obtained
commercial rights for further improvement of the GIFT strain, and the brand
name 'GIFT Super Tilapia was registered in the Philippines.5 ICLARM retained
the right to distribute the germplasm it had improved through the GIFT project.
Returning benefits to Africa
In 2000, ICLARM began a project to transfer GIFT's selective breeding tech-
nology from the Philippines to sub-Saharan Africa and Egypt. The objectives of
the new project were to train African scientists on the use of the selective breeding
technology that is the basis for GIFT, initiate national breeding programmes, and
develop strategies for the dissemination of the GIFT technology and the geneti-
cally improved fish resulting from it. With the assistance of INGA, national
research institutions in 13 developing countries in Asia, Pacifica and Africa have
now used the selection methods developed through the GIFT project to initiate
national breeding programmes for genetic improvement of their indigenous
cultured species (Gupta et al, 2000).
Under its Biodiversity and Genetic Resources Research Program (BGRRP),
ICLARM followed the GIFT project with another in the coastal zone of West
Africa to facilitate the conservation and sustainable use of the brackish water
black-chinned tilapia (Sarotherodon melanotherori), with the objective of
improving fish supply and providing livelihood opportunities for fishermen and
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farmers. 5. melanotheron has long been an important resource for poor fishermen
using a variety of fishing gear and traditional methods of fisheries enhancement,
the so-called 'brushparks'. However, indigenous knowledge and the management
practices that have traditionally been used to conserve its populations are breaking
down because of human population increases and habitat degradation. S. melan-
otheron is not currently farmed, but the national institutions in Ghana and
ICLARM believe it has potential for both brackish water and freshwater farming
and that its development for this purpose would reduce importation of exotic
species for aquaculture, which could have adverse environmental impacts.
Activities under the S. melanotheron project in 1998 included: collection of
more than 400 tissue samples in several countries by national institutions to
determine the genetic diversity of the subspecies; obtaining indigenous knowledge
on the biology, ecology and use of the brackish water tilapia; identifying locations
in Ghana with the potential for community-based sustainable aquaculture and/or
fisheries development; and starting an aquaculture development programme in
one of these locations (ICLARM, 1999). The live germplasm is being maintained
by the national institutions.
Case study conclusions
For certain purposes, genetic resources may be collected from — and benefits may
flow to - many communities in many countries. In the case of GIFT, ICLARM
had great ambitions to improve conditions for raising farmed fish and increasing
food supplies in developing countries, and to a large extent succeeded. While there
is no indication that the communities from which tilapia were collected received
any direct benefits, African countries did eventually benefit from the research
conducted under GIFT and subsequent projects. While none of this occurred
under the types of access and benefit-sharing arrangements envisioned by the
CBD, it provides a useful illustration of the types of non-monetary benefits that
may be useful to communities.
Access to broodstock in communities
When the original GIFT collections occurred, several years prior to the CBD,
genetic resources were considered common property and it would have been rare
indeed for collectors to seek the consent of provider communities. National insti-
tutions in the provider countries made the collections on ICLARM's behalf, and
none of the countries involved had requirements for obtaining the consent of or
sharing benefits with communities from which aquatic genetic resources were
obtained.
Ten years later, when ICLARM returned to Africa to obtain broodstock for the
BGRRP project, not much had changed. Once again government institutions
from African countries made the collections, and none of the countries had
developed access laws. As a CGIAR centre, ICLARM is obliged to follow CGIAR
collection policies, which state that centres must obtain formal permission from
the relevant authorized government body prior to making a collection (CGIAR,
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2001). Although the OAU model law clearly confirms the need for laws requiring
collectors to obtain consent from local communities (OAU, 2000), no African
country has yet made it a legal requirement.
The few access and benefit-sharing laws already in existence generally require
community consent for collections — without saying how to obtain it. What are
the implications when projects require collections in many communities scattered
over several countries? As in the case of the ICLARM projects, organizations
planning to select fish populations suitable for aquaculture may need to make
numerous collections to determine genetic variability and identify desirable char-
acteristics for breeding. In this respect, collections for aquaculture are like
bioprospecting for marine organisms - they may require collections from a variety
of populations over a wide area. Collections for aquaculture development require
much greater effort than collections for crop breeding, which often have the
benefit of generations of farmers' experience and knowledge. The fish farming
industry is starting from scratch - attempting to accomplish in a few decades what
crop farmers may have taken thousands of years to achieve. Many fish species
currently being tested for aquaculture potential have never been farmed before.
As more and more national access laws come into being, organizations like
ICLARM may need to obtain consent from numerous local communities for
collections of broodstock or even DNA samples. The impact of such a
requirement on research and development can be imagined.
Academic versus commercial collections
Even if laws distinguish between academic and commercial research, the consent
process is still likely to be onerous. The only distinction the OAU model law
makes is that academic users may pay lower permit fees. Then there's the difficult
question of the potential for overlap between academic and commercial research
purposes. Philippine law requires institutional collectors to switch from an
academic to a commercial permit if it becomes apparent that research may lead to
commercial prospects. The OAU model law prohibits collectors from applying for
IPR protection over biological resources or their derivatives without the consent of
provider communities. In the GIFT case, ICLARM had no direct commercial
objectives when the project started yet, ten years after the initial collections, a
private company obtained the right to commercial activities made possible by the
GIFT development of a new tilapia strain. As the GIFT example illustrates, the
link between the collector (national institutions), the user (ICLARM), and
eventual commercial use (by GenoMar) can cover a lot of time and territory.
Clearly, social benefits do arise from GenoMar's work, which could not effectively
proceed without some form of intellectual property protection.
More than anything else, the GenoMar link illustrates the complexity of issues
that policy makers must take into account when developing laws on access to
genetic resources and their commercial use. Laws that are too zealous can severely
impede the work of institutional collectors whose ultimate goal is to improve
conditions in local communities, and they can also hamper commercial opportu-
nities which may be in the public interest. Nevertheless, if governments are serious
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about ensuring benefits to communities that provide broodstock, they will need to
carefully consider how far reaching laws will be with regard to commercial profits
that may be only tenuously linked to initial collections and may not occur until
the distant future.
Benefits to communities
Obtaining the consent of each community providing aquatic genetic resources
could be relatively straightforward if fair and efficient processes are developed with
national assistance. The most difficult obstacle may ultimately be the negotiation
of benefits acceptable to communities. The OAU model law, like some other
proposed or existing laws, makes only one requirement: the payment of royalties.
This provision probably originated with concerns about bioprospecting for
medicinal plants or the use of the traditional knowledge of agricultural commu-
nities for commercial gain. However, the narrow legislative focus on monetary
compensation may be both short-sighted and counterproductive. Non-monetary
benefits directed towards improving the economic and social well-being of
communities may be far more useful in the long run not only for the communities
themselves but also for the promotion of sustainable development - the ultimate
objective of the CBD. The ICLARM projects provide an innovative example of
how access to genetic resources in a variety of communities can result in the
creation of sustainable fishing and fish farming livelihoods on a broad scale, poten-
tially resulting in far greater benefits for rural communities and countries than
cash payment. The GIFT example has no clear parallel in the collection of plant
genetic resources. Although Asian rather than African farmers were the initial
beneficiaries of the development of improved tilapia strains, the GIFT project
provides a useful model for innovative uses of farming technologies for the benefit
of local communities.
A legislative focus on benefit-sharing agreements between a provider
community and a collector may be too narrow to accommodate projects such as
those conducted by ICLARM and those that will be needed in the future to
improve the productivity of rural pond farms in developing countries. It may be
that national governments need to facilitate broader-scale agreements involving
groups of communities. In the case of GIFT, not every community in which
collections were made directly benefited from the results of the ICLARM devel-
opment of new strains and training for rural fish farmers. They may benefit in the
long run, however, through the efforts of national breeding programmes assisted
by GIFT. Alternatively, governments could take steps to ensure that communities
providing aquatic genetic resources share in revenues created in other commu-
nities - for instance, through the establishment of national trust funds to help
provider communities enhance sustainable fishing livelihoods (eg through
restoration offish habitat, revival of traditional fisheries practices, improvement of
marketing skills, etc).
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Pond farming and capture fisheries
In some northern countries, capture fisheries organizations fiercely oppose compe-
tition from industrial aquaculture, arguing that it will not only put them out of
business but also have an adverse effect on aquatic biodiversity. But equating the
industrial aquaculture of species like salmon with rural pond farming of species
like tilapia is comparing apples and oranges. The need for a massive increase in the
availability of fish protein to feed growing populations in developing countries is
undisputed, and to ensure food security, governments will need to do everything
they can to promote both sustainable capture fisheries and pond farming. Small-
scale pond farming can substantially benefit the economies of the smallest villages
and communities, some of which may rely on capture fisheries as well.
Chapter 5
Acting Globally: National Laws on
Access to Aquatic Resources
Farmed Atlantic salmon broodstock, British Columbia (Photo by Monica Maclsaac)
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THE COLLECTOR'S CONUNDRUM: What s the law?
In May 2002, the US Department of State (2002) issued the following guidelines
to American researchers collecting plant, animal and microbial genetic materials in
other countries:
Before collecting any genetic resources abroad, a researcher should have a
written agreement that includes these key provisions:
• prior informed consent of the national government;
• access to the genetic resources or 'traditional knowledge' of an indigenous
community or communities will normally require obtaining the prior
informed consent of that community (ies);
• the non-monetary and/or monetary benefits the collector will provide, and
whether, and under what conditions, the collector may transfer the collected
genetic resources to another party.
Basically, the guidelines sum up the essence of the access provisions of the CBD -
no more collection of genetic resources without a solid agreement with the
country and community where you're collecting them. The US Department of
State noted that many countries have either introduced or are developing national
access regimes and that the CBD creates an obligation to obtain the prior
informed consent of source countries whether or not they have such regimes in
place. Somewhat ironically, the US is one of a handful of countries that have yet to
ratify the CBD.
Imagine you're a researcher hired by an aquaculture company to collect, say,
tilapia broodstock from several locations in Africa or catfish broodstock from
different rivers in Asia. Or let's say you're with an ornamental fish consortium in
Florida and you want to enlist the help of villagers in a South American country to
collect live specimens so you can transport them back to the US and try breeding
them. Or perhaps, as a researcher for a pharmaceutical company, you know that a
new type of sponge has been discovered in Caribbean waters, and you want to
collect samples for testing. Or you're doing a PhD study on genetic variability in
freshwater turtles, and you'd like to travel to remote areas catching turtles in the
wild, scraping off DNA samples, and freezing them for later analysis back home.
At present, you or an intermediary might just go and collect the animals or
genetic material, pay whomever helped you catch them, make the appropriate
arrangements for safe transportation, maybe buy a gift for a minor official or two
if necessary and if your conscience would allow it, and go about your business. But
all that has changed with the CBD, and you want to make sure you're in
compliance with the US Department of State guidelines. Where to start?
Wanted: A guidebook for collectors
It would make the job of researchers a lot easier if there were the equivalent of a
Lonely Planet Guide to access and benefit-sharing laws in every country. The
guide might answer such questions as:
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• Does the country have any laws regulating the collection of aquatic bio-
diversity?
• What's the scope of the law? Does it make any distinction between biological
and genetic resources?
• Whose permission do I have to get and how do I get it?
• If I need to get the prior informed consent of an indigenous community, how
do I tell what the community is and who speaks for it?
• What happens if the community has no knowledge of the fish I'm collecting -
or at least no knowledge that I need for breeding or other research? Do I still
need to get its consent?
• What does prior informed consent mean, anyway? How much information do
I have to reveal and how can I make sure the community understands what I'm
talking about?
• What kinds of'benefits' will I be able to and need to provide? What if I'm not
planning to use the material commercially or, if I am, I won't know whether
there's likely to be any money it for years?
• If I do pay the community something for the right to collect fish broodstock,
can I patent the new strain I develop and be done with any future obligations to
the community?
• I'm a scientist, not a negotiator. I know nothing about the indigenous commu-
nities in the region where I'll be working and I don't even speak the language.
How can I get help negotiating an agreement?
• Why can't I just buy the fish or marine organisms I need from a local fisherman?
• If I do get consent, what am I allowed to do with the material I collect?
• What if a community says no? Can I just move to another part of the river
inhabited by the fish I'm looking for and make a deal with another community?
If such a guidebook did exist right now, it would be a very slim volume. The CBD
obligates all its member countries (188 in 2004) to develop access and benefit-
sharing measures. Ten years after the coming into force of the CBD, not a single
developed country has such a law in place. This may not be surprising given that
southern countries are where genetic resources are in greatest demand - though it
is a matter of some concern to indigenous peoples in northern countries. In the
South, as we'll see below, several countries are experimenting with new laws
governing access to genetic resources, community rights, and biodiversity
management generally. At the moment, that's largely all they are — experiments in
the form of regional model laws that countries might draw upon (eg OAU), provi-
sional presidential decrees (eg Philippines and Brazil) that lack the weight of
congressional statutes, and innovative but unimplemented proposals (eg Peru's law
for the protection of indigenous knowledge).
In essence, the world has been adopting a wait-and-see attitude towards making
clear rules regarding the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of
genetic resources, and sharing the benefits from their use - the three goals of the
CBD. Certainly the objectives of the CBD are no less important than they were at
the time of the Earth Summit in 1992 - quite the contrary. So why the delay?
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The hold-up in developing access laws
One body of opinion has it that industrialized countries, through the Agreement
on TRIPS, have hijacked the CBD. From this perspective, developing countries
put all their effort into gaining CBD recognition of national sovereignly over
genetic resources, only to find that what really mattered was ownership of the ideas
that makes possible particular uses of genetic resources. In other words, if a
southern country has sovereignty over a medicinal plant or toxic marine organism,
but a transnational company holds the patent on the process of using the genetic
resource to make a medicine - or, indeed, a patent on a naturally occurring gene
that enables a fish or plant to live in icy conditions — then sovereignty over natural
resources may be virtually valueless compared to the right to profit from
invention. Developing countries that thought that the CBD was merely setting
the stage for new rules have discovered to their consternation that the playing field
has shifted under their feet thanks to the pressures of corporate globalization.
The TRIPS syndrome is certainly not the only factor holding back the devel-
opment of access and benefit-sharing laws, but it has made developing countries
think very carefully about how to get the most bang from their legislative buck
when it comes to regulating genetic resources. Some countries are also taking it
slow and easy in order to learn from the painful experience of the Philippines, the
first country out of the starting blocks in the initial eagerness to translate CBD
theory into legislative action (see Case Study 5 at the end of this chapter).
The approximately 50 countries currently in the process of developing access
and benefit-sharing laws are asking themselves questions such as the following:
• How do we define the right of indigenous and local communities to negotiate
access to genetic resources? Do we base that right on their contribution of tradi-
tional knowledge, or should any community have the right?
• How do we balance our CBD obligations to protect traditional knowledge
against industrial country pressures to protect the IPRs of users of genetic
resources?
• How do we give communities a right to negotiate access to genetic resources
without bringing commercial and academic research to a virtual halt? How do
we distinguish between commercial and academic research?
• How do we build and finance the infrastructure needed to implement and
enforce new laws?
• What kinds of benefits should be negotiated with collectors at the national and
community levels? What kinds of benefits are meaningful and achievable, and
how can they promote the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity?
• Should there be broad stakeholder participation in the development of access
laws, or will that just lead to gridlock and no result at all? If we want to get
stakeholder input, how should we go about it?
In the meantime, while the parties to the CBD try to decide how to implement
access and benefit-sharing laws, confusion reigns. Ten Kate and Laird (1999) note
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that the most common industry complaint about the CBD and its implemen-
tation is the lack of clarity about access procedures. Companies say that while the
CBD (and existing access laws) may be fine in theory, there is no practical way to
implement, monitor and enforce them. As one researcher put it, 'The access and
benefit sharing discussion is not really moving, and companies and collectors are
operating in a vacuum.'
What makes the situation even worse for collectors of aquatic genetic resources
is that the development of new access laws is almost exclusively shaped by plant
issues such as the use of farmers' traditional knowledge about crop lines or access
to plants that may have medicinal values. In countries such as the Philippines,
collection of marine organisms for sampling by pharmaceutical companies has
certainly been in the minds of policy makers, but there's little evidence of much
thought being given anywhere to the application of access laws to collections for
aquaculture, whether for food fish or ornamentals. This will undoubtedly change
during the next two decades for two primary reasons: increased pressures for rapid
global growth in food fish aquaculture to provide food security, especially in
southern countries, and the continuing momentum of the indigenous rights
movement.
This chapter and the two succeeding chapters discuss:
• Progress to date in the development of laws related to the availability and use of
aquatic genetic resources.
• Possible frameworks for the negotiation of access agreements with fishing
communities.
• Fundamental principles that may need to be met to ensure the effective sharing
and conservation of aquatic biodiversity in the future.
FINE-TUNING THE CBD: The Bonn guidelines
The US Department of State memo described above appeared shortly after the
parties to the CBD had agreed on a set of general guidelines for access and benefit-
sharing legislation. By November 2001, 58 parties had submitted their second
national reports on their progress in implementing the CBD. We have already seen
in Chapter 3 what a generally low importance these national reports placed on
aquatic biodiversity. Regarding Article 8(j), 25 placed a high priority on imple-
mentation. Seventeen others described it as a medium priority, and 13 called it a
low priority. Slightly more than half of the countries that submitted reports indi-
cated that some actions were either being taken or contemplated to implement
Article 8(j). Others indicated that they were waiting for further guidance from the
CBD Working Group on Article 8(j) before proceeding (World Fisheries Trust,
2002b).
In the spring of 2002, the Sixth COP of the CBD approved the Bonn
Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the
Benefits Arising out of their Utilization (CBD, 2002). Like other CBD products,
the guidelines represent a hard won consensus among countries with very
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divergent interests and consequently take the form of general principles rather
than a detailed policy framework. It can be expected that countries may take very
different approaches on specific legislative provisions.
The Bonn Guidelines address the question of access to genetic resources in
indigenous and local communities in several sections dealing with prior informed
consent and benefit sharing.
Prior informed consent
• Respecting the established legal rights of indigenous and local communities
associated with the genetic resources being accessed or where traditional
knowledge associated with these genetic resources is being accessed, the prior
informed consent of indigenous and local communities and the approval and
involvement of the holders of traditional knowledge should be obtained, in
accordance with their traditional practices, national access policies and subject
to domestic laws (31).
• Access to genetic resources should be facilitated at minimum cost (26).
• Any change in use for which consent has been granted, including transfer to
third parties, may require a new application for prior informed consent (34).
• Countries of origin should support measures to enhance indigenous and local
communities' capacity to represent their interests fully at negotiations (16).
Benefit sharing
• Countries of origin, or other countries that have acquired genetic resources in
accordance with the CBD, should ensure the fair and equitable sharing of
benefits in conformity with mutually agreed terms established with indigenous
and local communities (16).
• Benefits should be shared fairly and equitably with all who have contributed to
the resource management, scientific and/or commercial process — including
governmental, non-governmental or academic institutions and indigenous and
local communities. Benefits should be directed in such a way as to promote
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity (48).
• Benefits may be monetary or non-monetary (Appendix II of the guidelines
includes an extensive list of each type).
The Bonn Guidelines appear to move beyond Article 8(j) of the CBD by
suggesting that the right of communities to prior informed consent exists whether
or not collectors of genetic resources rely on the use of traditional knowledge, and
that benefits should be shared with any community that has contributed to the
management of the genetic resource. This provision, if translated into national
legislation, may prove particularly relevant for fishing communities that may not
contribute knowledge vital to collectors but may nevertheless have a long history
of sustainable management of aquatic ecosystems.
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What legal rights do communities have?
The Bonn Guidelines' suggestion that the right to prior informed consent be
based on 'established legal rights' of communities is likely to be contentious in
many countries. Municipalities may, for example, include a range of distinct
fishing villages that may object if the right to consent to access rests with a distant
mayor - as indeed they have under Philippine access legislation. In the case of
indigenous communities, what the state recognizes as established legal rights may
differ widely from those claimed by indigenous peoples. Under Canadian law, for
example, many indigenous fishing communities (and First Nations) have no legal
right even to be consulted in the collection and use of aquatic genetic resources.
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized the existence of aboriginal rights in
areas where no treaties were signed before Canada became a nation. As a result the
federal and provincial governments have been embroiled for years in negotiations
with dozens of First Nations to create treaties that will define the nature and extent
of aboriginal rights, including ownership of land and control over biological and
genetic resources. While a few treaties have been signed (Case Studies 2 and 3 refer
to two of them), most are years away from being finalized. As Canada has
discovered, negotiating the legal rights of indigenous peoples may be the best way
to secure a fair and stable result, but the path is long and arduous.
Some countries, such as the Philippines and India, have opted instead to define
community and/or indigenous rights by statute. Others are still exploring other
options for sui generis protection of community rights and traditional knowledge.
Typically, the few national laws on community rights emphasize intellectual
property protection. In most nations, indigenous and local community rights
remain ill-defined at best, and national governments are approaching the issue
with extreme caution. The concept of'established legal rights', while it may sound
relatively straightforward, could be a powder keg when it comes to working out
the details of prior informed consent requirements in national legislation.
NATIONAL AND REGIONAL APPROACHES TO ACCESS LAWS
Countries developing access and benefit-sharing laws are likely to look for
guidance beyond the generic provisions of the Bonn Guidelines to the experience
of the few countries that have already embarked on legislation. Countries that
have drafted or enacted legislation have taken widely varying approaches to access.
For example:
• Costa Rica and India have embedded access and benefit provisions in compre-
hensive biodiversity management laws rather than as separate legislation. The
advantage of this approach is that it recognizes the integral relationship between
access policies and those for the management of biological and genetic
resources generally.
• The Philippines and Brazil have enacted laws specific to access and benefit
sharing.
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• Peru has proposed a separate law that deals specifically with the protection of
knowledge of indigenous peoples and recognizing their rights to control the use
of their knowledge.
The only countries with access and benefit-sharing laws currently in force are
Costa Rica, the Philippines and Brazil. Of these, only the Costa Rican law has
been approved by the national legislature. The Philippine and Brazilian laws are
presidential decrees that can be terminated by order of the president; in both
countries, bills have been presented to congress but not yet passed.
Some southern countries have been hesitant about putting rigorous access
requirements in place simply because of the fear of losing business and potential
revenues. If a desired species or population is widespread, collectors faced with
what they perceive to be onerous regulations may simply move their operations to
more 'friendly' jurisdictions. Partially to avoid such scenarios, three regional
groups of southern countries have prepared guidelines for member states both to
encourage consistency in approaches and to join forces in the challenge of
preparing very complex legislation with numerous possibilities for error. The
regional groups and the guidelines they have adopted include:
• The ASEAN: includes all South east Asian countries: Indonesia, Malaysia,
Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Lao People s Democratic
Republic, Myanmar and Cambodia. (Model law: ASEAN Framework
Agreement on Access to Genetic Resources.)
• The Andean Pact: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. (Model
law: Decision 391 — Common Regime on Access to Genetic Resources.)
• The OAU (predecessor of the African Group), including more than 50 African
countries. (Model law: African Model Legislation for the Protection of the
Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breeders, and for the Regulation
and Access to Biological Resources.)
The regional guidelines set minimum standards for national laws and take
somewhat different approaches to the recognition of community rights:
• The OAU model law specifically recognizes community rights over biological
resources and traditional knowledge and practices as expressed in customary
community law.
• The principles established under the ASEAN Framework Agreement (2000)
echo the language of Article 8(j) on traditional knowledge and practices and call
for 'the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of
biological and genetic resources at the community, national and regional levels'.
• The Andean Pact Decision 391 deals with agreements between the state and
collectors and makes no specific reference to consent by communities.
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: How the new laws deal with
access to genetic resources in communities
Not surprisingly, southern countries have been first off the mark to embark on the
development of access and benefit-sharing legislation. As the primary providers of
genetic resources, they have the most to gain by negotiating benefits in return for
permitting access. Northern countries have a far bigger stake in expanding patent
protection for users of genetic resources and consequently have been much more
actively involved in pushing for global standards for the other half of the equation,
namely for IPRs.
The three regional associations described above and several countries in Asia,
Africa and South America have taken different approaches to the regulation of
access to genetic resources in indigenous and local communities. Some countries
appear to limit the right to informed consent and benefit sharing to those commu-
nities whose traditional knowledge is needed for the use of genetic resources, while
others assume the right of communities to grant or withhold consent regardless of
whether such knowledge is a factor. As the previous chapter noted, this distinction
is far more crucial for traditional fishing communities than for farmers and for
indigenous groups familiar with medicinal uses of plants. Assuming that the law
does require community consent for access to aquatic genetic resources, several
other issues are important for both communities and collectors:
• What procedures should be followed to obtain consent?
• Should academic researchers be treated differently from commercial collectors?
• What types of benefit are most appropriate?
The following synopsis compares how the three regions and several countries
(Brazil, Costa Rica, India, Peru and the Philippines1) have addressed these ques-
tions. The Philippines — the first country to pass access and benefit-sharing legis-
lation after the CBD came into force - has the most experience with
implementation. Case Study 5 at the end of this chapter provides a detailed look at
the challenges the Philippines has faced. The Philippine experience holds
important lessons for other countries — and for communities and collectors —
about what works and what doesn't.
Numbers in parentheses refer to the article or section number of regional model
laws and national laws.
The scope of access laws: Biological and genetic resources
As Glowka (1998b) notes, drafters of legislation should be encouraged to use defi-
nitions that already appear in international agreements such as the CBD, since the
terms and definitions used in such documents reflect a broad international
consensus. The CBD defines biological resources as including 'genetic resources,
organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any other biotic component of
ecosystems with actual or potential use or value for humanity'. Genetic resources
are defined as 'genetic material of actual or potential value', and genetic material
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Box 5.1 Comparing Laws: Defining the Scope
Do access laws and guidelines apply to genetic resources, biological resources and/or
knowledge? As the following summary $hows, different countries and regions take different
approaches:
QAU
Applies to biological resources and knowledge or technologies of local communities in any
part of the country (s. 3). Biological resources are defined to include genetic resources,
organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any other component of ecosystems (s. 1).
Andean Community
Applies to in situ and ex situ genetic resources, defined as all material that contains genetic
information of value or of real or potential use (1).
ASEAN
Defines 'bioprospecting' as the search for wild species with genes that produce better crops
and medicines, or the exploration of biodiversity for commercially valuable genetic and
biological resources (3),
Brazil
Applies to access to components of 'genetic heritage', defined as 'information of genetic
origin'.
Costa Rica
Applies to samples of components of biodiversity, whether in situ or ex situ. Biodiversity
includes the variability of living organisms of any source, whether found in terrestrial, air or
marine or aquatic ecosystems or in other ecological complexes (s. 7). Access sections (ss.
62^85) apply only to genetic components (containing functional units of heredity) and
biochemicals.
Philippines
Applies to biological and genetic resources.
means 'any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing func-
tional units of heredity'.
Most laws do not distinguish between biological and genetic resources, or, as in
the case of the OAU model law, define biological resources to include genetic
resources. The access provisions of Costa Rica's biodiversity law apply only to
genetic components (containing functional units of heredity) and biochemicals.
In all cases, the scope of the laws is broad enough to include all forms of aquatic
genetic resources, although nowhere is it apparent that collection for aquaculture
has been contemplated. For example, the ASEAN framework defines
'bioprospecting' as the search for wild species with genes that produce better crops
and medicines, or the exploration of biodiversity for commercially valuable
genetic and biological resources. Collections of broodstock for industrial aqua-
culture haven't yet become an issue in developing countries.
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Prior informed consent by communities
The primary authority for approving applications for access lies with national
governments, which the CBD recognizes as having sovereignty over genetic
resources. Each country designates a 'Competent National Authority' to oversee
the approval process. Typically, under proposed and existing access laws, the
national authority requires proof of consent by indigenous and local communities,
although specific requirements vary considerably.
But what is a local community? Brazilian law defines it as a 'human group,
differentiated by its cultural conditions, which is traditionally organized along
successive generations and with its own customs, and conserves its social and
economic institutions' (Article 7). Philippine law describes it simply as 'the basic
political unit where biological and genetic resources are located' (2). The OAU
model law describes it as 'a human population in a distinct geographical area, with
ownership over its biological resources, innovations, practices, knowledge and
technologies governed partially or completely by its own customs, traditions or
laws' (1). It is not yet clear how different countries will translate such broad defini-
tions into practice both in regulatory frameworks and in dealing with groups
whose concept of themselves as a community may differ a great deal from that of a
government agency.
There is no consistency among countries on the issue of whether collectors need
consent for all collections of genetic resources or only when seeking access to tradi-
tional knowledge. Peru and Brazil specifically link the requirement to obtain
indigenous community consent to access to traditional knowledge. Countries
such as the Philippines require consent for access to genetic resources without
limiting the right to communities whose knowledge is required for the use of
genetic resources. The OAU model law recognizes the rights of communities over
their biological resources, innovations, practices, knowledge and technologies and
the right to benefit from their use (16).
Notable in some laws are the restrictions on the authority of communities to
withhold consent. The Costa Rican law recognizes the right of communities to
oppose any access to their resources or associated knowledge, whether for cultural,
spiritual, social, economic or other motives (66). In Brazil, however, access may be
permitted without consent 'in instances of relevant public interest' (17). Under
the OAU model law, communities can refuse access if it will be 'detrimental to the
integrity of their natural or cultural heritage' (19). It remains to be seen how
different countries will handle refusals of consent by communities that are simply
unsatisfied with the benefits offered to them, or give no reasons for refusal, and
what impact such refusals are likely to have on both academic and commercial
research. There are still too few instances of negotiations with communities to
determine whether the withholding of consent is likely to be a common trend. As
discussed below, bureaucratic hurdles under the new laws have already led to
'research chill' even before negotiations with communities become a reality.
Regional guidelines and national laws spell out principles but generally don't
provide specific guidance on procedures for obtaining community consent. As the
majority of laws discussed here are either in draft form or very new, regulations
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Box 5.2 Q>mpai?in| Laws: Community Rigfit to Consent
QAU
, Access to Biological resources, knowledge and/or technologies of Ipeal communities is
sjjlbject to the written prior informed consent of the Competent National Authority as well as
that of concerned local communities, ensuring that women are also involved in decision-
making (s 5), An access permit is granted through a written agreement between the
Competent National Authority, concerned local communities and the applicant or collector
(7). Local communities can refuse access if it will be detrimental to the integrity of their
natural or cultural heritage (19) and can withdraw consent or place restrictions on activities
relating to access if they are likely to be detrimental to their socio-economic life or their
natural and cultural heritage (20), Women are to fully and equally participate in decisions
at»ut prior informed consent for access (18).
Andean Community
Parties to access agreements are the state and the applicant (32). Applicants may make
ancillary contacts with the owner, possessor or manager of the land where the biological
resource containing the genetic resource is located (41). No specific mention of cornmu-
"nities.
Brazil
The $tsate r$ cognises the right of the indigenous communities and of the local communities to
decide on the use of their traditional knowledge related to the genetic heritage df the country
(1).
Peru
Collectors wishing to obtain access to collective knowledge for scientific, commercial or
industrial purposes must request the prior informed consent of one or more indigenous
peoples possessing the collective knowledge (7).
Costa Rica
Prior informed consent for access to genetic components and biochemicals must be
Obtained from representatives of the place where access will occur, whether regional
councils of Conservation Areas, owners of farms, or indigenous authorities (s 63), Local
communities and indigenous peoples can oppose access to their resources and associated
knowledge for cultural, spiritual, social, economic or other reasons (s 66).
Philippines
Prospecting within ancestral lands and domains of indigenous cultural communities is
allowed only with their prior informed consent, obtained in accordance with customary laws.
Prior informed consent must also be obtained from concerned local communities, defined
as basic political units where the biological and genetic resources are located (2). Research
proposals must be submitted to the recognized head of any affected local or indigenous
cultural community (4).
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implementing national laws are virtually non-existent outside the Philippines.
Under the Philippine regulations, a collector must obtain consent from the mayor
of a local community or head of an indigenous people, hold a community
assembly, fully describe the research proposal in a language or dialect under-
standable to local people, and describe proposed benefits. As Case Study 5 illus-
trates, community advocates have criticized these provisions for not requiring
sufficient consultation with communities that don't believe a municipal mayor
represents their interests. In addition, local people may not fully understand the
implications of proposed activities and uses of genetic resources, and may lack the
capacity to conduct negotiations effectively without assistance.
Protection of traditional knowledge
In some cases, access and benefit-sharing laws have made efforts to address
potential conflicts over rights to knowledge by providing for sui generis protection
of traditional knowledge. The advantages of unique legal forms of protection for
community property rights have been much discussed, but how they will be
crafted to fit into existing legal systems remains to be seen.
Costa Rica's biodiversity law recognizes and protects sui generis community
intellectual rights over knowledge, practices and innovations related to the use of
components of biodiversity and associated knowledge (82), and provides that no
form of intellectual or industrial property rights protection can affect these historic
practices. The law provides for a participatory process with small farmer and
indigenous communities to determine the nature and scope of sui generis rights
(s 83).
The OAU model law also takes a step towards the enshrinement of sui generis
rights by providing that the Community Intellectual Property Rights of local
communities are inalienable (23). Community Intellectual Property Rights are
defined as those rights held by local communities over their biological resources or
parts or derivatives thereof, and over their practices, innovations, knowledge and
technologies. The state recognizes and protects community rights as enshrined
under the norms, practices and customary law, whether written or not (17). The
Philippines, in addition to its bioprospecting law, has adopted separate legislation
for the protection of Community Intellectual Property Rights.
Some community advocacy groups have criticized the concept of sui generis
rights for trying to fit traditional knowledge into a property rights model that has
no relevance to traditional community governance systems. Indigenous commu-
nities with long traditions of sharing all community resources, including
knowledge, may be suspicious of sui generis initiatives based on IPRs models based
on individual rights. For some groups, recognition of rights over genetic resources
can only be settled through acknowledgement of full rights to manage and control
local ecosystems and the biological and genetic resources within them. The Costa
Rican and OAU initiatives are the most progressive among access and benefit-
sharing laws to date, but it remains to be seen how they will work in practice.
Bangladesh and the Philippines have moved a step further by drafting stand alone
community rights legislation.
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One of the primary incentives for national initiatives to protect traditional
knowledge is to provide a legal barrier against its unauthorized use by collectors of
genetic resources. As discussed in previous chapters in this book, sui generis
protection of traditional knowledge bolsters the rights of plant communities but
may be largely irrelevant to the collection of aquatic genetic resources in fishing
communities. This is because, while dependence on traditional knowledge may be
the rule in the use of plant genetic resources, it's the exception in the use of aquatic
genetic resources. Consequently, drafters of laws that apply to the collection of
genetic resources in general need to consider very carefully the implications for
both plant and aquatic collections.
Intellectual property rights protection
Most developing countries are amending their patent laws to comply with the
WTO TRIPS Agreement, which requires all countries to extend their patent
systems to include all technologies and all inventions. This includes the patenting
of micro-organisms and microbiological processes, although countries can exclude
plants and animals. In addition, developing countries are facing pressure to go
beyond the TRIPS agreements. For example, preferential trade, aid, investment or
technical assistance privileges may be tied to a commitment from developing
countries to adopt more hard line standards for IPRs on life forms, including
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) stan-
dards of plant variety rights or industrial patent rules over plants and animals
(GRAIN, 2002a).
The tension between TRIPS and CBD commitments is reflected in differing
approaches taken by access and benefit-sharing laws. The Brazilian law notes that
protection of traditional knowledge 'shall not affect, damage or limit rights related
to intellectual property' (8) and requires that access and benefit-sharing contracts
include provision for IPRs (28). By contrast, the OAU model law provides that
collectors must agree not to apply for intellectual property protection over a
biological resource or its derivatives without community consent (8); it also
prohibits patents on life forms and biological processes (9). Costa Rica provides
for the protection of IPRs with several exceptions, including the prohibition of
IPRs for 'inventions which, to be commercially exploited through a monopoly,
can affect farming or fishing processes or products which are considered basic for
the food and health of the inhabitants of the country' (78).
The question of IPRs is a sore point for many indigenous peoples, not only
because of understandable suspicions about the unauthorized appropriation of
traditional knowledge, but also because the concept of private ownership of ideas
directly contradicts indigenous traditions of sharing knowledge for the benefit of
all members of a community. Case Study 3 describes negotiations for access to
charr broodstock that failed in large part because of indigenous communities'
discomfort with proposals to patent processes for gene mapping. In this example,
there was no relationship whatsoever between the IPRs sought by the user and the
traditional knowledge held by Inuit communities. What will happen if indigenous
communities demand a prohibition on IPRs as a condition for providing consent
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for access, even though the collector's invention owes no debt to traditional
knowledge? It's a stalemate that is especially likely to happen during negotiations
for access to living creatures as opposed to plants, and policy makers would do well
to anticipate such scenarios. The right to intellectual property protection to inven-
tions is frequently one of the key benefits collectors expect to take away from what
may prove to be very expensive negotiations.
Treatine academics like commercial collectors: A recipe for
research chill
Some laws distinguish between applications for commercial and academic research
purposes. The OAU model law simply provides that applications must state the
relationship of the applicant with industry (11) and that permit fees may differ
depending on whether the research is for commercial or academic purposes (12).
Brazilian law appears to require an access and benefit-sharing contract only when
there is a possibility of commercial use (16). The Philippine law uniquely provides
for separate commercial and academic research agreements — the latter being
restricted to institutions within the country (3). Academic research agreements
can be broader and more general in character (4), with each agreement covering all
scientists and researchers at an institution. If it later becomes evident that
academic research resulting from collections has commercial prospects, a scientist
must reapply for a commercial agreement (5). Under either type of agreement,
collectors must obtain the prior informed consent of communities where collec-
tions take place; under academic agreements, collecting institutions can develop
their own internal guidelines for obtaining prior informed consent.
Drawing meaningful distinctions between academic and commercial research is
one of the most difficult challenges that policy makers face. Obviously, encour-
aging pure academic research is absolutely vital for countries that are serious about
developing the comprehensive knowledge needed not only to conserve biological
and genetic diversity but also to explore new uses that may be either commercially
valuable or in the public interest. This is even more important in the aquatic than
in the plant world given the current state of understanding of (and growing
commercial interest in) aquatic ecosystems. The very activity of research also
builds important technical capacity in the country.
Unfortunately, the days of independent research institutions appear to be
numbered and the boundaries between academic and commercial activities are
becoming less and less clear. In these days of downsizing, many research institu-
tions both in government and in the academic world are forced to become ever
more dependent on corporate support just to survive — and consequently may face
pressure to focus on research with promising commercial applications. A scientific
institution that collects sponges for taxonomic purposes may also have an
agreement with the American Cancer Institute to provide samples for screening.
The conundrum for policy makers is how to design processes for approval for
access to genetic resources that ensure a fair return from commercial applications
without being so onerous that they shut down scientific research altogether. As
Case Study 5 at the end of this chapter illustrates, the distinctions between
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Box 5.3 Comparing Laws: Academic vs Commercial Uses
QAU
Research applications must stale the objective of the research and the relationship of the
applicant to industry (s. 11). Permit fees may differ depending on whether research is for
commercial or academic purposes (s. 12).
Philippines
Research for commercial purposes, directly or indirectly, requires a Commercial Research
Agreement (CRA), Application for Academic Research Agreements (ARAs) is restricted to
Philippines universities and academic institutions, domestic governmental entities and inter-
governmental entities (3). ARA proposals can be broader and more general in character
than CRA proposals (4)^ One ARA can cover alt scientists and researchers at an institution
(§). Scientists operating under an ARA must later apply for a CRA if it becomes clear that
research and collection has commercial prospects (5)>
academic and commercial research under Philippine law appear to have done little
to facilitate academic research and indeed have hindered it.
In addition to distinguishing between academic and commercial purposes,
some laws also differentiate between nationals and foreigners. India's law specifi-
cally notes that no non-Indian person can obtain any biological resource or asso-
ciated knowledge without approval of the National Biodiversity Authority (3).
Under Philippine law, foreign applicants must apply for collection in partnership
with a Philippine national research institute or university. Their research applica-
tions must include a proposal stating the purpose, source of funds, duration and a
list of biological and genetic materials and amounts to be taken (4).
Sharing benefits with communities
Defining the nature, amount and method of delivery of benefits to communities
will likely be the greatest challenge of all for both policy makers and those involved
in access negotiations. Some laws mention benefits in the most general terms
without elaboration; others, such as Philippines Executive Order 247, specifically
mention benefits such as royalties. From the viewpoint of communities, the draw-
backs of limiting benefits to royalties have long been apparent because the like-
lihood of developing a marketable product from a single collection (at least in the
pharmaceuticals field) is so low. The Philippines legislation has been sharply criti-
cized by civil society organizations for providing only for royalties and for not
specifying how they will be divided between communities and government. The
OAU model law, which appeared three years later, addressed this concern by
requiring at least a 50 per cent share for communities.
Non-monetary benefits, such as technology transfer, training and employment
can ultimately be not only far more useful to communities but also more effective
in facilitating sustainable, conservation-based economies. Generally, under
existing and proposed laws, the responsibility to determine appropriate types of
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benefits and the manner of ensuring their delivery lies primarily with national
authorities. The effectiveness of access and benefit-sharing legislation will conse-
quently depend to a large extent on the ability and motivation of governments to
work with communities and collectors alike to facilitate creative solutions.
One important question that appears to remain largely unresolved is whether
benefits should be distributed only to those communities in which collections
occur, or on a broader scale. Peru, recognizing that collective knowledge may be
shared among a variety of indigenous groups, takes the approach of providing for
the transfer of monetary benefits to a general fund for the development of
indigenous peoples. (This in some ways resembles a similar approach taken in the
corporate world by Shaman Pharmaceuticals, which decided to divide a portion of
its profits among all communities where collections took place, whether or not any
given community's contribution led to the development of a marketable product.)
Governments that adopt such an approach could follow up with institutional
arrangements for promoting community development and biodiversity conser-
vation through, for example, transfer of small-scale technologies (and training in
their use) to support sustainable livelihoods, help in the development of marketing
skills and mechanisms, and assistance in the development of conservation
strategies that contribute to economic well-being. In fishing communities, this
might include, for example, providing help with the development of sustainable
fisheries that may or may not have been traditionally practised. Costa Rica's bio-
diversity law promotes community participation in the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity through technical assistance and special
incentives, especially in areas with rare, endemic or endangered species. To this
end, it requires the Ministry of Environment and Energy to give priority to
projects for community management of biodiversity (102). Using this type of
model, governments elsewhere might channel a portion of benefits received at the
national level to local and indigenous communities, to the advantage of the
country as a whole.
Such a broad-based approach to benefit sharing makes sense because it can
enable national authorities to use the proceeds from the use of genetic resources for
the benefit of many communities rather than just the few that may be involved in
negotiating agreements. It may also help avoid the detrimental effects that might
arise if one community's benefits place it at a significant advantage over neigh-
bours who may share similar genetic resources (and knowledge) but weren't party
to an agreement. This could conceivably happen to communities that negotiate in
good faith, only to discover that the collector moves to another community that
can meet his needs with fewer demands - just as collectors may avoid a country
with strict regulations (like the Philippines) in favour of a nation with fewer
restrictions.
As discussed earlier, while the general trend in access legislation has been to
require prior informed consent of communities whether or not their knowledge
contributes to the use of a genetic resource, not all countries take this approach.
The effect of some current laws could be to leave fishing communities entirely out
of the benefit-sharing equation and to create an imbalance in which objectives for
the conservation of terrestrial biodiversity are met at the expense of aquatic
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Box 5.4 Comparing Laws* Sharing Benefits with Indigenous and Local
Communities
OAU
Ureter the agreement with the Competent National Authority and communities, the collector
undertakes to: provide for the sharing of benefits; inform concerned communities of all
research and development findings; contribute economically to community efforts to regen-
erate and conserve the biological resource collected and to maintain the innovation,
practice, knowledge or technology to which access is sought (s. 8). Communities are
entitled to a share of earnings derived when any biological resource and/or knowledge
generates a product used in a production process (12). The state must ensure that at least
50 per cent of benefits so derived are channelled to concerned local communities in a
manner that treats men and women equitably (22).
Andean Community
Applications for access and access contracts shall include conditions for strengthening and
development of the capacities of the native, Afro-American, and local communities with
relation to the associated intangible components (know how, innovations, practices), the
genetic resources, and their by-products (17). Access contracts shall stipulate fair and equi-
table distribution of profits from the use of genetic resources or by-products with an intan-
gible component (35).
Brazil
Indigenous and local communities that create, develop, hold or conserve traditional
knowledge associated with genetic heritage have the right to receive benefits from the
economic use by third parties of associated traditional knowledge to which they hold rights
(9).
Costa Rica
Requirements for access include technology transfer and equitable distribution of benefits,
as agreed in permits, agreements and concessions (63).
India
National Biodiversity Authority approval of access depends on securing equitable sharing of
benefits arising from the use of biological resources, their by-products, innovations and
practices associated with their use and applications and knowledge related thereto (21).
Required benefits may include; joint ownership of IF*Rs with benefit claimers; technology
transfer; location of production, research and development units in such areas which will
facilitate better living standards to the benefit claimers; association of benefit ctaimers and
local people in biological resources; venture capital funds to help benefit claimers; and
payment of monetary and non-monetary benefits to benefit claimers (21). 'Benefit claimers'
includes conservers of biological resources, their by-products, creators and holders of
knowledge and information to use biological resources, innovations, and practices asso-
ciated with such use and application (21). If approving collectors' applications of IPRs, the
National Biodiversity Authority may impose a benefit-sharing fee or royalty or both or impose
conditions Including the sharing of financial benefits arising frorh the commercial use of such
rights (6),
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Box 5.4 continued
Peru
Whoever gains access to the collective knowledge of an indigenous people must destine at
least 0.5 per cent of the value of sales resulting: from the marketing of products developed
from such knowledge to the Fund for the Development of Indigenous Peoples (7). The Fund
will support projects and activities approved by an Administrator Committee.
Philippines
Commercial agreements between the applicant and government must include provision for
payment of royalties to the national government, local or indigenous cultural community (5).
biodiversity. This is another reason why drafters of access and benefit-sharing laws
will need to consider the implications of legislative provisions not just for plant
genetic resources but also for aquatic genetic resources and the communities that
provide them. Chapter 6 discusses strategies for developing benefits that are
appropriate for fishing communities and that can help promote conservation and
sustainable use.
MAKING BENEFIT SHARING WORK:
Responsibilities of industrial countries
The CBD states three objectives: the conservation of biological diversity, the
sustainable use of its components and the equitable sharing of benefits arising
from the use of genetic resources. Achieving the first two objectives logically
depends on meeting the third: unless the biodiversity rich countries and commu-
nities providing genetic resources benefit by doing so, they will have neither the
incentive to make those resources readily available nor the motivation or means to
promote their conservation.
Under Article 15(2) of the CBD, each contracting Party (ie the 188 countries
that have ratified the convention) must create the conditions needed to facilitate
access to genetic resources. That's the commitment developing countries made in
return for international recognition of their sovereignty over genetic resources. In
addition, under 15(7), each Party is to take legislative, policy or administrative
measures with the aim of fairly sharing the results of research and development
and the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources with each country
providing the resources.
What the CBD recognizes is that it will take a concerted and cooperative effort
by southern and northern countries (ie the primary providers and users of genetic
resources) to make sustainable development work. Developing countries have
made good progress towards putting access and benefit-sharing laws in place;
industrial countries, for their part, need to do whatever they can to make sure that
laws in provider countries are effective. Why? It's extremely challenging to enforce
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access and benefit-sharing laws because of the transnational, north-south flow of
genetic resources and because governments in many developing countries lack the
financial and staff resources to do so. As a result, there's a trend in source countries
to establish very restrictive access laws that often unintentionally hinder scientific
research as well as domestic and international development.
Laird (2002) suggests that the major industrial nations have abdicated their
responsibility to institute measures to ensure equitable access and benefit-sharing
arrangements. They have been slow to develop legal measures to ensure that the
acquisition and use of genetic material and associated knowledge by persons, insti-
tutions and corporations in user countries are carried out in compliance with the
laws in source countries and with the provisions of the CBD. For example, none of
the IPRs systems of the industrialized countries requires that patent applications
for inventions based on genetic inventions or associated knowledge acquired in
another country prove that the resources or knowledge were acquired in
compliance with the CBD or national law in the source country.
As illustrated in our discussion of biopiracy complaints in Chapter 3, this is an
issue that has received considerable attention in the plant world and has largely
been ignored in discussions about the commercial use of aquatic resources outside
of collections for the pharmaceutical industry. This will undoubtedly change with
the global expansion of commercial aquaculture and, with it, an increased interest
in international collection of the broodstock and germplasm that might produce
the best trains. Case Study 4 describes ICLARM's initiatives to collect tilapia
broodstock in several African countries in order to develop new strains in the
Philippines that are now widely farmed throughout Southeast Asia. ICLARM did
so with the permission of the source countries and for an altruistic purpose -
ensuring the availability of more hardy and productive strains for rural fish
farmers. At the time of the initial collections, ICLARM did not anticipate that
patenting would be an issue, although the 'Super Tilapia' was in fact patented
several years later by the GIFT Foundation. Variations of ICLARM's GIFT
initiative - considered highly innovative at the time it occurred - will likely appear
in the future for other species and other countries as the aquaculture industry
becomes more diverse. It will be important not only for source countries to have
workable access laws in place but also for recipient countries to support CBD prin-
ciples by taking legal measures to ensure that collectors comply with laws in coun-
tries that provide genetic resources, whether in situ (in the wild) or ex situ (eg from
gene banks).
Assuming that northern countries do become more rigorous about lending
support to the CBD principles and the access laws of southern countries, a variety
of uncertainties specific to aquatic genetic resources will need to be addressed. For
instance, Case Study 1 describes recent successes in breeding cardinal tetras in
Florida. Cardinal tetras are collected by local fishermen in Brazil and exported for
distribution to the aquarium hobbyists' trade - not for breeding but simply for live
display. Aquarists who want to breed ornamental fish might simply buy them from
the export trade and search out fish with the most desirable colorations or
patterns. Does a fish caught for aquarium display (or for food) transform from a
biological resource to a 'genetic resource' only at the instant someone decides to
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use it for reproduction? Is it the intent of the user rather than the physical charac-
teristic of the resource that ultimately matters? This is an especially important
question, given the divergent approaches countries have taken to date in defining
the scope of new access laws and whether they apply to just biological resources,
just genetic resources, just traditional knowledge of resources, some combination
of the above or, as in the case of Brazil, the wonderfully ambiguous 'genetic
heritage'.
If an aquarist comes to a US patent office to apply for a patent on a strain of
cardinal tetra he has 'created', how can he prove the breeding pairs were acquired
in compliance with the CBD and Brazilian law? The situation is doubly confusing
in Brazil because both the national and some state (eg the state of Acre) govern-
ments have independently put forward separate versions of access and benefit-
sharing laws. Moreover, the national government's provisional law is so new and
lacking in clarity that it's not at all clear how wide its scope is. What is almost
certain is that it never crossed the minds of the drafters of the law that it might
have relevance for the Rio Negro cardinal tetra fishery.
There are no easy answers to such conundrums. The point is that northern
countries, several of which are slowly proceeding with their own versions of access
and benefit-sharing laws, need to consider how best to support the efforts of devel-
oping countries to control the use of their biological resources in a manner that
aims to conserve genetic diversity. To do so, they need to develop mechanisms that
take account of inherent distinctions between plant and fish genetic resources;
they also need to anticipate new developments in the aquatic genetic resources
trade, some of which are only beginning to become apparent.
For a start, the Bonn Guidelines spell out several basic steps that user countries
can adopt to encourage compliance with CBD principles for prior informed
consent and mutually agreed terms. The measures suggested by the guidelines
include:
• Informing potential users about their obligations regarding access.
• Encouraging the disclosure (eg in patent applications) of the country of origin
of genetic resources and the origin of traditional knowledge.
• Preventing the use of genetic resources obtained without prior informed
consent.
• Cooperating with provider countries to identify infringements of access and
benefit-sharing agreements.
• Promoting certification schemes for collecting institutions.
USING FISHERIES CERTIFICATION TO SUPPORT ACCESS LAWS
It's hardly surprising that governments in industrial countries are slow to make
rules regarding sustainable development if doing so may affect the bottom line of
influential corporations. Yet recently there has been a trend among such govern-
ments to embrace forest certification, the main objective of which is sustainable
management of forest lands and ecosystems. Essentially, governments and the
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forest industry have been pushed into doing so by consumer demand shaped by
environmental campaigns. Certification has a very long history as a mechanism for
ensuring high product standards; adapting it to address conservation and fair trade
issues is a relatively recent development. In essence, it has become a tool by which
concerned citizen groups can both work with government and industry to secure
standards consistent with sustainable development and fair treatment - or, if
considered strategically necessary, bypass government and industry by targeting
markets and creating consumer demand for products that come with an assurance
that those high standards have been met.
Now it appears that the stage has been set for the certification movement to
expand its horizons to include the use of genetic resources. The Panel of Experts on
access and benefit sharing, appointed by the CBD COP, noted a need to consider
multilateral mechanisms to promote support for the prior informed consent rights
of provider countries and communities. One possibility suggested by the Panel in
its first report was the adoption of certification systems with a focus on access and
benefit sharing. This is an option that could prove relevant for some aquatic
genetic resources, and in fact is already under consideration in the collection of
ornamental fish.
Certification most commonly refers to independent, third party verification
that an organization complies with a set of standards and principles based on best
practices in the field. In the natural resources field, forestry certification has
received much attention in recent years. Increasing interest among forest
companies in achieving certification, through bodies such as the Forest
Stewardship Council (FSC), has largely been driven by consumer demand for
timber products from sustainably managed forests and by scepticism about some
countries' government regulations. Forest certification programmes ensure
sustainable management by auditing forest companies' on the ground operations
or environmental management systems, or both. In addition to providing certifi-
cates showing proof of certification, some programmes also provide product
'ecolabels' as an assurance to consumers that a timber product has met objective
standards for sustainability throughout the 'chain of custody' from forest to store
shelf. Generally, certification standards and principles are developed through
multi-stakeholder processes to ensure both credibility and widespread support.
In 1997 the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), which had been instru-
mental in the founding of the FSC, engineered the creation of a parallel body for
capture fisheries certification. The MSC seeks to achieve a balance between social,
ecological and economic interests in fisheries by evaluating and accrediting certi-
fiers, encouraging the development of national standards for fisheries, and
promoting training and education. MSC's Principles and Criteria for Sustainable
Fishing are based on the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. In
addition to certifying groups such as fisheries organizations, processors and
governmental management authorities, MSC provides chain-of-custody certifi-
cation.
The MSC still confines itself to capture fisheries. Given the controversy that
surrounds some sectors of food fish aquaculture, however, it may not be long
before certification systems expand to cover that industry as well. Depending on
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the level of public awareness and interest, consumers may also begin to demand
'fair trade' fish - that is, fish from stocks developed from fairly collected
germplasm. The coffee trade provides a good illustration of the rapidity with
which consumer demand can change. Until a few years ago, coffee drinkers gave
little thought to the origin of their beans. Then came the demand for 'organic
coffee', grown under 'sustainable' conditions. More recently, chains such as
Starbucks have begun selling coffee labelled as 'fair trade' in response to consumer
demand. A similar trend could occur for farmed fish or even pharmaceuticals once
public awareness of access and benefit-sharing issues increases - something that
only takes the determined efforts of a few NGOs. While it may be far more
difficult to evaluate chains of custody for consumer products containing multiple
ingredients (foods containing soybean derivatives, for instance), the process would
be more straightforward where there is a clear link between the origin of a genetic
resource (fish germplasm obtained from communities either directly or through
collaborative gene banks) and the tilapia or salmon at the seafood counter. As we
have already seen, both species of farmed fish have already benefited from locally
collected germplasm.
Existing models for sustainable fisheries certification could serve as a jumping-
off point for fair trade (or, more accurately, fair collection) certification. In 2001
another non-profit international organization, the Marine Aquarium Council
(MAC), announced its development of an independent third party performance
system to ensure quality and sustainability in the collection, culture and commerce
of marine ornamentals in coral reef systems. MAC works with the entire industry
chain of custody ('reef to retail') and the retailer can display a MAC logo after
certification. MAC certification will be a reality once the organization has
provided accreditation to independent certification companies.
Neither MSC nor MAC currently address prior informed consent issues,
although MAC has flagged bioprospecting as an issue in the development of stan-
dards. MSC's forestry counterpart, the FSC, has begun to address bioprospecting
related issues through a working group on non-timber forest products. The group
has proposed that FSC Principle 3 (indigenous groups) be adapted to require
adequate consultation with indigenous communities and remuneration to
indigenous and local communities for the use of traditional knowledge (Glowka,
2001).
Governments are increasingly relying on independent certification to
supplement environmental compliance laws, reflecting a general trend away from
direct government regulation towards collaborative approaches to environmental
compliance. In some cases (for example, Pan-European Forest Certification),
national governments work together to accredit independent certification
programmes and participate in standard setting. A similar approach to certifi-
cation for collection of aquatic genetic resources, both within and between coun-
tries, could facilitate both the making and enforcement of effective policies for
access and benefit sharing in communities.
Glowka (2001) suggests several reasons why an independent certification
system for bioprospecting might be a useful complement to access and benefit-
sharing laws and policies. Discouraged by past experiences with biopiracy and the
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failure of some researchers to live up to promises made, provider countries have
reason to be suspicious of the integrity of collectors. They may want legitimate
transactions to be as fair as possible but may lack the capacity to ensure a fair result,
determine what deals might be fair, or determine who might be a reliable long-
term partner. Regulatory systems that are too cumbersome may actually
discourage genetic resources transactions, with potential users simply moving their
operations to other countries, as in the case of some marine bioprospecting
projects. Nor do access and benefit-sharing policies necessarily increase the legal
certainty of transactions or certainty over the legal status of materials transacted.
Under these circumstances, certification systems applied to users of genetic
resources could increase the confidence of provider countries about potential
partners; and certification of the legal and institutional systems of providing coun-
tries could increase the confidence of potential users. In addition to helping
governments ensure that the application of their own laws and policies meets best
practices and not too cumbersome, certification systems could provide useful
guidance for countries that have yet to develop regulatory systems. At the local
level, certification of a collecting company or institution could facilitate benefit
sharing by increasing the readiness of a community to negotiate. In addition,
communities might feasibly apply for certification as an assurance to collectors of
their suitability as negotiation partners. In short, certification systems could be
adapted to deal with several types of applicant.
The primary downside of certification is the cost incurred by applicants for
certification, costs which may in turn be passed on to consumers. In the forest
industry, certification has taken off largely in response to consumer demand for
lumber from sustainably managed forests, reflected in the decision of the largest
North American home lumber retailers to buy only certified wood. In Canada,
after it became apparent that the British Columbia forest industry could only
remain competitive by achieving certification, the government started a
programme encouraging it to do so (Brown and Greer, 2001). The issue was
complicated by competition among certification systems. As the cost to the
consumer tends to increase with the rigour of certification requirements, certifi-
cation programmes need to take into account consumers' willingness to pay for
products that are 'environmentally friendly'.
CASE STUDY 5. COMMUNITY RIGHTS vs RESEARCH CHILL
The Philippine experience with access
and benefit-sharing legislation
The Philippines became the first country to enact an access and benefit-sharing
law, following a cooperative effort among community groups, civil society organi-
zations and the scientific community, strengthened by support from a president
who wanted to make his mark at a time when biopiracy had become a hot topic in
his country. The challenges the Philippines has faced during the initial years of the
implementation of Executive Order 247 hold useful lessons for policy makers
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generally and for those dealing with access to genetic resources in fishing commu-
nities in particular.
Threats to aquatic biodiversity in the Philippines
Coral reefs are among the most biologically diverse of shallow-water marine
ecosystems but are being degraded worldwide by human activities and climate
change. The waters of the Philippines' more than 7000 islands lie at the global
centre of reef building coral and fish diversity. A survey in the late 1970s found
that 71 per cent of the country's reefs were either in fair or poor condition and only
5 per cent remained undisturbed (Gomez et al, 1981). Reef degradation and over-
exploitation of reef fish species have continued with little abatement since that
time.
In the mid-1990s, fishermen in the profitable live fish trade sprayed an esti-
mated 10 to 15 million coral heads annually with sodium cyanide (Barber and La
Vina, 1995). The 1998 Philippines Fisheries Code of Conduct prohibits the use of
poisons and explosives in fishing. However, many local fishermen have continued
the practices because they say it's the only way they can feed their families. In the
Philippines, as in many other countries, fishing communities are often among the
poorest. Educating people about the importance of biodiversity doesn't mean
much if they're too desperate to care. Sharing the benefits from the commercial use
of aquatic genetic resources could help make a difference, but only if there's a
strong policy framework to ensure that there are benefits, and that they are the
kind communities want and need.
The world's first access law: Executive Order 2472
Two years after the CBD came into force in 1992, the Philippines became the first
country to enact access and benefit-sharing legislation. Presidential Executive
Order 247 (EO247), issued by the Ramos administration in 1995, contains guide-
lines and procedures for the prospecting of biological and genetic resources in the
public domain.3 EO247 is administered by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, which in 1996 issued regulations governing its implemen-
tation4 and established the Inter-Agency Committee on Biological and Genetic
Resources (IACBGR) to review requests for access to genetic resources.5
Several circumstances created a favourable climate for the drafting of EO247.
The overthrow of the Marcos regime in 1987 led to a democratic political system,
with NGOs and community advocates playing an influential role in policy devel-
opment. An increase in exploration by researchers for pharmaceutical companies,
especially in coastal waters, culminated in a public controversy, fuelled by media
coverage, about biopiracy by foreign corporations. Many policy makers felt that it
was important to establish an initial regulatory framework through the executive
order process, given the perceived urgency of the situation and the slow pace of
congressional legislation. EO247 was developed in 1994 through consultation
involving various government agencies, scientific and technical experts and insti-
tutions, and NGOs (Barber and La Vina, 1995). The Philippines is one of the few
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countries to have undertaken a broad consultation process in the development of
access regulations and today remains the only country in Southeast Asia with
comprehensive access legislation.
While EO247 is comprehensive, efforts to implement the law have been frus-
trating for researchers, community advocates and government agencies. Their
experience can provide useful lessons for policy makers embarking on similar laws
in other countries, bearing in mind that different cultural and political circum-
stances require different approaches. Every country will have to deal with the
issues addressed by EO247, including prior informed consent, appropriate mech-
anisms for benefit sharing, and creating the institutional structure for implemen-
tation and enforcement. The Philippines' experience clearly spells out the range of
challenges that face policy makers.
The framework for regulating biodiversity prospecting under EO247 contains
four basic elements:
• A system of mandatory research agreements between collectors and the national
government with minimum terms for provision of information and samples,
technology cooperation and benefit sharing.
• Minimum standards for obtaining prior informed consent from local and
indigenous communities where collection is carried out.
• An inter-agency committee to review applications and enforce compliance with
research agreements and to coordinate further institutional, policy and techno-
logical development.
• Minimum requirements for conformity with environmental protection laws
and regulations.
Commercial and academic research agreements: A recipe for
research chill?
Anyone proposing to collect genetic resources must operate under the terms of a
research agreement (commercial or academic) with a government agency. ARAs
apply to universities, other academic institutions, government agencies and inter-
governmental agencies proposing scientific research with no intention of profit.
Any collector with a commercial objective must obtain a CRA. Foreign propo-
nents are required to obtain the collaboration of a Philippines research institution
(such as the MSI of the University of the Philippines) in the development of
CRAs. If researchers operating under an ARA produce results that turn out to have
commercial potential or wish to transfer the collected materials to a third party, the
agreement must be replaced with a CRA. (EO247, s 3)
Anyone wishing to obtain either type of agreement must submit an application
to the LAC. The LACBGR includes representatives from government agencies as
well as a representative from a civil society organization and a member of a
'people's organization' representing the interests of indigenous communities. The
application must include a research proposal stating the purposes, source of funds,
duration, and a list of biological and genetic materials and amounts to be taken.
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ARA proposals can be broader and more general than CRAs (s 4), and a single
ARA can cover all scientists and researchers from an institution (eg the University
of the Philippines) (s 5), allowing a greater degree of self-regulation for academic
research. The purpose of distinguishing between commercial and academic
research was to minimize bureaucratic hurdles for academic researchers and to give
the LACBGR more time to monitor private commercial parties. Shortly after
EO247 came into force, Barber and La Vina (1995) noted that, as foreign
commercial collectors of genetic resources often rely heavily on local academic
institutions as suppliers, the application of different requirements to commercial
and academic research might prove counter-productive and would need to be
closely monitored. Since then, suspicions about academic and commercial links
have been one of several factors contributing to delays in approvals of applications
for research agreements.
Minimum terms of the agreements include:
• Limits on the type and amount of samples collected.
• Deposit of a complete set of all specimens with the National Museum or other
designated government entity.
• Access by Philippines citizens and government entities to all specimens
deposited abroad, and to relevant data.
• Information about all discoveries that lead to development of a commercial
product.
• Regular status reports to the LAC of the research and of the ecological state of
the area concerned and/or species collected.
• For endemic species, transfer to a Philippine institution of technology enabling
commercial and local use without royalty payments.
• Payment of royalties to the national government and local or indigenous
community when a research activity leads to development of a commercial
product, (s 5)
Far from facilitating access to genetic resources, EO247 appears to have put a
damper on research. More than 30 applications (primarily for ARAs) have been
made, but several of these have been withdrawn. By mid-2002, the IACBGR had
approved only two ARAs, one covering several campuses of the University of the
Philippines and the other for the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). The
only CRA to be approved was a joint undertaking between the Philippines
Department of Agriculture, the University of the Philippines and the University of
Utah, under a research programme funded by the US National Cancer Institute
and US National Institutes of Health. Its research objectives are:
• To collect approximately 200 marine organisms (ascidians, marine inverte-
brates, marine micro-organisms and sponges) annually from different habitats
in the Philippines archipelago, in amounts ranging from 50 to 500 grams
• To isolate active metabolites using bioassay-guided fractionation and to
determine the structures of active metabolites
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• To perform systematic inventories of biodiversity of various habitats in the
Philippine marine ecosystem.
The initial draft of EO247 was prepared by a group of chemists at the University
of the Philippines and aimed to regulate the collection and use of biodiversity by
foreigners but not by Philippines scientists. The later expansion of its scope to
include academic research, in part to comply with the CBD, has been a continuing
source of frustration to the academic community. Some academic and applied
scientists, as well as conservation NGOs, have argued that EO247 hinders scien-
tific progress and impedes students from obtaining academic qualifications. Some
scientists feel particularly disillusioned because they originally proposed the regu-
lation to control the activities of foreign scientists and protect their own interests
(Dano, 2001). The National Museum of the Philippines continues to take the
position that its legal charter authorizes it to conduct bioprospecting activities
without complying with the EO247 requirement to obtain a research agreement
(Peria, 2002). This has been a subject of continuing controversy, especially among
NGOs that suspect that commercial users of genetic resources may make arrange-
ments with the museum to conduct collections on their behalf.
Prior informed consent: Insurmountable hurdle or far too easy?
One of the prerequisites for approval of an application for a research agreement is
proof of prior informed consent by local communities, whether or not traditional
knowledge of uses of those resources is evident. Under a separate provision, collec-
tions within ancestral lands and domains of indigenous communities require
consent to be in accordance with customary community laws (s 7).
The regulations implementing EO247 (Department Administrative Order No
96-20) define prior informed consent as 'consent obtained ... after disclosing
fully the intent and scope of the bioprospecting activity, in a language and process
understandable to the community, and before any bioprospecting activity is
undertaken' (DAO, s 2). To obtain the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) Certificate
needed for approval of a collection permit (s 7), an applicant needs to take the
following steps:
• Provide a summary of the research proposal to the community mayor or head of
an indigenous people.
• Inform the community of its intention to conduct bioprospecting, through
media advertisements or direct communication.
• Advertise and organize a community assembly to discuss the proposal.
• Provide to the local mayor or recognized head of an indigenous people a
summary of the research proposal, in a language or dialect understandable to
them, stating (a) the purpose, methodology and duration of the project, as well
as the number of species/specimens to be used and/or collected, (b) equitable
and reciprocal benefits to parties concerned before, during and after the
duration of the bioprospecting activity, and (c) a categorical statement that the
activity will not in any way affect the traditional use of the resources.
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• Submit the PIC certificate, if issued by the mayor or head of an indigenous
people, to the Technical Secretariat of the Inter-Agency Committee on
Biological and Genetic Resources (IACBGR), together with proof of
compliance with legal procedures.
Researchers have complained that the requirements for prior informed consent are
too onerous, while community advocates say they don't go nearly far enough. As
straightforward as the steps appear, there are many potential complications. In
some cases it may be difficult to identify the recognized head of a community or
even to precisely define the identity of a community. Local people may question
the authority of a mayor to speak on their behalf, and it may be difficult for the
IACBGR to determine whether consent is apparent when communities are
strongly divided. Researchers planning projects in indigenous communities may
need considerable time and effort to understand and adhere to customary laws of
collective decision-making. Translating research proposals into local languages
may present a formidable task given the number of languages in the Philippines,
but even that may not be enough. One NGO suggests that pictures may be needed
to describe the species to be collected and the amounts to be collected.
Are the prior informed consent requirements too demanding or not demanding
enough? Both NGOs and academics support the process, but their concerns are
very different. Some NGOs point out that the implications of bioprospecting for
genetic resources may be virtually incomprehensible in some communities, and
that applicants for research agreements need to go far beyond a basic description of
a research proposal to ensure that communities have sufficient information and
understanding to make decisions about prior informed consent. The sample PIC
certificate contained in the regulations simply states that the signer (ie the mayor
or head of an indigenous people) has reviewed the research proposal, has under-
stood the implications of the proposed research activity, and has consulted with
constituents, who have voiced no objection. One interviewee expressed concern
that mayors and fishing organizations are likely to provide consent without suffi-
ciently understanding the consequences.
A researcher studying the toxic properties of cone snails used to simply buy
them from fishermen who caught them only for the commercial value of their
decorative shells and threw the venom duct away; now she can only obtain the
material under the authorization of a CRA with all its lengthy delays and compli-
cations. Some researchers worry that publicity about biopiracy and the possibility
of large royalties and other substantial rewards has raised community expectations
too far, increasing the difficulty of obtaining consent. Communities may have
difficulty understanding the difference between academic and commercial
research and may expect economic results that simply don't exist. Common suspi-
cions that commercial research may be cloaked under the guise of academic
research add to the confusion. One researcher noted that leaders of indigenous
communities are reluctant to sign forms because experience has taught them that
signing documents means giving up rights.
Scientists are not very good at explaining their work to local people (this is
hardly unique to scientists in the Philippines). They just want to get on with their
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research, and may lack the funding to develop complicated PIC procedures that
may need to be adapted to different community cultures. In remote areas,
obtaining prior informed consent from communities may take months. With the
assistance of social scientists, the University of the Philippines has developed
guidelines to help its researchers meet prior informed consent requirements. The
perception among many scientists that obtaining community permission is just
too difficult has short circuited several proposed research projects. However, as one
civil society organization notes, most of those who oppose prior informed consent
have not actually tried it (Dano, 2001).
Stronger prior informed consent provisions could act as a further disincentive to
researchers who find even the existing administrative requirements too great a
burden. Many of the Philippines' marine species can also be readily found in
nearby Malaysia and Indonesia, and Philippine enforcement agencies are too weak
in most parts of the country to stop commercial researchers from simply collecting
in secret. However, advocates for community and indigenous rights are quick to
point out that giving communities a chance for greater control over their own
destinies is not only a matter of justice but also may be just what is needed for
achieving more responsible management of biological diversity. EO247 has
opened a Pandora's box that will not easily be shut.
Who speaks for communities? Proposing a voice for fisheries
cooperatives
The Department of Agriculture is responsible for fisheries management and policy
development in the Philippines. The 1998 Fisheries Code provided for the
appointment of an undersecretary of fisheries in the department to oversee fish-
eries regulation, research and policy development. The Code promotes public
participation in policy development through the appointment of a National
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Management Council comprising a cross-section
of interest groups including government, small fishermen, commercial fishermen,
fish processors, academics, and civil society organizations. At the local level, the
Code provides precedence to municipal fishermen and their cooperatives within
15 km of municipal shorelines. It also provides for the creation of local Fisheries
and Aquatic Resource Management Councils (FARMCs), with small fishermen
making up three-quarters of the membership, in every municipality with fishing
activities. The main role of local FARMCs is to help in the preparation of
municipal fisheries development plans, recommend the enactment of ordinances,
and assist in enforcement of fisheries laws.
The Tambuyog Foundation, a civil society organization that promotes the
rights of fishing communities, suggests that requests for prior informed consent
should be directed not to mayors but to FARMCs, which, it argues, more legiti-
mately represent the interests of fishing communities and are the keepers of tradi-
tional knowledge. Who has the legitimate authority to speak for communities?
Although EO247 delegates that authority to heads of municipalities (for local
communities), other national access laws have yet to address an issue that will be
crucial to the implementation of effective consent arrangements.
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Royalties and other benefits — An improbable dream?
A brochure describing the MSI-University of Utah bioprospecting enterprise and
aimed at target communities, noted its medical, ecological and scientific benefits
and added that the institutions would share any royalty or profit with the
Philippine government in the event that a product capable of being patented
should be developed. The brochure addressed the question of benefits to the local
community as follows:
At the early stage, the study will find out what is the state of the envi-
ronment in the study site. The data can help to plan ways of taking care of
and preserving the ecology of the place. We can't promise that any drug will
come out of the study. But, if there should he any, every effort will be made
so that the local community will share in the financial benefits. How
exactly will be determined later on.
One of the key benefits of the agreement has been training for University of the
Philippines researchers in purification processes.
For communities and national government alike, the promise of royalties is the
pot of gold that encourages prior informed consent for commercial collections.
Anti-cancer drugs are at the top of the list and, in the event that the identification
of an anti-cancer agent leads to the development of a marketable drug, no doubt
the returns would be considerable. However, the odds of collections in any
particular community leading to commercial profit are extremely slim. In the
event that royalties do materialize, it will be up to parties to research agreements to
determine how to distribute them. The legislation has come under criticism in
some quarters for not precisely defining a royalty split (say, 50-50) between the
government and provider communities.
Section 5(e) of EO247 provides that forms of compensation other than
royalties may be negotiated where appropriate. As communities are not parties to
research agreements, they have no direct role in negotiating benefits. However,
under section 8 of the regulations, parties to research agreements must ensure that
negotiated benefits also accrue to local communities and indigenous peoples and
are allocated for conservation measures. The latter requirement has been a sore
point for critics of the legislation who maintain that creating an obligation to aim
community benefits in the direction of conservation undermines the sovereignty
that the concept of prior informed consent is intended to confer. This illustrates a
dilemma likely to face policy makers drafting effective access and benefit-sharing
legislation in other countries. To be faithful to the objectives of the CBD, is it
enough simply to require equitable sharing of benefits with communities, or
should there be strings attached to promote the conservation of biological
diversity? To create an incentive, is it also necessary to create an obligation? In the
Philippines, much depends on how the requirement for allocation for conser-
vation measures is interpreted. For example, benefits that have no apparent direct
link to conservation, such as improved health and education programmes, may
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still make a significant long-term contribution to conservation of ecosystems by
helping a community improve its economic health.
As Batungbacal (2000) points out, economic benefits from bioprospecting do
not have to be enormous to create significant environmental, social and economic
results in coastal communities, provided they are captured at a local level and are at
least partially dedicated to conservation:
One hundred thousand dollars in the hands of an NGO, a small business
or a local community can go a long way: providing medicines, supporting a
nature reserve or an inventory of biodiversity, funding a clinic or processing
facilities, and creating employment. These direct benefits can be felt in-
directly in other sectors of the economy —for example, in tourism or through
providing transferable skills such as information technology — thus
contributing to a country's broader sustainable development.
Various organizations in the Philippines have been actively promoting alternative
livelihoods in sustainable fisheries and aquaculture. For example, the SEAFDEC
has helped communities on the island of Bohol start up sustainable mud crab fish-
eries with low-technology support and has worked with other communities to
demonstrate the long-term effects of no fish areas in increasing catches (Primavera
and Agbayani, 1997). The Haribon Foundation, in cooperation with Project
Seahorse, has coordinated the development of seahorse sanctuaries in poorer
fishing communities, again with the result of rebuilding populations and catches
(Project Seahorse, 2000). And ICLARM's GIFT project has provided improved
broodstock and training to rural pond farmers (Pullin et al, 1991). Each of these
projects, discussed in the following chapter, illustrates the potential for improving
economic conditions in communities in ways that increase awareness of ecological
issues.
Biosprospecting for marine organisms in the Philippines often takes place in
fishing communities where economic conditions create little incentive for careful
management of fisheries resources. For example, the Fisheries Code prohibits the
use of explosives and poisons in coral reef fisheries, but local fishermen may flout
the law out of desperation to feed their families. Assistance with the creation of
sustainable fisheries livelihoods could be one of the most useful forms of benefits
to communities providing aquatic genetic resources in the Philippines.
Implementing Executive Order 247 - A bureaucratic
nightmare
The magnitude of the difficulties involved in implementing EO247 is illustrated
by the fact that only two out of 37 applications for research agreements had been
approved five years after the presidential order was issued in 1995. The great
majority of these applications for ARAs. It appears that many would-be applicants
for CRAs have moved their research activities to more 'friendly' countries or,
in some cases, have simply bypassed the legislation by making unauthorized
collections.
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One of the main reasons for delays in approval appears to have been a lack of
financial and bureaucratic support for the IACBGR charged with reviewing and
approving applications and for the Technical Secretariat to support its work. One
member of the IACBGR notes that, although the Committee was intended to
convene monthly, its meetings are irregular because of the difficulty of forming a
quorum. She attributed this to the fact that the dealings of the IACBGR have been
a low priority for overworked government agencies and to a general lack of
awareness in government bureaucracies of the significance of its mandate. Another
interviewee noted that the IACBGR had difficulty preparing effective procedures
and guidelines because government representatives were too busy to deal with the
issue.
An uneasy relationship between NGOs and scientists also appears to have
contributed to a rocky start for EO247. Some NGOs remain concerned that there
is not a clear enough distinction between academic and commercial research and
that EO247 provides insufficient authority and information to communities to
secure adequate benefits from collections. One scientist commented that some
NGOs seem to take satisfaction in frustrating the efforts of scientists to engage in
both commercial and academic research. She added that the anti-biopiracy focus
of NGOs distracts the attention of the country from increasing its capacity for
commercial development of genetic resources in a manner consistent with bio-
diversity conservation.
How can the processing of research applications be made more efficient?
Suggestions put forward by representatives from NGOs and the research
community included the need for:
• Increased government funding for the IACBGR and to make its work a priority
for heads of government agencies
• A 'one-stop shopping' system to expedite the application process with a single
agency being responsible for reviewing and approving applications, monitoring
and providing guidance for prior informed consent procedures, monitoring
compliance with agreement requirements, and enforcing the law
• Increased public and bureaucratic awareness of bioprospecting and biodiversity
conservation issues
• A central biodiversity office to promote both the commercial use and conser-
vation of biological diversity.
Executive Order 247 and aquaculture
EO247 was motivated by national concerns about the collection of both sea and
plant life whose chemical components might enable the development of new
drugs and other pharmaceutical products. The law's definition of'prospecting' as
the research, collection and utilization of biological and genetic resources
for purposes of applying the knowledge derived to scientific and/or
commercial purposes
could be interpreted to include the collection of wild broodstock for food fish or
ornamentals aquaculture. In theory, the provisions might even have applied to the
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ICLARM's collection of germplasm from locally cultured tilapia under the GIFT
project. However, there is no indication that EO247 was intended to deal to
collections for aquaculture, and its application to such collections remains a grey
area. The normal practice (by SEAFDEC, for example) is simply to purchase
broodstock from local fishermen, who appear to be content with the current
arrangement.
Would fishermen get a better deal through formal access agreements between
communities and collectors? Perhaps so, if a collection led to the development of a
valuable strain with international markets — or perhaps there would simply be an
expansion of the 'research chill' that currently appears to inhibit collections
throughout the Philippines. Once again, it is important to consider some funda-
mental distinctions between different uses of genetic resources. Article 8(j) of the
CBD was driven by concerns about the appropriation without compensation of
traditional knowledge of crop breeding and medicinal uses of plants, and it was
initially anticipated that access and benefit-sharing legislation implementing
Article 8(j) would tie access agreements to the provision of traditional knowledge
enabling the effective use of genetic resources. EO247 moved beyond the expecta-
tions of Article 8(j) by requiring the consent of communities with or without tradi-
tional knowledge, and some other national laws have followed suit.
To the drafters of EO247, there was a clear logic in requiring the agreement of
communities for collection of marine organisms that might eventually yield
enormous profits in the event of the discovery of, say, an anti-cancer drug. Should
the same logic require a collector of broodstock to make an agreement with a
community rather than simply buying from a fisher who sells his catch for a living?
If so, how? Drafters of access and benefit-sharing policies in other countries face
many tough questions, and this is one of the toughest.
Lessons for other countries
As other countries in the ASEAN region develop their own legislation based on the
ASEAN Framework guidelines, there may be an opportunity for smoother imple-
mentation of EO247 simply because collectors of genetic resources cannot just
move their operations to a more accommodating nation. Nevertheless, the
Philippine experience deserves careful consideration by other countries. Executive
Order 247 was carefully prepared, with participation by a broad range of stake-
holders, and at first glance appears to be a logical and straightforward approach to
facilitating access to genetic resources. As so often with the implementation of
legislation that represents a major change to the status quo, the devil has been in
the details, and the details here are many. At the very least, the difficulties experi-
enced in implementing EO247 suggest that to be effective, access and benefit-
sharing laws need to:
• Provide for an efficient process without unreasonable delays.
• Ensure the availability of adequate government resources to implement and
enforce enabling regulations and to process applications expeditiously.
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Ensure that distinctions between academic and commercial research are clear
and that academic research applications can proceed without unnecessary
obstacles.
Provide adequate support for the negotiation of prior informed consent at the
community level.
Clearly define the scope of the legislation with regard to the genetic resources to
which it applies.
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Chapter 6
Results that Count: Meaningful
Benefits for Fishing Communities
Fishing family with traditional fish trap, Marituba wetlands, Brazil (Photo by Brian Harvey)
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One of the three objectives of the CBD, the equitable sharing of benefits from the
use of genetic resources, is intended to promote the other two: conservation and
sustainable use of genetic resources. Ten years after the CBD came into force, there
are few publicized examples of benefits to developing countries from the use of
plant genetic resources, and virtually none for aquatic genetic resources. The most
obvious explanation is the slow progress in the development of access laws and the
regulations that define how they'll work in practice. In the meantime, uncertainty
about legal requirements for access has had a chilling effect on commercial and
academic research and has left many indigenous and local communities uncertain
about whether they have any rights to negotiate with collectors and, if so, how to
go about it.
Some corporations and research institutions have negotiated agreements with
national governments, and occasionally directly with communities, in countries
where legislation has yet to be enacted. One of the reasons there has been little
public information about such agreements is that many have been negotiated
secretly, especially in cases where sensitive commercial information is involved.
Martinez (2002) points to the growth of a new profession of 'biotrade brokers'
whose job it is to negotiate little-publicized deals between northern organizations
and southern biodiversity rich countries, which may share some or many species
and compete among themselves for a share of the action. GRAIN (2002a)
concludes that the trend towards such bilateral contracts has rarely favoured
provider countries. Its study of a number of completed agreements concluded
that, in most cases, more than 95 per cent of the benefits derived from biodiversity
continue to be captured by industrial interests. Other analysts might use different
measuring sticks and come up with different results, but there's no doubt that
there is a gap and that it needs to be narrowed.
At the community level, receiving a fair share of benefits will start with legal
recognition of the right of informed consent to the collection of genetic resources.
However, much more will depend on the types of benefits up for discussion
(royalties may have zero value), the support of a sound negotiation framework and
the commitment of both communities and collectors to negotiate a workable
agreement.
BLUE GOLD OR FOOLS' GOLD? Prospects for benefit sharing
Plant biodiversity has been called 'green gold' because of the potential for
bioprospecting agreements to provide lucrative export markets for plants and
plant products from southern countries. The high expectations that the CBD
created haven't been met so far. Are the prospects for 'blue gold' any better?
Chapter 1 details the potential value of different types of aquatic genetic resources.
Benefit-sharing agreements will likely vary considerably in nature and scope
depending on the types of resource and collection requirements involved.
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Marine bioprospecting
Bioprospecting for marine organisms is like panning for gold. It may only take one
major find in one location to produce riches. But, just as in prospecting for gold,
the disappointments far outnumber the successes.
The odds against provider communities receiving a share of royalties from phar-
maceutical companies are extraordinarily high, given the rarity with which
samples lead to the development of a marketable product. Moreover, pharmaceu-
tical and other companies are increasingly managing to reduce the need for
collection of samples: they synthesize compounds, chemically alter them to make
them distinct from the originals and therefore eligible for patent protection, or
grow medicinal plants on plantations. By one estimate, the global trade in genetic
resources runs to several billion dollars annually (ten Kate and Laird, 1999), but
such large figures bear little relationship to amounts received by provider coun-
tries. The total profits in worldwide trade in plant seeds in 1993 were about
US$700 million. As Pullin and Casal (1996) note, if 10 per cent of that amount
came from materials collected under the CBD, there would have been about
US$70 million a year in profits to be shared and perhaps US$7 million in royalties
to be shared among source countries - an amount that might be exceeded by the
cost of estimating and distributing such benefits.
Plant bioprospectors sometimes attempt to negotiate agreements with national
governments to obtain samples from parks and other protected areas, either to
avoid the need to deal with communities or private landowners or because the
rules for negotiation are simply more straightforward. One of the few
bioprospecting agreements on aquatic genetic resources provided for the
collection of thermophilic organisms unique to the hot springs of Yellowstone
National Park. The US Parks Service itself initiated the process with the express
intent of discovering applications for products derived through research on ther-
mophilic organisms (so prior informed consent was not an issue), and was to
receive US$100,000 annually from the Diversa Corporation for five years of
sample collection as well as in-kind services and royalties from any products
developed (Columbia University, 1999).
However, most bioprospecting for aquatic organisms will continue to focus on
ocean waters, where marine equivalents of parks are so few that collectors don't
have the option of obtaining specimens from protected areas even if allowed to do
so. Assuming that continues to be the case, what say are communities likely to
have in collections off national coastlines? Most bioprospecting for marine
organisms is conducted on the seabed of the continental shelf, which falls within
national jurisdiction under the UNCLOS. In Fiji, indigenous communities
already have certain rights to the seabed. However, this is the exception rather than
the rule, and whether communities have a right to benefits from offshore resources
is likely to remain a controversial issue that becomes even more complex as scien-
tific knowledge of ocean life expands. Will communities be able to demand a say if
micro-organisms found recently in hydrothermal vents on the seabed hold the
prospect of commercial development? It sounds unlikely, but territorial claims of
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some indigenous peoples (like the Haida in Canada's Queen Charlotte Islands,
close to some of the vent discoveries) may extend far beyond the coastline.
Traditional knowledge of or uses for seabed organisms is likely to be virtually
non-existent in areas where bioprospecting takes place, but this may not be a
barrier to community rights in countries that follow the Bonn Guidelines, and
appears not to have been an obstacle under the Philippine access law. Future access
policies (and land claims agreements with indigenous communities) will need to
clearly consider and describe the rights of communities over offshore aquatic
genetic resources if contentious disputes are to be avoided.
Food fish aquaculture
Collections of broodstock for development of new food fish strains are more likely
to lead to returns, though not of a similar magnitude, to source communities,
simply because the odds of creating a successful commercial product are higher. In
addition, the research and development phase is likely to be far shorter than the
ten to 20 years for pharmaceutical products. Consequently, benefits such as
royalties that depend on commercially valuable results are likely to be distributed
more quickly.
Collectors of aquatic genetic resources don't have the opportunity, frequently
pursued by plant bioprospectors, of drawing upon the extensive holdings of
publicly available ex situ collections. The need for wild broodstock could diminish
over time as genetically diverse ex situ collections become well established;
however, the gradual expansion in the farming of food fish species or populations
that have never before been cultured will lead to ongoing demands for wild genetic
material. Universities and other national institutions are currently the primary
actors in this field and will generally have to meet the same requirements as foreign
collectors if current trends in the development of access law continue.
One of the key distinctions between bioprospecting and aquaculture is that the
development of promising new strains for farming may require collection from
many dispersed locations, so that several communities and in some cases several
nations could be involved in the negotiation of agreements. This would have been
the case, for instance, if national access and benefit-sharing laws had applied to
ICLARM s collections of wild tilapia broodstock in four African countries in the
late 1980s (see Case Study 4). Such a diversity of communities contributing to
development of a product is unlikely to occur in the plant world, and it raises the
question of how benefits can most effectively be shared and how the process of
negotiating benefits can most efficiently be carried out in a way that is cost
effective for a fish breeder and fair to participating communities.
Those access laws that already exist appear to operate on the assumption that
agreements will be bilateral (that is, between a national institution and a foreign
collector or between a national institution and an individual community). For the
collection of aquaculture broodstock, multilateral agreements may be more cost
effective, efficient and realistic, especially for the sharing of non-monetary benefits
(such as assistance in the development of sustainable livelihoods) that may be
useful in similar ways to the variety of communities providing broodstock.
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Breeding of ornamentals
Regulation of the collection of broodstock for the ornamentals industry presents
altogether different challenges. For some species, breeders can simply tap into the
well established live trade in ornamentals to obtain broodstock without ever going
near the community of origin. About 90 per cent of freshwater ornamentals
already come from breeders, and cultured populations of popular species like the
neon tetra are so diverse that the need for wild broodstock has virtually been elim-
inated. By contrast, only a handful of marine ornamental species are bred in
captivity.
Sophisticated aquaculture technologies are increasingly making it possible to
culture species never before bred in captivity, creating new demands for wild
broodstock with desirable coloration and markings. However, it may be very
difficult for regulatory agencies to make effective distinctions between collections
for sale to hobbyists and those that will be used by breeders. Breeders who buy
broodstock through existing import and export channels do not necessarily need
to make their intent known. Moreover, fishermen already involved in the live trade
may be quite happy to meet collectors' needs for a small informal payment.
Another distinction between the ornamental and food fish industries is worthy
of note. Paradoxically, NGOs that oppose food fish aquaculture because of its
environmental impacts may support the culture of ornamental fish because they
assume it will reduce the pressure on wild fish populations. However, competition
from breeders may have a grave impact on communities where the capture fishery
not only provides a primary way of life but also provides the incentive needed to
protect ecosystems from more damaging resource uses. Case Study 1, on the
cardinal tetra fishery in Brazil, describes just such a situation. In that instance, as
Project Piaba might argue, to support the notion of community benefit-sharing
negotiations with Florida fish breeders would be to support the destruction of a
local community dependent on capture fisheries. In short, there may be a great
danger in focusing obsessively on the rights of communities to negotiate benefits
from the use of aquatic genetic resources when what they really need is practical
assistance - from any source willing and able to provide it - in protecting existing
livelihoods and local ecosystems against the threat of development pressures.
SHARING BENEFITS FAIRLY WITH COMMUNITIES
International legal instruments include two commonly used meanings for 'equi-
table sharing of benefits'. One refers to equitable sharing among countries
regarding the use of natural resources; the second calls for a fair economic return to
all state and non-state actors from which resources are obtained (Lynch and
Maggio, 1997). Agenda 21, negotiated at the 1992 Earth Summit, provides that
governments should 'recognize and foster the traditional methods and the
knowledge of indigenous people and their communities ... and ensure the oppor-
tunity for the participation of those groups in the economic and commercial
benefits derived from the use of such traditional methods and knowledge...'. In
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1994, the Desertification Convention went further, expressly requiring equitable
sharing with local communities.
What does 'equitable sharing' really mean, and what types of benefits are likely
to be practical? As discussed in the previous chapter, while some access laws make
specific reference to royalties, others make no effort to define the nature of
benefits.
National responsibilities
The CBD calls on member nations to encourage the equitable sharing of benefits
arising from the use of communities' knowledge, innovations and practices. As the
name of the Convention implies, the primary rationale for Article 8(j) is the recog-
nition that benefits to communities can provide a positive stimulus for the conser-
vation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Under the framework set out by the
CBD, each country has the right to prior informed consent to the collection of
genetic resources and to negotiate the mutually agreed terms under which collec-
tions may occur. Communities are not specifically recognized as parties to these
agreements, even by access laws that provide for community prior informed
consent. Ordinarily, states and designated national institutions negotiate the
benefits they wish to receive and make separate arrangements for distributing a
portion of benefits to communities.
In addition to calling for equitable benefit sharing between parties to agree-
ments, the CBD outlines the responsibilities of Parties to the Convention, espe-
cially northern countries, for sharing specific types of benefits with developing
countries. These include:
• Ensuring access to and transfer of technologies that are relevant to the conser-
vation and sustainable use of biological diversity or make use of genetic
resources and do not cause significant damage to the environment (Article 16).
Of particular interest to developing countries are technologies that enable them
catch up with northern countries in the study and uses of genetic resources in
order to advance their own economic development.
• Exchanging publicly available information relevant to conservation and
sustainable use, including the results of technical, scientific and socio-economic
research (Article 17).
• Promoting technical and scientific cooperation, with special attention to
strengthening the national capabilities of developing countries (Article 18).
• Taking legislative, administrative or policy measures to provide for effective
participation in biotechnological research activities, especially by developing
countries, and promoting access by developing countries to the results and
benefits arising from biotechnologies based upon genetic resources provided by
those countries (Article 19).
• Providing financial resources to enable developing countries to implement the
Convention and benefit from its provisions (Article 20).
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Negotiated benefits typically focus on technology transfer (eg training of scien-
tists) and capacity building at the national level, in addition to the standard nego-
tiation of royalties and other financial rewards. What hasn't been addressed in any
comprehensive way - either in international agreements or in most national laws -
is how to share these benefits equitably with communities providing genetic
resources, and what types of benefits will prove most useful and acceptable to those
communities. Governments were quick to accept the principle that incentives to
conserve resources depend on adequate benefits from their use, but generally
haven't embraced its logical extension — that the same principle must govern rela-
tionships with local communities. Neither the Bonn Guidelines nor most national
laws appear to take for granted that prior informed consent by communities
includes direct negotiation of benefits.
Community expectations
In the case of the Philippines, one of the few countries where prior informed
consent by communities has been put into practice, it appears to have been treated
primarily as an exercise for sharing information about the purposes of proposed
collections. The inter-agency committee charged with ensuring the protection of
community rights regarding prior informed consent has been hampered by a lack
of government commitment, inadequate resources, and agency conflicts (see Case
Study 5). Thanks in large part to the strong network of civil society organizations,
the Philippines has been among the most progressive of countries in its legislative
support of community rights; it is reasonable to assume that other countries with
a less impressive record will have more trouble translating rhetoric into action.
Not surprisingly, one of the main criticisms levelled at the CBD by advocates
for indigenous and local communities is its failure to provide substantive guidance
for the sharing of benefits with local people - that it 'talks the talk' but doesn't
'walk the walk'. Needless to say, achieving consensus among most of the world's
countries about specific mechanisms for addressing community rights, even if
that's ultimately the key to conservation and sustainable use of global biodiversity,
would have been a near impossible task. Access laws that do provide for compen-
sation to communities generally don't specify an effective mechanism for doing so
- the Philippine legislation again being a good example.
Dissatisfaction with mechanisms for distributing benefits and the types of
benefits themselves has fuelled demands for direct community control over
genetic resources rather than simply having a right to prior informed consent.
With few exceptions (such as the OAU model law, community rights legislation in
the Philippines and Bangladesh, and a few land claims negotiations in Canada and
Australia), national governments have shown little appetite for devolving signif-
icant authority to communities. Some indigenous organizations have already
made clear their categorical opposition to the collection of genetic resources in
their territories. While this opposition may be based in part on principled
concerns about genetic modification of wild creatures or plants, usually it has far
more to do with wanting to be treated fairly and with respect.
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It doesn't sit well with indigenous groups that the CBD's attention to rights of
traditional communities appears to have more to do with biodiversity conser-
vation and corporate desires for access to their resources than with a sense of fair
play. For the most part, national governments continue to pay little attention to
international human rights conventions that recognize the right of indigenous
peoples to self-determination. It is not surprising, therefore, that many indigenous
groups balk at the suggestion (implied or explicit in most national access laws to
date) that benefits negotiated with communities should be designed to promote
biodiversity conservation and sustainable use objectives. And it is no small irony
that indigenous peoples with the longest traditions of practising sustainable use of
ecosystems have largely been deprived, through erosion of their cultures and loss of
control over their territories, of the ability to continue to do so. Any effort to
develop practical frameworks for the negotiation of benefits with communities
will need to keep this reality in mind.
A HANDOUT OR A HAND UP?
Royalties vs non-monetary benefits
As discussed in Chapter 5, national access and benefit-sharing laws can set the
stage for negotiations with communities by requiring their prior informed consent
access, but the types of benefits that result will depend on the nature of the negoti-
ations. From the point of view of a company collecting genetic resources,
monetary benefits such as royalties may make most sense, but community nego-
tiators will be well aware that royalties rarely materialize - at least in the case of
pharmaceutical bioprospecting. Communities that hope to achieve tangible
benefits of a lasting nature may do better by exploring opportunities for non-
monetary benefits.
Fishing communities tend to be over represented among the poorest commu-
nities of the world because their traditional sources of sustenance and income have
been devastated by the impacts of industrial activities such as commercial trawling,
pollution of fish habitat by runoff from mining or agricultural activities,
destruction of habitat by industrial logging, disruption offish migration routes by
dam building, and loss of physical control over traditional territories. What can
truly benefit such communities in the long term is the means to regain an
economic footing based on local enterprises with links to aquatic resources, a
chance to apply traditional as well as new skills, feasible marketing opportunities,
and a cooperative approach. As Schumacher (1973) pointed out more than 30
years ago, long-term prosperity in communities means looking at the real needs of
local people, using appropriate low or intermediate technological solutions that
are in tune with local resources, means and culture. Creative benefit-sharing agree-
ments are one way of providing a catalyst for such solutions.
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Royalties
Royalties are the most common currency of access negotiations and the benefit
most likely to be required under national laws. From the point of view of
collecting institutions, they're the most straightforward and fair means of compen-
sation for the right to collect. Being forced to 'share benefits' before there's any
guarantee of benefits to the collector makes no sense from a business point of view
and simply puts a damper on research that may benefit both a company and
society at large - provided something comes out of it. Why give something for
nothing? Dividing up benefits before there's any proof of the value of a genetic
resource, such institutions say, will simply be the thin end of the wedge leading to
greater and greater demands from communities caught up in the 'pot of gold'
syndrome.
The problem with this argument is that it treats genetic resources purely in
economic terms - commodities to be bought and sold, without value until they
produce a profit. Apart from the fact that it doesn't take into account other values
to communities, the argument ignores a basic premise of the CBD - that genetic
resources that were once common property are now subject to national
sovereignty, and collectors from northern countries have an obligation to negotiate
the right to access. What primarily motivated developing countries to buy into the
CBD was the promise of putting an end to the exploitation of biodiversity by
industrial countries without adequate compensation. Developing countries also
sought to put an end to the assumption that it is their responsibility to conserve
the richest areas of biodiversity for the benefit of northern countries. That's why
access to technology for the use of genetic resources has been such an important
bargaining chip for developing countries. To arrive at mutually agreed terms with
provider countries, commercial collectors may need to be prepared to negotiate
the full range of monetary and non-monetary benefits outlined in the CBD.
Non-monetary benefits
Typically, collectors will be negotiating with national institutions rather than
directly with communities, at least in countries that don't provide full negotiation
rights to communities. The types of non-monetary benefits that may be most
valuable at the national level (such as technologies for genetic research and modi-
fication and training of scientists to use them) may be irrelevant to the needs of
indigenous and local communities. If the prior informed consent process is to
work smoothly, communities will need assurance that any benefits they receive
will be meaningful.
Royalties may seem attractive at first glance, but they can also turn out to be an
empty promise that doesn't pay the rent. Monetary alternatives to royalties may
include fees per sample collected, milestone payments at each stage during the
development of a product, and short- and long-term employment with a
collection project. However, the most valuable benefits to communities are often
non-monetary ones that strengthen local economies and cultures battered by
decades of fisheries depletion, erosion of traditional ways of making a living, and
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the march of industrial development into once remote indigenous and local
communities.
The case studies included in this book, while they do not all focus on benefit-
sharing agreements, illustrate how a wide range of non-monetary benefits may be
relevant to fishing communities:
Case Study 1 - Project Piaba provides training and technologies to help fishing
communities along the Rio Negro maintain a sustainable ornamental fishery (eg
construction of a municipal aquarium to increase public awareness of habitat
needs of fish populations; teaching fishermen how to reduce mortalities in
captured fish; helping fishermen to develop marketing strategies).
Case Study 2 — A salmon farmer offers to help build a fish hatchery in return for
access to wild broodstock.
Case Study 3 - A Canadian aquaculture consortium offers indigenous groups
part ownership in a fish farming enterprise in return for access to charr brood-
stock.
Case Study 4 - A fisheries research institute in the Philippines, after developing
improved tilapia strains from wild broodstock in four African countries, transfers
the breeding technology to African research institutes with a view to helping rural
community pond farmers increase fish production.
Case Study 5 - A scientific institute in the Philippines promises communities
that (in addition to possible royalties) research associated with collections of
marine organisms will facilitate conservation of aquatic ecosystems.
Case Study 6 - A bioprospecting agreement with Fijian communities provides
for assistance with the development and management of village-based enterprises
as well as the establishment of a marine conservation area to allow fish populations
to recover and potential fisheries stocks to increase.
Obviously, a company or research institute may find it far easier to negotiate
royalties or other payments directly with a community than to embark on a range
of other options outside its immediate expertise. How agreements with fishing
communities turn out will probably depend to a large extent on the availability of
alternative benefit-sharing models, the skill of negotiators, and support for alter-
native benefit-sharing arrangements from government or non-governmental insti-
tutions. In many cases, non-monetary benefits acceptable to a community might
be as simple as employing local people to collect aquatic genetic resources. In other
instances, negotiations might consider options for creating longer lasting
employment or other benefits such as support for educational or health
programmes.
The agreement described in Case Study 6 resulted from an effort by the WWF
and the University of the South Pacific to demonstrate best practices under the
CBD. While the case study illustrates some of the many benefits that can
contribute to a community's well-being and promote conservation, it is unlikely
that such comprehensive agreements will become commonplace in the near future
without significant guidance and support from governments, NGOs or other
bodies with an interest in promoting benefit-sharing agreements and the resources
to do so. There are three key reasons for this:
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• Agreements require a comprehensive framework to support negotiations with
communities that may have no experience dealing with interested collectors.
• Collectors must have the incentive (which usually includes the option of patent
protection for any discoveries) to conduct laborious negotiations directly with a
community.
• From the point of view of institutional or corporate collectors, it generally
makes good business sense to limit benefits to the promise of a share of future
royalties rather than becoming involved in the expensive and messy business of
negotiating non-monetary benefits (primarily capacity building and tech-
nology transfer) that may be of more immediate use to communities.
Governments that are serious about furthering the objectives of the CBD and who
recognize the importance of management of biodiversity at the community level
will need to determine how to deliver meaningful benefits to fishing communities
without making it impossible for collectors to reach a deal. This applies equally to
bioprospecting and to collections for aquaculture.
LINKING SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS TO CONSERVATION
Conservation and sustainable use of aquatic genetic resources aren't going to be
achieved simply by beefing up governmental policies on harvesting and ecosystem
management. Ultimately, meeting those objectives will depend on governments'
success in developing strategies for the involvement of communities located in
areas of rich biodiversity. The CBD and other international agreements have
recognized the importance of encouraging a greater role for traditional commu-
nities, but it's a long road from rhetoric to reality.
Some governments have taken tentative steps towards developing co-
management agreements with communities, but sharing authority doesn't always
address a more fundamental barrier to conservation: widespread poverty among
countless communities that prospered before the erosion of their traditional
cultures and ecosystem management practices. Aquatic products are the main
source of animal protein for most of the world's poor and indigenous peoples, and
fishing villages are over represented among the poorest communities in the world.
The cause may be industrial development or overfishing or loss of community
control over natural resources or any combination of these.
The point is that governments need to develop imaginative and practical ways to
enable fishing communities to be more self-sufficient, whether through increased
local control, health and education programmes, or assistance with the devel-
opment of sustainable livelihoods. Obviously, negotiation of non-monetary
benefits such as sustainable livelihoods initiatives is likely to be more complex than
simply making a deal for royalties or up-front payments. However, if such benefits
are likely to be more effective in achieving CBD objectives, it may be worthwhile
for national governments, industry and international organizations to cooperate in
developing the support systems needed to promote sustainable livelihoods that ulti-
mately create benefits far beyond the local communities that initially receive them.
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Where overfishing or habitat destruction have contributed to the loss of tradi-
tional fishing practices, the most useful benefits may be building capacity to
manage fish stocks more effectively or develop new types of sustainable fishing
livelihoods. Community programmes in the Philippines and Fiji have demon-
strated that the establishment of no-fish zones, with the agreement of all
community interests, can restore fish populations while dramatically increasing
catch numbers and sizes in adjacent areas (Aalbersberg et al, 1997; Agbayani et al,
2000). A little bit of training and application of low-technology techniques can go
a long way to developing alternative fishing livelihoods that benefit entire commu-
nities. Examples include a SEAFDEC initiative to provide training and tech-
nology to develop sustainable mud crab fisheries, Project Seahorse's cooperation
with the Haribon Foundation in the Philippines to help communities develop
sustainable seahorse fisheries, and ICLARM's programmes to help pond farmers
in Africa and Southeast Asia raise fast maturing tilapia (see Case Study 6 at the end
of this chapter). Innovative projects such as these can have the double benefit of
helping to build community stability and conserving aquatic biodiversity.
The two Philippine projects described below, while not the result of access
agreements, exemplify how benefit-sharing initiatives that are well planned can be
used to promote conservation and sustainable use in fishing communities. They
also illustrate several key components to ensuring the success of sustainable liveli-
hoods projects. These include:
• A close link between sustainable livelihoods and traditional fishing occupa-
tions.
• Low-technology solutions.
• Community participation in developing and implementing resource
management plans.
• Information and education about ecosystem relationships and effective
management systems.
Seahorse culture in Handumon, Philippines
For aquaculture to contribute to conservation, it must serve as an alter-
native to fishing, transforming seahorse fishers into seahorse farmers.
Aquaculture that does not include seahorse fishers will not reduce pressure
on wild populations, because seahorse demand is considered limitless. For
seahorse aquaculture to be accessible to seahorse fishers, it must be low tech-
nology and low risk to avoid impoverishing them further.
PROJECT SEAHORSE, 1998.
The Philippines is one of more than 50 countries involved in the trading of more
than 20 million dried and live seahorses a year for use in traditional medicine
(including aphrodisiacs) and as aquarium specimens and curiosities. Demand far
exceeds the supply, yet catches are steadily decreasing because of overfishing,
habitat loss (including the destruction of mangrove forests) and unsustainable
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collection methods such as taking pregnant and immature fish. The dependence of
thousands of rural fishermen on seahorses creates an unfortunate pattern common
to many other small-scale fisheries: as village populations increase, fishing inten-
sifies, contributing to a decline in seahorse populations. This in turn leads to
declining catches and a greater pressure on fishermen to collect smaller and
immature seahorses, which are both less valuable, and vital to sustain seahorse
populations. Too often the result is increased poverty for villagers together with the
loss of one of their most valuable resources, forcing people to look for alternative
livelihoods that may worsen the initial problem.
The village of Handumon on the island of Bohol in the Philippines was one of
many communities that experienced the vicious cycle described above. Twenty per
cent of households in the community depend on seahorses for 40 per cent of their
income, and between 1985 and 1995 the catch had declined by 70 per cent. In
1995 Project Seahorse, under the direction of Amanda Vincent of the University
of British Columbia, partnered with the Philippines-based Haribon Foundation,
developed a proposal for a conservation project to protect and rebuild local
seahorse populations. The two groups worked with the villagers to establish a 33
hectare seahorse sanctuary. Pregnant males caught in other locations were placed
in meshed underwater cages. Juveniles escaping through the mesh were then held
in underwater corrals to grow to maturity before being sold or released to replenish
wild stocks. The project trained villagers in the management of seahorse stocks
and also encouraged the development of other livelihoods, such as seaweed
farming and ecotourism (seahorse watching), to help reduce local dependence on
the seahorse trade. In addition, villagers participated in the planting of 15,000
mangroves to reforest the shore of the sanctuary. The end result was stabilization of
seahorse populations and increased opportunities for enhancement of a
conservation-based community economy.
In addition to establishing the marine reserve, the project provided training in
surveying marine ecosystems and recording fisheries data, a public awareness
programme, assistance towards the development of a natural resources
management plan and identification of alternative livelihood options, and a
gender analysis to examine issues such as women's contribution to income gener-
ation in fishing villages. Plans were also made to transfer management of the
reserve to a new people's organization, Kanagmaluhan. The project also plays an
advocacy role with the local and national governments to promote enforcement of
fishery laws, develop effective fisheries management policies and build awareness
of marine conservation issues (Project Seahorse, 1998 and 2000; Amanda
Vincent, McGill University, personal communication).
Community fisheries management,
Malalison Island, Philippines
A development project organized by SEAFDEC in the Philippines illustrates the
types of challenges that poverty stricken fishing communities may face and the
multifaceted approach needed to promote sustainable livelihoods and economic
stability. The Malalison example underscores the importance of designing
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solutions to meet specific local needs and of community ownership of the design
process.
Almost three-quarters of the households on tiny Malalison Island (55 hectares)
in the central Philippines make at least part of their income from fishing, and 75
per cent live below the poverty level (Agbayani et al, 2000). Serious depletion of
local fish stocks began with the introduction of dynamite fishing after the Second
World War and has since accelerated as a result of a succession of other factors
leading to intensified fishing: the use of sodium cyanide in the capture of orna-
mentals (a ban on both dynamiting and cyanide in 1976 proved ineffective); the
intrusion of commercial vessels using purse seine and bag nets in the 1970s; and
local adoption of non-traditional fishing technologies (compressor assisted spear
guns and the muro-ami, a type of gill net using weighted 'scare lines') in the 1980s.
By the late 1980s, live coral cover was down to 35 per cent and the community
catch had shrunk to a small fraction of what it once had been (Baticados and
Agbayani, 2000). As in many other rural Philippines fishing communities, the
prospect for economic diversification and the alleviation of poverty was hampered
by low levels of education, an absence of skills for developing alternative liveli-
hoods, and lack of effective community organization.
In 1991, with funding assistance from the International Development Research
Centre (IDRC), the Aquaculture Department of the SEAFDEC began a pilot
project in community-based fisheries management (CFRM) at Malalison Island.
Its objectives were to develop the community into a strong organization that could
be granted territorial use rights to strengthen fisheries management, encourage
supplemental livelihoods, regenerate fish habitats, and increase fish stocks. After
SEAFDEC and its NGO partner, PROCESS Foundation, conducted initial
biological and socio-economic research in the community, the newly created
Fishermen's Association of Malalison Island (FAMI) acted as a formal link between
the project and the community. The project then provided FAMI members with
training in leadership and communication skills development, organizational
strengthening, cooperatives management, gender sensitivity, legal and policy
issues and values formation. The training also included discussions of methods for
conserving fisheries resources and improving fisheries income as a result (Agbayani
etal, 2000).
With the support of FAMI, the village council approved the establishment of a
reef conservation area in which fishing would be banned, with FAMI members
helping to monitor the area. FAMI were also able to substantially reduce
destructive and illegal fishing practices, although many local fishermen were
ambivalent about prohibitions of practices that they saw as the only way to obtain
enough fish to feed their families.
The objective of promoting territorial use fishing rights was based on the
premise that communities are most likely to become protective and judicious users
of aquatic resources if they feel a sense of ownership and responsibility and have an
opportunity for self-regulation based on sound empirical knowledge of local
fishery ecosystems. The open access regime established in the 1970s was charac-
terized by gear conflicts among Malalison fishermen as well as conflicts between
local and commercial fishermen, with no workable mechanism for conflict reso-
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lution or effective fisheries management. However, the devolution of adminis-
trative functions from the national to local governments under the Local
Government Code of 1991 provided an important step towards the establishment
of community fisheries management rights. The code provided municipalities the
exclusive right to grant fishery privileges to organizations and cooperatives of
marginal fisheries. What was needed in Malalison for this to occur were the moti-
vation and capacity to organize and a full appreciation of the economic and
conservation benefits of doing so.
Following discussions with SEAFDEC researchers, the Culasi municipal
council decided to grant FAMI territorial fisheries rights to a 1 km2 area between
Malalison Island and the mainland, but did not consult the fishermen of
Malalison and other coastal villages on the choice and size of the area. In 1995,
Executive Order 240 created a Fisheries and Aquatic Resources Management
Council (FARMC) in every coastal barangay (village) and municipality, setting the
stage for fisheries co-management at the village level, and FAMI formed a
FARMC for the village of Malalison. Under this arrangement the barangay
council enacts and implements fishery-related regulations with the advice of the
FARMC and with consultation as necessary with the national Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources to determine whether a regulation is within the purview of
local government. FARMC members have been trained and deputized as fish
wardens to assist with the enforcement of regulation (Baticados and Agbayani,
2000).
A subsequent survey showed that the majority of local fishing families reported
higher incomes following the completion of the project as a result of catch
increases and opportunities for alternative employment in areas such as farming
and livestock raising. The survey also showed an increase in the abundance of fish
and a perception that there was now greater fairness in the control over fishery
resources, allocation of access rights and influence in fishery management.
Collective decision-making was easier and conflict resolution quicker.
Using marine protected areas to improve fishing livelihoods
The worldwide depletion of commercial fisheries has been due in large part to the
practice of heavily fishing one species until its populations start to disappear, then
moving on to another species or area and doing the same. In the past, the popula-
tions of many species were able to rebuild to some extent in natural refuges that were
either too deep or remote or dangerous to allow intensive fishing, but such areas have
become increasingly accessible with new fishing technologies. Establishing no-fish
areas to enable the restoration of vulnerable populations and ecosystems has become
an increasingly popular fisheries management technique in the past decade. Because
no-fish zones can contribute to fairly rapid population recoveries and hence to direct
economic benefits to fishermen and their communities, they may be an important
tool to promote sustainable livelihoods for fishing communities, especially in
southern countries.
Local fishermen often oppose the establishment of marine reserves because they
assume it means an immediate reduction in areas available for fishing. While this
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may be true in the short term, there is increasing evidence that protecting a rela-
tively small but well-chosen area can produce a 'spillover effect' that can fairly
quickly result in fish population increases, and more productive fishing than
before, in surrounding areas. Some recent studies suggest that fish in protected
areas live longer and grow larger (Roberts and Hawkins, 2001). Larger fish not
only produce more eggs but may also spawn more frequently. After a coral reef
protected area was established as part of a cooperative community development
project in the Philippines, a fish census four years later found that the abundance
of surgeon fishes and fusiliers (the main species fished locally) was ten times higher
than in non-protected areas, and that their biomass was 40 times greater
(Agbayani et al, 2000). By increasing both population densities and the size offish,
reserves can greatly increase the number of young spawned, and the drifting of
eggs and larvae into fishing grounds can help restock local fisheries. In addition, as
the growth of protected fish populations produces crowding, migration offish to
outside areas also benefits fisheries.
Other scientists remain to be convinced of the effectiveness of protected areas as
a fisheries management strategy and express concern that they may be little more
than a scientific fad that has become a bandwagon of the ecological community.
Yet another point of view is that fisheries don't fail because of the inability of local
fishermen to manage catches but because of political pressures to prolong non-
sustainable fisheries.1 Consequently, what is chiefly needed is better communi-
cation to decision-making authorities about how protected areas work and how
they can increase rather than decrease catches if given time. Clearly, protected areas
should not be viewed as an alternative to catch restrictions for large-scale
commercial fishing. Creation of protected areas may produce less dramatic results
in areas where fish move over a wide range or where biodiversity is low than in
coral reef chains or in tropical river systems, but the latter are likely to be the
primary focus of agreements between indigenous and local communities. Already
there are several promising examples of the use of protected areas to conserve fish
populations and enhance local fisheries in such communities.
On the Caribbean island of St Lucia, life for fishermen had become increasingly
difficult by the late 1980s. Catches had dwindled after decades of population
growth led to an intensification of fishing along coral reefs. An initial attempt by
the government to establish a country-wide system of 19 marine reserves failed
because of inadequate funding and consultation with local fishermen. In the early
1990s, after catches had further deteriorated and fishermen were complaining
about conflicts with tourists, the Fisheries Department set up a process of partici-
patory community management around the town of Soufriere. The result was that
local stakeholders, including fishermen, diving operators, hoteliers and boaters,
agreed on a zoned management plan for 11 km of coastline. At the heart of the
plan were four no-take zones, interspersed between fishing areas, to promote the
build up offish stocks while providing an attraction for divers.
The scepticism of local fishermen about the establishment of the protected areas
disappeared five years later when it was found that not only had protected reef fish
stocks tripled in number but also fish stocks in surrounding unprotected waters
had doubled, resulting in a catch increase of close to 50 per cent. Moreover,
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biomass in one protected area where some trap fishing was later allowed was still
higher than in sites with no protection, demonstrating that even partial protection
can produce benefits (Roberts and Hawkins, 2001). While successes of this
magnitude may not be expected in regions such as the North Atlantic, they can be
very significant in coral reef ecosystems and in biodiversity rich river systems,
provided that care is taken to involve all who have a direct stake in the local fishery.
SETTING THE STAGE FOR EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS
In anticipation that benefit-sharing arrangements with communities are likely to
become the norm in the future, and in keeping with the spirit of the CBD, some
companies have already made it a practice to negotiate benefits whether or not the
law requires it. Shaman Pharmaceuticals, for instance, developed the practice of
not only making agreements with several South American countries but also
arranging for any benefits to be shared with all communities in which it had been
active. The company was praised by some for its innovative approach and criti-
cized by others for presuming to decide what benefits were best for the commu-
nities it dealt with. The volatility of the pharmaceuticals market later forced the
company to restructure and focus on botanicals, but its initiative set a precedent
worthy of consideration.
Countries that already provide for community consent for access to genetic
resources are discovering, perhaps to no one's great surprise, that legal require-
ments aren't worth much without an effective framework to support negotiations
with and by communities. Case Study 5 describes the problems the Philippines
has experienced in trying to ensure its Executive Order 247 facilitates rather than
impedes access in communities. Case Study 3 describes the failure of negotiations
for access to Arctic charr in Inuit communities of the Canadian north. The
breakdown was a costly disappointment to a consortium that had spent consid-
erable time and effort attempting to convince widely scattered communities. The
failure was attributed to indigenous communities' concerns about interference
with their spiritual connection with the fish, the proposed patenting of a genetic
mapping process, and the potential for competition from the farming industry —
despite the promise of joint ownership in the business. Everyone involved was
breaking new ground — this was the first significant attempt in the country to
develop an agreement with communities for access to aquatic genetic resources.
As illustrated by Case Study 6, two of the key differences between the Fijian and
Canadian negotiations lay in the level of support for a negotiation framework and
the variety of benefits on the table. There is no easy answer for what works and
what doesn't in negotiations, but what the case studies do make clear is that access
and benefit-sharing laws need to be supplemented by efforts - whether by
government or by other organizations — to build sound negotiation frameworks.
Key components of effective multiparty negotiations are likely to include ensuring
that:
• Communities have the support they need to negotiate effectively.
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• All stakeholders likely to be directly or indirectly affected by the outcome are
included in the design and implementation of the negotiation agreement.
• Skilled facilitators or mediators are available to help identify stakeholder
interests and explore options, including conditions for access and potential
benefits.
• Sufficient relevant information is available to facilitate informed decision-
making.
Obviously, the complexity of negotiations will depend very much on a variety of
factors, including the magnitude of the stakes. Negotiations with a pharmaceutical
company hoping to develop a product with significant commercial value are likely
to be far more protracted than a deal with a fish farmer who wants to collect a few
pairs of broodstock. The key point is that for prior informed consent to be mean-
ingful, a community needs to have full information about the implications of
providing consent before it decides whether and how to negotiate.
CASE STUDY 6. SHAPING NEGOTIATION TOOLS:
A marine bioprospecting agreement in Fiji
One of the features distinguishing the British colonization of Fiji was the decision
to reserve a large proportion of the land for indigenous Fijians, with the provision
that the land not be sold or otherwise permanently alienated. Today, 83 per cent of
the land in Fiji is communally owned by indigenous Fijians. Ownership of marine
areas, including traditional fishing grounds, is governed by both national and
customary law. The 1990 constitution recognizes indigenous rights over all
resources located in fishing grounds, including the seabed; the state retains the
right to collect royalties on resources extracted from the seabed. Family groups
continue to manage lands in their territories, and often that control extends as far
into the sea as local boats can go. Traditional authority is respected, and
government is perceived as protecting traditional rights. It consults with chiefs on
fishing licences and other resource use permits, and outsiders pay compensation to
mataqali (land owning family groups) for local uses. The intensification of
resource use by industries such as coral mining, logging and mining, and by a
growing human population, has posed an increasing threat to both marine and
forest biodiversity.
Since its founding in 1968, the chemistry department at the University of the
South Pacific (USP) has been doing research on the isolation of natural products
from plants used for medicinal purposes in Fiji. In the early 1990s, the department
decided to expand into the marine area and to upgrade its facilities to add value to
local samples. In 1995, USP reached agreement with the Biodiversity
Conservation Network of the World Wildlife Fund (now the WWF) for funding
of a bioprospecting research project with the understanding that the project would
not only advance scientific knowledge but also promote community development
and community-based conservation, adhering to CBD principles and
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emphasizing best practices for benefit sharing with communities. The project
would include collection of both marine organisms and plants.
One of the selected source areas was the coastal community of Verata
comprising eight villages with about 1600 people, whose traditional leaders had
expressed concern about overfishing and coral mining. USP sought the support of
Verata at an early stage of the project, holding community meetings to describe its
purposes, encourage community participation in project activities, and make the
link between conservation and community benefits. One of the objectives of the
project was to establish protected areas where gathering would be prohibited,
raising questions in the community about whether benefits from bioprospecting
would adequately compensate for the loss of returns from tabu sites, and how long
it would take to regenerate key species. The promise of benefits in addition to
royalties was a key factor in winning over a community that in the past had
received little or no return from bioprospecting by outsiders.
USP then approached Smith Kline Beecham (SB), a pharmaceutical company
collecting marine samples, which responded positively to the request to extend its
work to Fiji. Although the Fiji government had no policy on bioprospecting, a
forward looking official from the Department of Environment (created specifi-
cally to deal with the implementation of the CBD and Agenda 21) formed a
working group from relevant government ministries to set the parameters for the
project and for bioprospecting in general. The government eventually decided to
take a regulatory role to define the approval process and to ensure that the rights of
communities were protected.
Following national government approval of the project, USP and its NGO
partner, the South Pacific Action Committee for Human Ecology and
Environment (SPACHEE), obtained project approval from the provincial
department for native affairs with jurisdiction over Verata. The next step was to
decide whether there should be a three-way agreement between SB, USP and
Verata or separate contracts between SB and USP and between USP and Verata.
Those in favour of a three-way agreement argued that Verata should be an equal
partner in view of the role of the communities in conservation and as holders of
traditional knowledge. However, legal constraints only allowed SB to make
payments to legally constituted bodies. When SB closed down its natural products
discovery division, USP found a new partner, Glasgow's Strathclyde Institute of
Drug Research (SIDR).
Separate agreements were made between USP and SIDR and between USP and
the community of Verata, in part because of SIDR's reluctance to contract directly
with a community that was not a legal entity. While the USP-SIDR agreement
recognized only the two parties as stakeholders, the draft agreement was put out
for public discussion and suggestions for improvement, which were used where
possible. In addition, the agreement implicitly acknowledged other stakeholders
by requiring USP to obtain prior informed consent from resource owners for
extraction and export of biological samples, and by noting that:
one of the purposes of the agreement is to promote the conservation of bio-
diversity in Fiji by creating incentives for species conservation and to
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provide an equitable share of profits to the people of Fiji. In collecting
extracts, cultural and ecological values will be respected.
The agreement between USP and Verata contained detailed procedures for prior
informed consent by the community for any research activity. Applicants would be
required to provide information on: all parties participating in the research and
funding sources; the kind and amount of materials to be taken; the type and
purpose of research; and the conservation status of species to be collected. In
addition, USP agreed to involve the community in all phases of contract negotia-
tions and subsequent activity, and to ensure that all draft agreements would be
translated into the Fijian language and distributed to the community for its
consideration. Any new potential commercial activity from an extract was to be
fully discussed with the community at the beginning of research activities. Any
subsequent disputes arising from the agreement were to be settled by the
Permanent Arbitrator in Suva. The requirement for approval by the Paramount
Chief of Verata and the tikina council was expected to reduce the likelihood of
dispute.
The USP-SIDR and USP-Verata contracts did not address the issue of IPRs
attached to ethnobiological knowledge because there was no reliance on tradi-
tional knowledge of marine species.
Benefits to the community covered by the agreement included:
• 100 per cent of the portion of extract licensing fees received by USP during the
period of funding of the project, less the costs of extraction and transportation,
to be held in a community trust (estimated at US$105,000).
• Equitable sharing of any further financial benefits between USP, Verata and the
Fijian government.
• Training for community members in collection and preparation of samples and
methods of biodiversity and socio-economic monitoring.
• Assistance with the development and the management of small, village-based
enterprises.
• Community workshops in resource management and community devel-
opment.
Other potential benefits not in the agreement included establishment of a marine
conservation area and screening of biological compounds for activity against
Pacific region diseases. Both the USP-SIDR and USP-Verata contracts stipulated
that the collection of samples must not adversely affect the natural environment.
In addition, the USP-Verata contract provided for community-based conser-
vation projects to preserve species and habitats. One of these was for protected
areas where extraction was banned to allow the recovery of species of commercial
value. Preliminary biological monitoring indicated a substantial increase in the
population of the kaikoso clam.
The comprehensive workshops subsequently organized in Verata by USP and
SPACHEE led to the development of community action plans and resource
management plans designed to ensure the sustainable commercial and subsistence
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use of renewable natural resources, including their protection and rehabilitation.
Additional workshops provided training in biological monitoring, sample
collection and preparation, and development of a community register of
important plants (Aalbersberg, 1997; Aalbersberg et al, 1997; Columbia
University, 1999; William Aalbersberg, personal communication).
The Fijian agreement illustrates several points that may be useful in planning
future negotiations for access to aquatic genetic resources:
• Agreements with communities can contribute to the subsequent development
of access policies by providing an opportunity to test the requirements for
successful negotiation processes. Although the Fijian government was not
directly involved in the negotiations, these were undertaken with proactive
consultation with several government institutions, including the Department
of Environment, which was created specifically to address the implementation
of the CBD and Agenda 21. This consultation and the bioprospecting
agreement helped in the formulation of Fiji's Sustainable Development Bill,
which deals with access to genetic resources but hasn't been enacted.
• Funding and operational support from institutions or government greatly
enhance the opportunity for successful negotiations. While this may seem
obvious, the fact is that most small communities have neither the financial
resources nor the skills needed to conduct protracted and complicated access
and benefit-sharing negotiations. The agreement might be criticized because of
USP's self-interest as a potential beneficiary of commercial benefits from
discoveries made from collections. However, the agreement would not have
occurred without NGO funding and the involvement of USP as an interme-
diary between the community and pharmaceutical organizations. Nor might it
have occurred had the project team not provided a professional facilitator.
Naturally, some communities may prefer to negotiate directly with collectors
without intermediaries, and governments (or indigenous organizations) could
develop programmes to train communities not only to conduct negotiations
but also to negotiate a wide range of benefits acceptable to all parties. However,
the general trend of emerging access laws is to require foreign collectors to
collaborate with provider country universities or other institutions in negotia-
tions involving communities. Direct negotiations with communities may be
less complicated for collections of broodstock for aquaculture; however, the
potential economic value of collections may also be less, limiting the ability of
the collector to offer substantial or wide-ranging benefits.
• Government policy support for negotiations is crucial. In the Fiji case,
government not only welcomed the project but saw it as an opportunity to
advance its own efforts to develop workable access and benefit-sharing policies.
This contrasts sharply with the situation described in Case Study 2, in which a
Canadian salmon farmer was thwarted from collecting salmon broodstock in
spawning streams or negotiating with indigenous communities because the
fisheries department had not developed policies on community rights to
consultation or on broodstock collection. Both types of policies are funda-
mental to the successful negotiation of agreements by communities.
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• The legal status of a community may inhibit negotiations even when it has
control over resources. In the Fiji project, the community did not have an
opportunity to negotiate prior informed consent for commercial development
by drug companies because it was not party to the agreement between USP and
SIDR. Companies may balk at making agreements with communities that are
not legal entities - that is, 'unorganized' villages as opposed to incorporated
municipalities. Conversely, communities that are not treated as equal partners
in negotiations are likely to have less incentive to consent to access. While some
villages may be content to have their interests represented by municipal govern-
ments, others may be opposed to such an arrangement because it is inconsistent
with traditional forms of government or simply because of distrust between
government recognized municipalities and traditional communities.
• Broad stakeholder support for negotiations is critical. The Fiji project took
great care not only to consult with community leaders but also to hold work-
shops, open to all members of the community, to define the nature and scope of
negotiations. Translation of documents into the local language also helped to
ensure the full involvement and understanding of local people. Especially when
benefits are tied to conservation objectives, it is important that all community
sectors (or stakeholders) are 'on side' to make agreements work.
• Traditional knowledge and IPRs are not necessarily vital components of
successful agreements for access and benefit sharing. While this may seem like
good news for fishing communities without a history of medicinal uses of
aquatic genetic resources, problems are bound to arise. In the first place, the
agreement with Verata was only possible because the national government had
recognized indigenous ownership over lands and marine resources.
Communities that have neither ownership rights nor relevant traditional
knowledge may not have the opportunity to negotiate benefits unless national
legislation permits it.
Chapter 7
Putting Principles into Practice
Artisanal fisherman and his family, Sao Francisco River, Brazil (Photo by Brian Harvey)
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ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING LAWS:
A work in slow progress
We have spent a considerable portion of this book examining the issue of access to
aquatic genetic resources and the sharing of benefits derived from their use. The
question of access and benefit sharing has been front and centre in international
discussions about the trade in biological resources ever since the CBD acknowl-
edged national sovereignty over biological diversity in 1992. Community rights
have entered into the debate insofar as the CBD recognizes the importance of
compensating communities for the contribution their traditional knowledge and
practices may make to both the use of genetic resources and conservation of
biological diversity.
Efforts to attain the lofty ideals of the CBD have hit a wide variety of stumbling
blocks. Progress in the development of access and benefit-sharing laws has been
slow. No developed countries have passed access and benefit-sharing laws (the US
has pointedly declined to ratify the CBD), and developing countries are taking
their time working out the details. This means not only learning from the experi-
ences of early actors such as the Philippines but also determining how to address
the impacts of the TRIPS agreement, which appears to have diminished the rele-
vance of national sovereignty over genetic resources by strengthening the hand of
genetic resources users - notably the corporations that hold the patents on inven-
tions. Meanwhile, there are virtually no examples of actual benefits received by
communities providing genetic resources.
Is access and benefit-sharing theory an emperor with no clothes? The frustration
faced by researchers and the absence of benefits received by communities since the
CBD came into force certainly raise questions about how access policies might
work effectively in the future. The emperor may have very little on at the moment,
but perhaps it s simply a question of taking the time and patience to find the
clothes with the right fit.
Not everyone agrees that access and benefit-sharing laws are good things.
Participants in the Crucible Group, a policy group representing a broad cross-
section of interests, expressed very divided opinions: some commented that such
laws create unrealistic expectations of economic rewards that are at best a long
shot; others argued that well-constructed national access laws can ensure signif-
icant benefit sharing where none existed before and that, even if benefits are
smaller than originally expected, it is still worthwhile to have them in place
(Crucible Group, 2001). Indigenous groups appear to have mixed feelings about
such laws. Some welcome the chance for a greater share of the pie, no matter how
small. Others view access laws as merely a way of avoiding what they see as the real
issue, namely ownership of lands and resources. Whatever their merits, access laws
will increase in number as more and more countries move to meet their commit-
ments under the CBD.
As this study has shown, the implementation of the CBD to date has been char-
acterized by a preoccupation with plant genetic resources issues. As demands for
access to aquatic genetic resources increase, especially in the field of food fish aqua-
culture, it will also become more important to take account of differences between
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plants and fish in the development of access laws. Most importantly, as discussed
in Chapter 2, it will first be necessary to fill significant policy gaps in the
management of aquatic genetic resources and aquatic biodiversity generally.
AQUATIC BIODIVERSITY MANAGEMENT:
Filling policy gaps
The preceding chapters have illustrated several key points about the management
of aquatic biodiversity:
• The world is in the midst of a 'blue revolution' in which aquaculture is grad-
ually catching up to capture fisheries as the primary source of the world's food
fish supplies. The blue revolution is being fuelled by rapid progress in the
science of genetics, with constant new developments in selective breeding and
molecular biology. The blue revolution also includes bioprospecting for a
marine organism that's genetic and chemical make-up hold clues for pharma-
ceutical and industrial applications.
• The genetic diversity of the world's aquatic life is the natural capital on which
the blue revolution depends. An extraordinary range of aquatic species and
subspecies have evolved to adapt to specific and localized habitat requirements.
Scientific understanding of species adaptations will become increasingly
important as the use of aquatic genetic resources expands and is refined. For
example, a fish scientist wanting to develop a farmed salmon strain that is
tolerant of warmer water conditions resulting from climate change might be
able simply to select broodstock from a naturally occurring population -
providing that the stock still exists and its special characteristics have been iden-
tified.
• The biological diversity of aquatic life and the genetic diversity within species
continue to diminish at an alarming rate as a result of human activities. It is
reasonable to assume that many aquatic species become extinct before science is
even aware of their existence (an estimated 95 per cent of oceanic life forms
remain unexplored). Funding for molecular biology is generally far more
readily available than funding for the basic taxonomy that needs to be done in
order to categorize aquatic species and populations. Ironically, the corporate
(and hence academic) incentive to develop new techniques for using genetic
resources far exceeds governmental incentives to promote the discovery and
conservation of new species. The natural capital of the ocean, river, lake and
wetland genetic resources is disappearing even before its magnitude is known.
• Most national aquatic resources policies remain fixated on the maintenance of
current commercial fisheries or development of new ones. National policies on
aquaculture tend to react to public concerns about environmental impacts
rather than adopting a comprehensive and far-sighted approach to protecting
ecosystems while at the same time exploring future opportunities, conserving
the genetic diversity needed for productive and efficient aquaculture, and
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ensuring that access to aquatic genetic resources, when required, will be facili-
tated and appropriately regulated.
• Parties to the CBD have acknowledged that indigenous and local communities
have rights to fair treatment in negotiations for access to genetic resources and
can play an important role in the conservation of aquatic biodiversity. While a
few countries have taken steps to recognize certain rights of indigenous and
local communities to negotiate access, most have been reluctant to address the
issue, especially in light of concerns about impediments to academic and
commercial research.
National policies on access and benefit sharing cannot be developed in a vacuum.
As illustrated in Figure 7.1, effective policies for the management of aquatic
genetic resources and the sustainable management of aquatic ecosystems are
prerequisites for workable policies on access and benefit sharing. These secondary
policy levels are far more developed for the plant than for the aquatic world.
Moreover, plant genetic resources are generally collected from ex situ collections,
while aquatic genetic resources are almost without exception collected from the
wild.
Effective policies for the management of aquatic biological and genetic diversity
depend in turn on a foundation of information (which again lags behind what is
known about plants) and cooperation among policy makers and stakeholders.
Each of the following components will be important in filling the policy gaps:
• Increasing scientific knowledge of the occurrence, distribution and genetic
make-up of aquatic species; aquatic ecosystem relationships; and the human
impacts on aquatic resources.
• Integrating traditional ecological knowledge with scientific research.
• Promoting effective systems for gathering, organizing, and sharing information
about aquatic genetic resources.
• Increasing public and agency awareness about the importance of biological and
genetic diversity, including aquatic genetic diversity, and of policies for
sustainable use.
• Clearly defining and coordinating the responsibilities of government agencies
involved in the management of aquatic resources.
• Ensuring the effective participation of stakeholders, including indigenous and
local communities, in policy making.
Building information and understanding
Scientific knowledge
Without scientific understanding of biodiversity and ecosystem relationships, the
development of aquatic resource management policies is likely to be shaped by the
most influential stakeholders. In the past, the results have been overfishing,
destruction of habitat, and loss of the biological and genetic diversity needed to
sustain human uses of aquatic resources. Recognition of aquatic ecosystems as
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management units is very recent, and a high level of science is needed to support
this management approach. The importance of expanding scientific knowledge to
support policy making is still under-appreciated. The vast majority of aquatic
species, both ocean and freshwater, haven't even been identified yet, and the
impacts of human interventions (and disruptions such as global warming) on
aquatic ecosystems aren't well understood.
The flow of scientific information is anything but guaranteed. Research institu-
tions are struggling for government funding and increasingly must rely on
corporate support. Aquatic resources policies must not only be guided by objective
scientific knowledge, they also need to support its expansion. In particular,
drafters of policies for access to aquatic genetic resources need to ensure that scien-
tific research is encouraged rather than discouraged by regulatory requirements.
Governments can't always wait for scientific certainty before making policy, but
they need to be prepared to amend policy if research results clearly undermine
outdated assumptions on which policy has been based.
Traditional ecological knowledge
Traditional knowledge needs to be considered and incorporated at the outset of
policy making rather than being perceived simply as a resource that is traded for
compensation.
Despite their contradictory approaches to learning, science and traditional
knowledge can complement one another as a foundation for policy making.
Science asks only those questions that can be answered and demands objective,
verifiable proof, not belief. It attempts to reduce complex systems to their basic
elements. Traditional knowledge takes the opposite approach. It sees nature as an
integrated whole and incorporates that view into spiritual belief. Its lessons come
from experience and anecdote, not analysis. The two systems can complement one
another if mutual distrust can be overcome.
Indigenous peoples have become increasingly reluctant to share traditional
knowledge, having seen it so often exploited and misused. Governments need to
work with communities to build the trust needed to include traditional knowledge
in policy making. Avenues for doing so may include strengthening understanding
of cultural differences, ensuring legal protection against the unauthorized misuse
of traditional knowledge, building co-management agreements with indigenous
communities, and further expanding community rights over traditional lands and
resources.
Gathering and collating information
The information needed for policy making goes far beyond the simple accumu-
lation of scientific and traditional knowledge. Policy makers need to have access to
that knowledge in order to identify what information they need and ensure that it
is readily available at the local, national and international levels. Information
systems for aquatic genetic resources are poorly developed. Significant gaps
include assessments of fish stock distribution and abundance; tabulations of
landings for all but the largest commercial fisheries; and searchable registers of
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genetic diversity information. The movement of fish between countries and
through international waters increases the need for international collaboration in
data collection and organization. Recent examples of such collaboration include
the World Fish Center's FishBase database and the Aquatic Animal Diversity
Information System (AADIS) being developed by FAO and World Fisheries Trust.
Such registries need to include traditional knowledge where communities agree to
provide it.
Public and professional awareness
Policies for aquatic resources management are unlikely to succeed without public
awareness and support. People need to understand the reasons for developing a
policy, its likely impact, and the consequences of doing nothing. At a more basic
level, people need to understand the importance of sustaining biological and
genetic diversity and the advantages and disadvantages of alternative management
options. This is especially true for aquatic life because of the limitations of current
scientific knowledge and because of uncertainties and potential conflicts about
new uses of aquatic genetic resources. Tools such as the internet provide policy
makers with an opportunity to increase public awareness. In addition, communi-
cations links enable an increased role for international and intergovernmental
agencies to run public awareness programmes that can ease the way for national
and local policy makers.
Communications with the public need to be clear, concise and free of jargon. As
much as possible, it should also have the appearance of objectivity in order to build
public trust in policy making, especially at a time of public scepticism about gover-
nance. For this reason too, public awareness should focus on informing rather
than 'educating' the public, especially when dealing with controversial issues. It
should also include an interactive component, ensuring ready access to infor-
mation providers for citizens wishing to clarify issues. Finally, the scope of public
awareness programmes should be broad enough to include commercial interests
(eg small and large fisheries and other industries) and government agencies that
may be directly or peripherally involved in policy making.
Professionals within agencies, including those charged with developing policy,
are frequently poorly informed on aquatic issues peripheral to their own responsi-
bility. Because of the interconnectedness of these issues, such a situation can
cripple attempts at policy, and needs to be addressed through briefings within and
between agencies and through greater contact with stakeholders.
Cooperative approaches to policy making
Agency coordination
Historically, government agencies have been defined by their responsibility for
separate resources (agriculture, mining, forestry, fisheries), each operating in an
insular manner. Both fisheries and aquaculture are often subsumed under larger
departments such as agriculture, and agencies combined within a fisheries
department may work at cross purposes or without integrated strategic plans. The
PUTTING PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE 207
need to address sustainable development issues has created complexities that
require greater cooperation among existing resource agencies as well as the
involvement of other agencies such as those that oversee municipal and indigenous
affairs, environmental protection and marine protected areas, agriculture, forestry,
water resources, and economic development.
The effectiveness of aquatic resources policies has too frequently been under-
mined by turf wars, lack of communication, and indecision over resource conflicts
(eg between aquaculture and commercial fisheries, fisheries and forestry/mining,
community and commercial fisheries). Governments need to take a stronger
approach to promoting cooperation among all relevant agencies in the devel-
opment, implementation and enforcement of aquatic resource policies, with
clearly defined agency responsibilities at each level.
Stakeholder participation
The stability of policies is directly related to the extent of public 'buy in'. Clear and
complete information is the first step towards building public support. In
addition, policy makers need to anticipate and address the interests of the multiple
stakeholders likely to be affected. In democratic societies, governments delegate
decision-making authority to policy makers, and policies need to reflect the
direction taken by government. However, 'public input' is not a token exercise. It
not only provides a pool of information needed for sound decision-making but
can also ensure to the greatest extent possible the fulfilment of apparently
competing needs. Sustainable management policies based on inadequate consul-
tation or heavily favouring individual sectors are unlikely to have long-term
success. Moreover, as many governments are in the process of devolving
management responsibilities to stakeholder partnerships (public and private
sectors, NGOs, community fisheries organizations), intensive participation is
required not only to shape government policies but also to work out the details of
cooperative management. The very real risks of devolution, including a lowering
of technical competence, loss of corporate memory, and loss of long-term funding
need also to be recognized.
The list of stakeholders may include indigenous and local community fisheries,
commercial fish farming and capture industries, sport fisheries, tourism, other
industries such as forestry and agriculture, municipal governments, NGOs, and
affected government agencies. Policy makers should, as much as possible, involve
stakeholders directly in the policy making process through a cooperative and
inclusive approach. The degree of involvement of indigenous and local commu-
nities should reflect the extent to which policies are likely to affect them. The
benefits of stable and well-informed policies will almost certainly outweigh the
costs of managing participation, and these costs are likely to diminish as effective
participation mechanisms (including mediation where necessary) are fine-tuned.
Effective stakeholder participation is equally important at all policy levels,
whether they relate to the management of aquatic biodiversity, uses of aquatic
genetic resources, or access to genetic resources and the equitable sharing of
benefits derived from their uses.
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THE FOUR 'POLICY PILLARS' OF ABS LEGISLATION
The previous section describes the need for greater emphasis on the basic compo-
nents needed for the development of aquatic resources policies. This section
provides an overview of the policy levels needed to support access and benefit-
sharing legislation that works for aquatic resources, illustrated by Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1 The policy foundation for access and benefit-sharing legislation
Pillar One: Management at the ecosystem level
Life was simpler for policy makers when fisheries management largely meant
setting quotas and size limits. Today, policies for sustainable management of
aquatic ecosystems need to follow a continuum of conservation and sustainable
use, and policy makers' decisions are mightily complicated by changing scientific
information, uncertainties about what makes ecosystems work and how human
uses and natural events affect them, demands created by new uses of biological and
genetic resources, increasing stakeholder conflicts, limited budgets and even
climate change.
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A coordinated approach to aquatic biodiversity management policies needs to
take into consideration many factors that may not have been considered relevant
to the development of earlier fisheries policies. The following are examples:
• Completeness of reliable information (science, traditional knowledge, stake-
holder input).
• Integration of strategies for the conservation of aquatic biodiversity and wild
fish populations (eg fish quotas, marine protected areas, habitat protection and
restoration).
• Ecosystem relationships supporting not only commercially valuable fisheries
but also those with potential commercial value, and the species in the food
chain they depend on.
• Adherence to the precautionary principle of ecosystem management.
• Coordination of capture fishery and food fish aquaculture policies, addressing
environmental and socio-economic impacts of each.
• Environmental effects of transgenic organisms, and introductions and
transfers.
• Climate change and its effects on aquatic species.
• Land and access rights of indigenous peoples and their roles in ecosystem
management.
• Promotion of community, small-scale fisheries, linking rights to use with
responsibilities for conservation.
• Support for independent fish certification systems (such as MSC and Marine
Aquarium Council) that apply objective standards to local operations and
follow the chain of custody from original provider to end consumer.
• International cooperation in policy development and compliance with interna-
tional agreements promoting conservation and sustainable use.
Pillar Two: Management of aquatic resources at the genetic
level
All biological resources contain the functional units of heredity in every cell. The
practical difference between aquatic biological resources and aquatic genetic
resources lies in the manner in which they're used. New uses are proliferating in
enhancement of farmed fish, the development of drugs and industrial products,
and transfer of genes between unrelated species. Commercial uses for microbes
from marine hydrothermal vents may be next.
Uses of aquatic genetic resources raise formidable social and environmental
issues that need to be addressed. What are the implications of approving trans-
plants of fish genes into a strawberry or of insect genes into a fish? Who owns or
controls or even knows about material in a fish gene bank, and should there be any
limitations on its use? If Florida ornamental fish breeders learn to culture new
strains of cardinal tetra, what are the social and policy implications in the US and
Brazil if the market for Rio Negro capture fisheries is wiped out? A few years ago,
these applications of aquatic genetic resources would have been considered barely
within the bounds of possibility; now each is a reality.
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Governments need a set of policies specific to the management of aquatic
genetic resources. Such species-specific policies are already well developed in the
plant world. Policy makers on the aquatic side cannot afford to lag behind, because
genetic uses are expanding quickly and bring with them complex social and envi-
ronmental issues. Too often, governments have been too slow to act (eg policies on
gene banking) or have jumped the gun (eg policies supporting net pen aquaculture
without sufficient scientific information). A measured approach to policy making
is needed not just for uses of aquatic genetic resources but also for their movement
and handling. Under what conditions should transfers between watersheds and
introductions of exotic species be permitted? Where should collectors be
permitted to collect broodstock or other genetic material, and in what amounts?
Finally, governments need to address the thorny question of IPRs such as
patents on fish genes. Whose property is a Super Salmon or Super Tilapia, and
what rights does the owner have to protect it?
Pillar Three: Access and benefit sharing
Access and benefit-sharing policies cannot function in a vacuum. Collectors of
aquatic genetic resources need clarity about whether the uses they propose will be
permitted or can proceed without undue delay. One use of aquatic genetic
resources might contribute positively to the sustainable management of aquatic
biodiversity, another might have negative impacts - but the ground-rules need to
be known. Collectors also need to know the rules for the handling and movement
of genetic materials. Provider countries and communities have an interest in
ensuring that benefits arising from access agreements contribute to sustainable
ecosystem management and stable community economies. Sound policies for the
management of aquatic biodiversity can be an important tool in the creation of
sustainable fishing livelihoods and in decisions about appropriate transfer of tech-
nologies.
In addition to its access and benefit-sharing provisions, CBD lays the
groundwork for national action in the development of policies on the
management of aquatic biological diversity at the ecosystem and genetic levels.
While both these levels of policy provide a foundation for access and benefit-
sharing policy, all three levels are interdependent. For example, a primary purpose
of access and benefit-sharing legislation is to contribute to sound biodiversity
management and use of genetic resources. Unfortunately, national reports from
CBD Parties, in sections dealing with aquatics, do not give a high priority to the
development of access and benefit-sharing legislation.
Pillar Four: Enforcement
Access and benefit-sharing legislation is only as effective as the enforcement
measures that accompany it, and the vast geographic scope of aquatic biodiversity
means that enforcement is no easy matter. A variety of agencies may be involved in
the administration of access and benefit-sharing legislation, and their efforts need
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to be clearly coordinated. Agencies' resources may be stretched by competing
priorities.
Government needs to express its commitment to the effective functioning of
access and benefit-sharing legislation. It needs to ensure that accompanying regu-
lations are in place, clearly designate lead agencies and their responsibilities, and
ensure that they have adequate resources to do the job. Efforts need to be made to
ensure effective coordination not just among national agencies (or between them,
when aquatic biodiversity crosses international boundaries) but also with their
regional subsidiaries and with public sector groups that may be able to contribute
to enforcement mechanisms. In addition, some countries may need to take steps
to discourage bribery of local officials.
A CHECKLIST FOR DESIGNING ACCESS AND
BENEFIT-SHARING POLICIES
National level
Access and benefit-sharing policies
• Ensure effective participation of stakeholders, including indigenous and local
communities, in the development of ABS laws and policies.
• Clearly define aquatic genetic resources.
• Clearly define circumstances in which communities have the right to prior
informed consent.
• Where relevant, clearly define the meaning of traditional knowledge associated
with the use of genetic resources.
• Provide support for documentation of traditional fisheries knowledge.
• Clearly distinguish between requirements for commercial and academic users.
• Provide institutional support to build the capacity of communities to negotiate
access agreements.
• Provide institutional support for benefit-sharing agreements, with a focus on
sustainable livelihoods.
• Support development of international conflict resolution mechanism to resolve
issues of equity in contractual agreements.
Community rights
• Develop sui generis policies for the protection of indigenous and local
community rights.
• Address the question of indigenous rights to lands, waters, and control over
aquatic genetic resources.
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Uses of aquatic genetic resources
• Develop biosafety and transfer policies specific to aquatic genetic resources.
• Develop policies governing ex situ collections (gene banks).
• Develop policies governing food fish aquaculture, ornamental aquaculture and
bioprospecting.
Community level
• Develop policies on ownership and control of aquatic genetic resources, co-
management, and/or sui generis systems for protection of community resource
and knowledge rights.
• Develop practical strategies and capabilities for co-management of aquatic
genetic resources.
• Document traditional knowledge of aquatic genetic resources.
• Build capacity for participating in development of national/regional policies for
biodiversity management, sustainable uses, and access and benefit sharing.
• Build capacity for negotiation of access agreements.
• Determine under what conditions and for what purposes consent for access to
aquatic genetic resources will be provided.
• Determine information required from researchers regarding funding sources
and their obligations to those sources.
• Analyse options for monetary and non-monetary benefits and their usefulness
to fishing communities.
• Develop networks with other communities (including fisheries councils) and
civil society organizations for development of consistent community policies.
Countries receiving genetic resources
• Direct a portion of foreign aid to building community capacity for negotiation
of access agreements and for crafting of practical non-monetary benefits (eg
low-tech sustainable fisheries livelihoods); support efforts of international
development organizations to do the same.
• Promote industry and public awareness of independent certification systems
applicable to access to aquatic genetic resources (eg MSC, MAC).
• Ensure that patent laws require declaration of origin of aquatic genetic
resources and associated knowledge leading to inventions.
• Ensure that policies for aquaculture of exotic species take into account equi-
table sharing of benefits with source countries and communities and impacts
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Clarissa Marte, Head of Research Division, Aquaculture Department,
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center; Mudjekeewis Santos, fishery
biologist, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, Department of
Agriculture; and Julita Ungson, Technical Consultant for Fisheries,
Department of Agriculture; Ephraim Batungbacal, Coordinator, Anti-
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Resources, Their By-Products and Derivatives, for Scientific and Commercial
Purposes and for Other Purposes'.
4 Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department
Administrative Order No. 96-20: 'Implementing Rules and Regulations on the
Prospecting of Biological and Genetic Resources', 1996.
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